The paper focuses on the widespread presupposition about a possibility for the developing countries beyond the East Asian region to follow the development path of the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of East and Southeast Asia known as ‘tigers’. The author underlines that the ‘tigers’ success story was the effect of fortune combination of the external and internal factors of fast modernisation of the countries under scrutiny. The subject of the given paper is a set of the external factors of the East Asian ‘miracle’.
In the author’s opinion, there were three main external factors of successful development in the East Asian NICs. Firstly, there was a strong influence of cold war in the region. Since the early‑1960s the rivalry between the USSR and USA was here ‘supplemented’ by pretensions of the Maoist China to the role of ‘torch’ for the poor and wretched peoples of Asia. Thus, there was the specific triangle of foreign forces that operated in the region. The US ruling circles conceived that the best way to ‘the containment of communism’ was to create a show case of ‘good capitalism’: to eradicate mass poverty, to build contemporary effective economy, to open the channels of vertical social mobility for youth, and, thereby, to erode the social soil for the Leftist ideas.
Secondly, the business and political leaders of the considerable countries understood a necessity to modernise their economies. The local elites, being in vassal dependency on the American protection, were obliged to follow the path of development that corresponded mostly to the interests of US. This circumstance determined, to a big degree, a choice of the outward‑looking industrialisation.
Thirdly, the export‑oriented industrialisation in East Asia coincided with profound structural changes in Western economies. The NICs could occupy niches at the internal markets of industrial countries, exporting their manufactured goods to the West. It provided the growth of incomes for further accumulation. The neoconservatism in politics and neoliberalism in economics in the West helped to the East Asian ‘tigers’ to carry out their modernisation.
Since the called external factors of East Asian ‘miracle’ do not recently exist in other developing regions, the author comes to conclusion that none of these regions can repeat the success story of the Asian NICs.

The article discusses strategic intentions and practical actions of modern Chinese leadership aimed to make China a “great maritime power”. The authors analyze theoretical investigations of Chinese scientists in the fields of maritime strategy and politics; examine basic principle of contemporary Chinese maritime policy, Beijing strategic documents and specific plans aimed at developing marine activities, as well as the problems that arise on this way and some practical results achieved. The authors conclude that despite an active “sea rhetoric” of Chinese top leaderships, the global ocean is not in the main focus of Chinese politics which is primarily oriented towards Eurasian continent. For the PRC leadership, “turning China into a great sea power” neither an ultimate goal, nor a path to achieve the world hegemony, but one of the means to solve some goals to support country’s economic and social development. Today main efforts of Chinese maritime policy are aimed at the ocean studies, legal and technical preparation for excavation of deepwater resources, marine environmental protection, upholding the sea rights and interests of China. As far as Beijing considers the “near seas” as “vital” for ensuring China economic and military‑political security, it acts in their space offensively, actively and uncompromisingly. However, although China’s maritime policy focuses mainly on achieving the economic goals, for the past decade the country’s maritime economy has developed at a slower pace than the country’s economy as a whole. The authors conclude that China has a lot to do in order to effectively use not only its own sea space, but also the vast resources of the global oceans to realize the ambitious goals and objectives of the country’s development.

The article is devoted to the analysis of Indian approaches to maritime spaces and the evolution of perception of the regional space by the Indian expert and political community. The author points out sub‑imperial stage, when India was seen as the dominant force in the region and the center of the sub‑empire inside the British Empire; the period of the Cold War, when India focused on strengthening its position in the international arena by building ties with African and Middle Eastern countries, while paying attention to maintaining the status quo in South Asia; and the period after the end of the Cold War, when India rethought its strategic priorities and developed original approach to the division of the regional space. The author offers his own version of the division of the space of the Indo‑Pacific region, based on the approach of the Indian scientist K.R. Singh, who proposed at one time the spatial division of the Indian Ocean region; this option allows to take into account the difference in the attitude of Indian political elites to various subregions and highlight the reasons why this difference arose.

The beginning of the new decade in 2020 has brought a combination of seemingly dramatic events across the world. We have focused on China and its economic role in Asia under new realities of trade war from Donald Tramp, coronavirus outbreak and de‑globalization, which started after global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008‑09. De‑globalization is understood as a steady decline of the role of exogenous factors in economic development, which has been observed globally and even more clearly in China in 2010‑19.
De‑globalization is also understood as a process of regionalization forming more intensive and cooperative links with neighboring countries and territories. The China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may be viewed as a de‑globalization source providing self‑consolidation of national states in Asia – to build a more friendly and productive environment for the future of the continent. In this sense BRI may be assessed as a project opposite to liberal globalization –poor in results both economic and social.
Thus, today’s crises are a good test for China’s cooperation with its neighbors, ideas of collective self‑reliance, South‑South consolidation and leading role of national states in economic modernization: ideas which were popular before arrival of liberal globalization in the 1980‑90’s. Globally that may mean restoration of UN documents and projects on economic rights and duties of states, code of behavior for TNC etc.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the specific role of joint ventures and other strategic alliances in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) carried out by Chinese Multinationals Corporations in Central Africa. After exploring the extent to which the use of Sino‑Western joint ventures has helped Chinese firms to improve their technical and managerial skills both in domestic and foreign markets, the focus shifts to Central African countries members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The result is that joint ventures have become a major vehicle for Chinese multinationals firms to channel FDI, thus supporting the hypothesis that in the region under study this strategy allows them to guarantee the supply of raw materials (oil and mining products: copper, cobalt, gold, diamond,..), as part of a “package deals” linking FDI, Chinese Aid and Trade, also known as “Angolan model”; to conquer foreign markets (for technology and manufactured goods “Made in China”) and; to a lesser extent, to acquire strategic assets (brands, technological innovation, managerial skills).The commitment of Chinese stateowned MNCs through the “package deals” appears to be the keystone of stability and sustainability of Chinese FDI in Central Africa and in the continent In conclusion, the expectation is that the flow of Chinese FDI to Central Africa, should contribute to the process of sustainable development in recipient countries, provided that adequate political and economic governance is guaranteed. A pre‑requisite is to achieve institutional change, from a rent‑seeking to a developmental behavior at the state level, the result being an enhanced capacity to promote engineering potential, through the strengthening of human capital, and to negotiate transfer of technology and know‑how, with emerging countries partners, especially BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)

In 2013 the People’s Republic of China has entered the second stage of foreign economic openness. If at the first stage, which started in the late 1970s as an integral part of the overall reform policy, China focused primarily on attracting foreign equipment and technologies, knowledge, and capital, at the new stage, the sending abroad Chinese capital, goods, services, and technologies becomes at least an equal task. One of the most important elements of this stage is the creation of experimental free trade zones (EFTZ), designed to help China master the most advanced world rules and regulations for conducting trade, investment activities, and international financial transactions.
The first such zone was created in 2013 in Shanghai. At the very end of 2014, EFTZ were established in Tianjin, Fujian and Guangdong. This event was followed by the creation of zones in 7 more provinces of the PRC (5 of which are in the inner and Western regions of the country). In 2018, Hainan island was declared a free trade zone, and in the summer of 2019 EFTZ were established in six other regions of China.
China’s experimental free trade zones have been in existence for more than six years. They have accumulated a variety of operational experience, which is also being implemented in national practice and is partially reflected in this article.
The article focuses on the Shanghai EFTZ. The article shows changes in its format and describes features of zone’s development at the initial stage of 2013‑2015, in the dynamic period of 2016‑2017 and in the context of complex external economic conditions (2018‑2019). This text was prepared on the basis of original Chinese‑language sources, including official statistical materials of Shanghai. Useful information was also obtained during a visit to the Shanghai EFTZ in April 2019, organized with the assistance of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Shanghai.

The article analyzes the basis of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy at the present stage. The main attention is paid to the documentary substantiation of foreign policy, political and legal bases of foreign policy strategy, and key organizations in this area. There is analysis of the most significant areas of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. It is noted that the Republic is trying to find a new balance in the region and the world, pragmatically maintaining contacts with the main players in the region – Russia, the United States, Turkey and Iran.
Moreover, in foreign policy documents of Baku, special emphasis is placed on cooperation with the West, in particular, there is a strengthening not only in the framework of doctrinal cooperation with NATO and the EU, but also constant contacts on all political, economic and military lines. In addition, the leadership of Azerbaijan pays special attention to the problem of Nagorno‑Karabakh. The article also shows that the fundamental documents that determine the external state agenda, although they are sufficiently Westernoriented, at the same time reflect the ambition of Azerbaijan in the context of becoming a regional center of power. This process is also influenced by external actors, in particular the Republic of Turkey. It was determined that the territorial issue, logistic and military issues, regional and global political trends are indicators, thanks to which one can observe the transformation of the foreign policy of Azerbaijan. In the context of bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, it was revealed that the interaction between the countries seems significant for both states in terms of ensuring security in the South Caucasus.

Different interpretations of the concept of “Central Asia” (CA) as well as mutual definitions of its geographical borders indicate the incompleteness in the process of forming Central Asia as a region. Regionalization as an effective form of upholding and promoting by Central Asian countries their national interests is distinguished in Central Asia by a multilevel characterization. It includes the desire of the republics to promote their national interests as sovereign states, then to develop their trade, economic and political interaction within the framework of integration processes, and to join various integration initiatives and supranational projects with a wide range of non‑regional participants. Central Asian states’ attempts to develop intra‑regional cooperation in the period from 1994 to 2005 ended in failure. Since 2017, the idea of a “new integration” has been gaining popularity in Central Asia, and it is considered to be a part of the construction within the framework of the Union of Central Asian States which is planned for creation. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan claim for the role of “region‑forming” countries and two cores around which the development of hypothetical regional integration is possible. At the same time, the foreign policy of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, their approaches to security problems have a kind of differences, while their regional neighbors are also differ from each other in their approaches to some economic and social issues; the resource base of Central Asian states is incomparable either. Therefore, there are many factors that hinder a regionalization as well as an integration. Among them are the centripetal aspirations of the Central Asian countries/ They prefer, instead of neighbors in the region, external partners and markets, international financial institutions and donor structures. There are objective obstacles that impede regionalization, including the fact that the five republics of the region reluctant to share the sovereignty acquired after the collapse of the USSR in favor of supranational structures, whether they operate on the scale of the post‑Soviet space or they are planned to be created within the region.

The article deals with the possibilities of improving the access of Russian goods to foreign markets through regional trade agreements. Participation in such agreements has acquired mass character in the current century, within their framework about two thirds of transboundary commodity flows are already moving. The main peculiarity of regionalism development in this century is the pro‑integration character of the concluded agreements, which are not limited to agreements on free trade zones of goods, but cover a wide range of issues of trade in services, investment cooperation, competition, environment, labor standards, i.e. they envisage a movement towards greater institutional homogeneity of economies. Until recently, Russia was limited to the tasks of preserving and developing economic ties in the post‑Soviet space, and only after the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union did it start showing interest in signing free trade agreements with non-CIS countries. To date, the EAEU has concluded free trade agreements with a number of countries and is negotiating a FTA with several more countries. The EAEU integration policy has not yet brought any noticeable results in terms of a significant reduction of tariff barriers into total foreign markets: the current and planned integration projects will allow Russia to enjoy tariff preferences on less than one tenth of the global market. Possible new union agreements on preferential trade with ASEAN countries can only help Russia to expand its scope, while the creation of liberal economic partnerships such as WTO plus is not on the Russian integration agenda. Nor is there any intention to promote the idea of a FTA with Russia’s largest trade partners – the EU and China – in the EAEU. The conclusion is made that it is vital for Russia to address the problem of increasing the competitiveness of manufacturing industries, without which further facilitation of access to foreign markets through free trade agreements may not be possible.

CMEA evolution is considered using the concept of a life cycle. Entry into individual stages of the life cycle depends on the compliance of integration institutions with internal and external development factors of the participating countries, the ratio of integration and national identity. The CMEA analysis allows us to assess the dynamics of modern integration projects important for Russia. The main reasons for the collapse of the CMEA were the overestimation of the role of planned instruments and the underestimation of the role of monetary instruments, collective import substitution (autarky) and technological weakness, primarily the USSR, as a leader in the integration process. To modernize their industry, the CMEA countries, under conditions of detente, increased imports of equipment from Western countries. The country’s budget deficit arising in connection with the growth of external debt was forced to solve by raising prices for consumer goods and services, which caused social discontent. Delays in market reforms exacerbated the situation. The “perestroika” that began in 1985 in the USSR, brought about drastic changes in domestic and foreign policy and gave a “green light” to market transformations in CEE countries. Despite the failure, CMEA made a significant contribution to the development of global regionalization processes. It was part of the bipolar world order and supported strategic stability in the world, contributed to the improvement of European integration institutions, especially in terms of planning the integration process and creating mechanisms for converging the levels of development and welfare of the participating countries.
The CMEA experience has shown that in order to meet the growing complexity of the international economic, it is necessary to create the corresponding integration and national institutions of the participating countries. The central issue of the effectiveness of integration is the acquisition by the participating countries of such specialization, not only within the framework of the integration association, but also of the global economy as a whole, which will ensure their sustainable income.
In the course of evolution, modern integration associations will change functions and institutions, the composition of participants, enter into larger alliances, but are unlikely to disappear from the world economy as CMEA.

The article raises the question of whether German participation in resolving the armed conflict in Mali is a special case or, on the contrary, is a transition to a new political‑military strategy in Africa. In this regard the author issues the key parameters of Bundeswehr`s usage in Africa from 1990‑s until the middle 2010‑s and pays special attention to Somalia. The paper analyzes the features of German military presence evolution there. In comparison with Somalian one the author explores German approach to the resolution of the Malian armed conflict at the period of 2013‑2015 and since 2016. The paper pays attention to the Bundeswehr`s usage in EUTM Mali and MINUSMA missions and the results of this process. The article underlines the huge increase of German military presence since 2016‑2018 in Mali and shows the reasons of this tendency. Considering German activity in Mali, the paper explores its «spillover effect» with the examples of German relations with Algeria and G5 Sahel countries. In this regard the scientific research pays special attention to German bilateral relations with Burkina‑Faso and Niger. The paper underlines that by the beginning of the 2020‑s FRG concentrated its efforts in the African states which belong to traditional sphere of French interests. In the conclusion the author shows the importance of Sahel region for the testing of new German politicalmilitary strategy in Africa.

The paper analyzes the processes of transformation of leaders of rebel movements and tribal militias (warlords) into leaders of political parties and senior government officials after the end of the Civil War (1991‑2002) in Sierra Leone. It is argued that the opportunities for an anti‑government (or, on the contrary, pro‑government) armed group to become an officially recognized political organization, and for erstwhile field commanders to become its leaders, emerge either in the event of a rebel victory or after the signing of a peace agreement (as it happened in Sierra Leone) and the beginning of the integration of former militants into the post‑war society. It is usually the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs that allows former rebels and their leaders to escape punishment for crimes committed during conflicts.
At the same time, the opportunity to “earn forgiveness” is not the only incentive for a warlord to evolve into a peacetime politician. Indeed, gaining political power in African countries entails access to various sources of enrichment, and since running armed groups requires their leaders to possess organizational and entrepreneurial skills and charisma ‑ naturally, along with less positive character traits ‑ many warlords who have not yet fulfilled their political ambitions or secured their financial situation try to “adapt” their wartime skills and experience to peaceful life.
A proven way of gaining power peacefully is by participating in presidential and parliamentary elections. It is assumed that the development of a political career by former rebels in the context of peacebuilding should prevent the unfolding of another spiral of violence, but this is far from always the case: accustomed to achieving goals by military means, they often attempt to solve political issues through violence in peacetime. The paper considers the reasons for certain former rebel leaders to remain committed to peacebuilding and for other warlords to prove unable to achieve political goals by peaceful means.

The article is devoted to the study of the linguistic tradition of the Berbers, who are the indigenous people of North Africa. The Berbers have maintained a rich tradition of spoken language.
At the turn of the 20th ‑21st centuries, against the backdrop of the intensification of the movement for self‑determination, their cultural and linguistic rights, the Berbers launched a large‑scale activity aimed at restoring the national written language. The author suggested that the need to develop standardized writing was partly due to the desire of the Berbers to consolidate the official status of their language in the Constitution.
The author notes that the aggravation of the so‑called “Berber question” at the end of the 20th century spurred the interest of scientists and researchers in the Berber written heritage.
Most of the surviving handwritten documents make Berber texts (mostly religious), recorded using the Arabic alphabet between the 15th and early 20th centuries. The study of conditions for their creation and fields of their application shows that these texts played a significant role in the dissemination of religious and scientific knowledge among the Berbers. It is concluded that despite the use of the predominantly oral form of the language, the Berbers managed to create a unique written tradition.
The article discusses in detail the main problems of the study of Berber manuscripts, among which: the requirement from the researcher of serious pre‑knowledge in various fields; the problem of accessibility of texts stored in private collections; the need to develop unified approaches to the description of Berber manuscripts, their digitization and other important arrangements to ensure the availability of documents for the scientific‑research community.
Particular attention is paid to the history of the creation of the first collections of Berber manuscripts and their cataloging. The author has also highlighted the work of scientists, who made a qualitative contribution to the study of the Berber manuscripts, most of which have not yet been discovered and carry significant potential aimed at pre‑ serving and enhancing the Berber cultural and historical heritage.