The article lays out a hypothesis that the global order slides into a new bipolarity in the context of the escalating geo-economic and geopolitical confrontation between the two poles that currently dominate the world - the United States and China. The neo-bipolar construction cannot yet be regarded as an established new world order, but the general movement of the world economy and international relations in this direction is obvious. The neo-bipolar bipolar confrontation manifest itself with varying intensity in different regions of the world. The author argues that at present the peripheral regions which are strategically important for the prospects of competition are becoming an important testing ground for relatively “safe” elaboration of methods and tactics of geo-economic rivalry and h mutual exchange of systemic attacks. Today, Africa has become practically the leading theater of the new bipolar confrontation. The article analyzes the economic, military and strategic aspects of the rivalry between the United States and China on the African continent. It provides a comparative analysis of the new African strategies of the two superpowers adopted at the end of 2018. The author asserts that in the context of the emerging global bipolarity, the strategies of the USA and China represent antagonistic programs based on fundamentally different initial messages. In the case of the US strategy, this is to deter by denial the spread of the competitor’s influence using tough policies, including forceful (while not necessarily military) confrontational actions. While China seeks to neutralize the opposition of the United States and its allies to Beijing’s expansion on the continent and to win the freedom of interaction with any partners in Africa causing minimal direct confrontation possible. Therefore, despite the seemingly “peripheral” importance of the confrontation on the continent, for the establishment of a neo-bipolar world order, the proclamation of the new US regional geopolitical strategy, which focuses on the containment of China in the name of protecting democracy and independence, can serve not only for Africa, but for the whole planet the same milestone signal as Churchill’s Fulton speech for the final advent of bipolarity in the postwar world.

The paper traces the evolution of conceptual approaches to South-South economic cooperation. It is shown that with the collapse of the bipolar system and the rise of globalization the interest in South-South cooperation have risen again, and compared to the 1950–1970-ies focuses more on economic relations of developing countries. At the same time, the article shows that the deepening differentiation of the countries of the global South allows us to consider the South-South dialogue as ambiguous process. According to the author, this is a set of relations of very different level of interaction between developing countries, which are part of a more fundamental process of transformation of the existing “Westcentric” world order. The paper identifies four such levels, characterized by very different opportunities for participating in economic ties between developing countries: relations of major countries of the South with each other (especially in BRICS and IBSA groups); the interaction of the largest countries with other developing countries (most known for the cooperation in the framework of “One belt, one road” Chinese initiative); intensive contacts of countries of the global South due to the objectively existing neighborhood effect (the most famous integration groupings are ASEAN in Southeast Asia and MERCOSUR in Latin America); and cross-border ties of small developing countries geographically distant from each other. The paper concludes that South-South cooperation cannot be a full-fledged alternative to other global economic ties. Indeed, countries of the global North dominate in many areas and more often still offer mutually beneficial cooperation to developing countries, so that isolation from the global North is akin to autarky. South-South cooperation should be viewed primarily as a way to develop additional forms of interaction different from that dominant in the contemporary world, prescribed mainly taking into account the views of several leading economic powers. Thus, it is correct to speak of South- non-West cooperation, referring to rather developed countries that are not able to build relations with the US and key EU countries (e.g. Russia). 

This article explores how, in the quest for new global order, global governance might acquire greater sociological legitimacy. What are the sources of legitimacy in global governance? In other words, what conditions generate confidence and trust in global-scale authorities? To explore this question, the article first elaborates on the general concept of legitimacy as it relates to global regulation. Thereafter the discussion considers, under three main headings, a broad range of possible drivers of legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis global governance. First, some of these sources are institutional, relating to features of the global regulatory organisations, such as their procedural inputs and their performance outputs. Second, other sources of legitimacy are individual, relating to the characteristics of the subjects of global governance, such as their identity orientations and their levels of social trust. Third, further sources of legitimacy in global governance are societal, relating to the general ordering patterns of world politics, such as prevailing norms, capitalism, and a hegemonic state. The article concludes by urging that researchers break from past habits of treating institutional, individual and societal sources of legitimacy separately and in isolation from each other. Instead, legitimacy in global governance can be more fully understood – and more effectively promoted in practice – if one examines these various forces together, and in terms of their mutual constitution.

Currently, international relations and the global order are in turmoil and disorder. The bases of the international order and the means by which it was regulated are in the process of being dismantled, such as the central considerations of the Treaty of Westphalia that guided international politics and diplomacy for centuries. As the world becomes increasingly polarised into different opposing and competing geopolitical camps, the question needs to be asked, why is this happening? The answer seems to lie, at least in part, in a rapidly evolving and changing system of global political hegemony, where liberal democracy is on the wane. This is also further influenced by the declining economic and military power of the West, where the US is still the unipolar hegemony, but is declining in its hard power and ability to manage/control international affairs as it was able to do in the 1990s (such as the First Gulf War in 1990–91 and Kosovo in 1999). This paper analyses the rise and decline of the West, and the international consequences and results. A conclusion of this paper, although the West is significantly weakened in terms of its political, military and economic power, it is trying to stave off its decline. Therefore, the ‘New Cold War’ is an important element in this strategy as a means to try and unite a divided and wary domestic audience by attempting to invoke the spectre of a foreign ‘threat’ and to do this through the concept of a crisis. A crisis represents an extraordinary situation, which if accepted, becomes the basis for applying extraordinary measures to ‘rescue’ the public from the hazard. It is a means to try and bargain the public’s freedom for their sense of security.

The old international order created under the auspices of American hegemony in the aftermath of World War 2 appears to be unravelling. In part, this is a consequence of a redistribution of material power in the international system as other powers - especially China – seek to play a more prominent role. In part, however, it is a consequence of the actions of the Trump administration and its privileging of ‘America first’. Consequently, urgent challenges such as dealing with climate change, which seem to necessitate international cooperation, are likely to get worse and even more difficult to address. This paper details and analyses the range of ‘structural’ and agential forces that have collectively shaped the contemporary international order, but which are under increasing stress. Some of these factors— the relative of decline of the US, ‘the rise of the rest’, the persistence of authoritarianism— are familiar features of long-run historical change. What makes them significant in our time, I argue, is their potential to impede much needed international cooperation to address unambiguously collective challenges. Consequently, the new international disorder, threatens nothing less than the end of order of any sort—or any sort one might want to live under, at least.

The paper is devoted to the study of Russia’s export specialization in the countries of Africa in the period from 2001 to 2017. A comprehensive analysis of the dynamics, the commodity and geographical structure of Russian exports to the African continent has been carried out. Using bilateral trade data for product groups at the level of two digits of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), this study examines the main patterns of comparative advantage in Russia’s trade with the countries of the region in the early 21st century. Based on the calculation results of the bilateral revealed comparative advantage index (RCA), authors identified a group of Russia’s trade partners in Africa, characterized by the largest number of export specialization product groups: Algeria, Angola, Guinea, Egypt, South Africa. Comparative analysis of Russia’s export specialization in Africa with the main partners in terms of trade turnover indicates, that Russia has more diverse comparative advantages in trade with some African countries (17 product groups), than with European ones, such as Germany (9 product groups) and Netherlands (8 groups). The study shows that Russia has export specialization in the following main product groups in African countries: HS 84 ‘Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof ’, HS 85‘Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof ’, HS 87 ‘Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof ’, HS 48‘Paper and paperboard’ and HS 10‘Cereals’. The authors revealed, that the intensity of Russia’s export specialization in African countries increases with the augmentation of the technical complexity of products exported. It proves that Russian industrial products have competitive advantages in the African market. The development and strengthening of economic cooperation with Africa is one of the most important direction of non-commodity and non-energy exports expansion and geographical diversification of Russian trade. The paper concludes by discussing the promising avenues for the future Russian-African export partnership.

Latin American countries were not a part of the earlier draft of the route map of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Through efforts of both sides, starting from the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017, Latin America has become an indispensable and important participant of the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. In view of the differences in history and objective circumstances between China and Latin America in terms of histories, cultures, current economic states and development needs etc., policy coordination plays a fundamental role in the China-Latin America cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road initiative. This article explores the four aspects of policy coordination in the BRI context, namely historical background, philosophy, principle and objective. The article notes that the weight of the US, EU and Japan in the global economy is decreasing, and the number of contradictions in the national economies of these countries, on the contrary, is growing. At the same time, the aggregate economic weight of developing countries is increasing. This new paradigm of development of the world economy gives a chance to developing countries, namely China and Latin America, to deepen economic cooperation. China has already become the second largest trading partner and the third largest source of investment for Latin American countries. China also proposes a solution based on its own Chinese experience, which will allow countries from Latin America to further accelerate their economic growth through infrastructure cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. The basic principles of such cooperation are win-win cooperation, shared growth through discussion and collaboration and the essence of policy coordination, etc. It is believed that, on the premise of a high degree of consensus achieved through policy coordination, both China and Latin America will achieve sustainable and efficient cooperation and development under the framework of the Belt and Road initiative.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the consequences of the referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union. The causes that contributed to the radical transformation of political processes and crisis phenomena in the framework of European integration processes are revealed. It is noted that the crisis of the British model of democracy and the rise of “monitoring democracy”, as well as the constitutional reforms in the UK, which were not brought to a logical conclusion, influenced the effectiveness of political institutions. The range of new complex issues of constitutional, legal, financial, economic, social and humanitarian nature that need to be addressed in the context of brexit is determined.
The features of the development and implementation of the strategies of the United Kingdom and the European Union on the negotiation process are considered. The most important stages of negotiations on the problem of developing an agreement defining the conditions and principles of relations between the parties in the post-brexit period are studied. Particular attention is paid to the key controversial issues - the implementation of the financial obligations of the United Kingdom to the EU, guarantees the rights of EU citizens and their families living in the UK, as well as the preservation of the free movement of people, goods, services and capital between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
The author analyzes internal and external factors that have a direct impact on the course of the dialogue, arguments and counter-arguments of the parties, the reasons for the change in the positions of the United Kingdom and EU leaders on key issues of cooperation in the new historical conditions. There is a deep split between British society and the main political forces of the country on the issue of withdrawal from the EU. The factors that led the UK to a serious political crisis and the inability to develop an adequate and effective brexit strategy are considered.

In this paper, we first attempt to track post-WWII shifts in the balance of power between a number of big powers in the international system. By relying on a number of possible proxies for power in the international arena, we argue that what the international system is going through today is not a relatively indiscriminate diffusion of power from the centre towards the periphery, but a marked rise of China that seems to have left the rest of the “emerging world” behind. We then delve deeper into the foreign policies of the US and China, the two main powers in this seemingly neo-bipolar system. We find that risks of confrontation are rising. On the one hand, this is related to the US’s continued preference for a strategy bent on “primacy”, rather than on strategic restraint. On the other hand, Beijing’s foreign policy is growing increasingly assertive, and does not hide anymore within the rhetoric of the “peaceful rise”. We conclude by showing that this shift in international power, coupled by the grand strategies preferred by China and the US, are imperilling the fragile scaffolding of global governance. The risk is that, rather than leading us towards a new but sustainable global order, the transition will only lead us backwards: to a world in which rules are less confidently upholded, and where the logic of the balance of power and of arms races further gains momentum.

Three alternative world orders can be imagined in the post-World War II international relations. During most of the Cold War a bipolar order, centered on the possession of nuclear weapons, existed. This world order was incomplete, however. The United States and the Soviet Union faced each other with equal capacity to destroy each other, but in terms of economic and global influence the United States was superior. The strengthening of economic and technological dynamics increased further the U.S. influence, but also sparked the power of non-states actors, including transnational corporations and banks, independent of states. Simultaneously with the globalization of the world, one could witness the rise of non-state actors in the military and political fields. The emergence of the world order of the third type has sometimes been called the neomedieval world in which some central tenets of feudalism has re-emerged. None of these world order models can be said to dominate in today’s world and none of them is likely to emerge victorious any time soon. In recent times., globalization has suffered from various setbacks and state-centric relations have reemerged. Their focus is not, however, any more on the military competition between the United States and Russia, although some of its elements remain in the arms competition between them. Globalization has brought in new ingredients in the rivalries between states and it has appeared most visibly in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry for economic and technological dominance of the globalized world economy. In other words, a new type of economic bipolarity is winning ground and is only secondarily manifesting itself in military relations. Patterns of warfare has in recent decades been colored by fighting of non-state military forces and the rise of new feudal patterns of behavior, but they have not been pronounced enough to justify the labeling of the entire world order by the name.

Over the past few years, American military policy in Europe has changed qualitatively. Official Washington was forced to recognize the strengthening of Russian military power and the need to reconsider the role of the European command as a rear, designed to ensure the actions of the Central and African command. Of particular concern to the Pentagon is the Russian potential in areas such as air defense, long-range artillery, anti-tank ammunition and electronic warfare. The United States believes that over the past decade there has been a marked improvement in the quality of Russian troops, their combat readiness and  equipment. Under these conditions, the American armed forces are losing their once undeniable and absolute superiority in Eastern Europe. The Americans had to once again increase the number of their armed forces on the European continent (though on the basis of rotation), increase allocations for “deterring Russia” and persistently demand from their European allies to increase defense budgets. Official
Washington does not exclude the possibility of a large-scale military conflict with Russia in Europe. The new US Nuclear Policy Review of 2018 states that the Russian Federation is ready for the first use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Trump’s administration is configured negatively to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it considered ineffective and is allegedly used by some United States trading partners to achieve trade and political objectives contrary to American interests. Some American claims to the WTO, at least partially, are shared by other members of the organization. The process of improving international trade rules is clearly not keeping up with the pace of change in the world. Signs of the WTO erosion are evident in advocating increased use of trade policy instruments outside the organization under the pretext of protecting national interests and national security, the introduction of new trade sanctions and other restrictive measures, the crisis of the system for the settlement of trade disputes. The absence of multilaterally agreed arrangements on the reform of the WTO encourages the Trump Administration to act unilaterally. The United States stated their right to apply the restrictive measures against the WTO members under the pretext of protecting national security, insisting on the need for a selective approach to decisions taken not in their favor, probe to eradicate undesirable for this country most favored nation trade regime (MFN), and accentuate the flaws of multilateralism in trade negotiations. Against this backdrop, the Trump Administration announced its willingness “to lead the international efforts” for the reformatting of the WTO with a view to restoring its sole political leadership in the organization. However, aggressive, reckless and uncoordinated with the partners of the United States actions untie hands to other countries to protect their own interests, both within the legal framework of the WTO and beyond, making the risks of returning to the priority of force factor on the principle of “everyone for himself ”. The future of the multilateral trading system, the scope and depth of these reforms will largely be determined by the coherence or uncoordinated actions of key players - the United States, China and the EU. While the contribution of other countries, including Russia, could also be significant. The priorities will be the prevention of further escalation of trade conflicts and preparation of the conditions for a new round of trade negotiations.