The article explores the newest trends in Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union as one of the most dynamic fields of еuropean integration. In the EU the discourse on the strategic autonomy and strategic culture develops rapidly against the backdrop of Brex-it and transformation of relationship with the US. The history of European integration repeatedly poses a question whether the EU is capable of becoming an independent subject of international relations with its own politico-military potential based on the principle of strategic autonomy. The author examines dilemmas of the European defence union (EDU), with PESCO in its core, the key role of France and Germany in its promotion and development. Among the main issues scrutinized are recent events in the sphere of common defence policy, attitudes to the idea of the European army, dialectics of CSDP and NATO. A conclusion is drawn that in the near future the leading priority for EDU will consist in deepening integration among EU member states’ military-industrial complexes, strengthening their competitiveness versus the USA. The author holds that the politico-military potential of the EU is an objective requirement for the organisation with global economic interests and that it will receive further stimulus as a result of Brexit. The interests of security of the EU and non-Western centres of power will be better served if this potential transforms into effective EDU rather than be incorporated into the European pillar of NATO. The opposite development, including building up of “defence Schengen”, incorporation of the Alliance’s european members in the military planning, directed against Russia, dilution of neutrality of several member states of the EU will lead to further corrosion of european security and global stability.

The article analyzes the five-year period for the implementation of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and highlights the main problems of its development at the present stage. Among them there are external pressure on the EAEU from major economic agents (China) and regional economic partnerships (European Union), which leads to erosion of the Eurasian integration processes. The interaction of the EAEU partners has a negative impact on the strengthening of Western sanctions against Russia. Domestic disintegration factors are the low share of mutual trade and investment, the lack of tangible progress in the formation of common sectoral markets, the rapid growth of new non-tariff barriers and exceptions to the general rules of trade, the growth in the number of trade and currency conflicts. A serious problem is the weakening of the potential of Russia as a driver of economic integration in the EAEU. First of all, it concerns the level of innovativeness of the economy, which is the most important attractive factor in the conditions of the fourth industrial revolution. Tax and investment competition within jurisdictions within the EEU is increasing, which leads to the migration of Russian business to Kazakhstan and Belarus. In this regard, the article raises the question of a significant adjustment of the model of integration in the EAEU. New initiatives and actions are proposed, which should give a tangible effect on the existence of the EAEU for the population and business. We are talking about reorienting economic integration towards the consumer, stimulating informal integration, which should become the basis for strengthening formal integration at the macro level, developing a joint program to develop technologies of the fourth industrial revolution “Make in EAEU 2030” for structural and technological modernization of the economies of the EAEU countries, in which all states of the Union are interested.

Starting from the late 2000s, the Post-Soviet states have faced the so-called integration dilemma. Seeking to deepen their trade relations and economic links with the regional centers of force - the European Union and Russia - they found themselves increasingly compelled to choose between two integration projects: either joining the EU Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area or developing relations with Russia and several other interested members of the CIS under the auspices of the Customs Union and Single Economic Space (Eurasian Economic Union since 2015).

This paper purports to demonstrate that, although both tracks were declared to be economic by nature and were not publicly opposing each other, it was geopolitical reasoning that has dominated the deliberations of the five Eastern European members of the CIS in assessing and choosing between the two. The paper contrasts these countries’ political strategies and approaches to the integration dilemma and examines the internal and external factors behind these approaches. We explain why, despite the apparent similarity of the economies and interests of some of the states in question, their political strategies have diverged considerably under changing geopolitical circumstances. Finally, the paper evaluates the prospects of further engagement of Eastern European CIS countries in the integration projects.

In the context of the ongoing crisis in EU-Russia relations, the search for new formats of economic dialogue becomes particularly relevant. With the assistance of the Eurasian Economic Commission, various platforms are being created to explore the possibilities for cooperation between the EAEU and the EU in the areas of trade, investment, convergence of technological standards, etc., with the participation of leading experts and business circles. However, despite the gradual growth of interest in issues of Eurasian economic integration within the Western scientific and expert community, skepticism regarding the EAEU still prevails. The EAEU itself is mostly seen as a political project initiated by Russia and unable to bring real economic benefits to its member countries. US and European observers dwell on unequal economic opportunities of the EAEU countries, insufficient mutual trade and mixed consequences of the transition to common customs tariffs for Kazakhstan and Armenia. Moreover, in many European publications the EAEU is perceived not as a possible economic partner of the EU, but as its geopolitical competitor. Most experts conclude that cooperation between the EU and the EAEU is either impossible or possible only on a limited scale. Nevertheless, the attitude of Western experts towards the EAEU is gradually changing. Integration processes in the Post-Soviet space are increasingly viewed through the prism of the theory of new regionalism. It is noted that the EAEU, as well as another project in Eurasia - the Silk Road Economic Belt, may become an alternative to Western models of integration. Over the past four years, besides economic costs, Eurasian integration has also brought certain dividends to its members, which, however, do not always lie on the surface and are often of a political nature. In this regard, some European experts and scholars (although they still constitute a minority), mainly from Germany and Austria, admit that it is counterproductive for the EU to ignore the EAEU, and advocate for cooperation between them.

The genesis of the Russian civilization is inextricably connected with the Mongol conquests of the 13^th century. From that moment, Russia acquired a binary, Euro-Asian identity, which allowed it to master large spaces of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia in a different way compared to other European nations mastered the spaces of Asia and Africa, and eventually create the largest Eurasian state. All of its subsequent development took place in the constant internal struggle of two origins -the West and the East, both of them attracted Russia, influenced its identity and created opportunities for development, which Russia managed to exploit successfully. Until now, geopolitics remains a trigger for internal change and the cause of the transformation of Russian identity. Disappointed with the Eurasian project and trying to reunite with the West at the end of the 20^th century, Russia decided to abandon the “Asian burden” and at the same time its own type of historical development. However, Russia did not change its identity, but rejected it. As a result, it did not fit in, but fell out of global trends.

The rise of China opened up new opportunities for Russia. The strategic cooperation and interaction of the two countries has become a powerful tool in their struggle for multipolarity and global status in rivalry with the West. But at the same time, it has given Russia a new geopolitical challenge. Today, China is ready to offer the Post-Soviet Central Asia an attractive socio-economic model and a familiar and acceptable ideology. Under global geopolitical changes Russia is facing the choice of a new development strategy, which could find ways of conjunction the “Russian world” with the European Union and the Chinese “Belt and Road”.

Even from the cursory observation, the Eurasian Economic Union appears to be a good example of what is frequently referred to in the comparative regionalism research as diffusion of theEU model - many specific institutional solutions and, more generally, the fundamental agenda and the design of the EAEU are inspired by the EU experience. This article asks two questions: first, how can we explain the diffusion of the EU model in case of Eurasia, and second, which consequences does the diffusion have for the relations between the EAEU and the EU, as well as the EAEU and the Asian integration projects (like the Belt and Road Initiative). Our conclusions are paradoxical: we show that the standard arguments of the diffusion literature show limited empirical validity in the Eurasian case; and that the institutional similarity between the EU and the EAEU makes the interaction of these two organizations more, and not less difficult.

The article analyzes the Visegrad group (V-4) activities, identifies its main directions, compares the approaches of the V-4 to the reform of the EU, to the issues of common defense and security, to the migration crisis, Brexit, relations with Russia, Eastern partnership with the EU policy in these areas. The main scenarios of development of the Visegrad group are considered, expert opinions on this issue are analyzed. Although V-4 was created under the auspices of the EU for the European integration of its member States, after joining the Union, the V-4 not only did not stop its cooperation, but, on the contrary, intensified it, seeking to establish a new status and strengthen its influence on the common EU policy. Initially, one of the important activities of the group was the promotion of the Eastern partnership, which was part of the EU policy. The aggravation of migration problems in 2015 forced Visegrad Group to formulate their own agenda. In general, the V-4 approaches to a number of issues do not coincide with the positions promoted by the European Union. There is a desire of the group to declare its interests more loudly, and for the European Union the position of V-4 on the migration agenda has become a certain challenge. The analysis of expert assessments of the group’s development prospects showed a wide range of opinions - from optimistic to pessimistic scenarios: some believe that cooperation within the group will be strengthened, others believe that it is likely to be completely eroded within the EU. A general conclusion is made that, on the one hand, the Visegrad group demonstrates the desire to strengthen its position in the EU and the voice of V-4 sounds more clearly, but, on the other hand, it would be wrong to overestimate the importance of the “Visegrad Fronde”: further strengthening of the independence of the V-4 is prevented by the preservation of internal differences in the group, as well as by the high degree of general dependence of the V-4 member States on the European Union.

The article analyzes changes in the foreign trade sector of the Visegrad countries after their entry to the European Union with special focus on relations with Russia. The territorial orientation of trade relations of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic is considered. The author highlights the continuing trend of the EU’s market priority for the Visegrad group against the background of strengthening the role of partner countries of “four” and the Asian vector. Special attention is paid to the sectoral structure of foreign trade of the Visegrad countries and its transformation since 2003. The Russian Federation’s role in foreign trade of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic is analyzed not only in terms of the priority of the Russian direction, but also the possibilities of changing existing positions. The dynamics of the Russian positions in foreign trade sectors of four Viseg-rad countries are considered highlighting the main factors influencing trade relations. In this regard, the changed in 2014 political and economic conditions of mutual trade including the factor of sanctions are analyzed in detail. The sectoral structure of trade relations with Russia allows to say that there are remaining imbalances and it’s atypical for the Visegrad countries. The Russian positions in the foreign trade of the Visegrad countries at present time are estimated as weakened, corresponding to the period of the early 2000s which are a consequence of the influence of one of the long-term and negative factors in recent years while the trade structure maintains relatively stable. The existing dynamics of recovery of trade relations between Russia and Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic suggests that reaching the pre-crisis level will not happen in the near future.

The article examines the development of relations between Byelorussia and the European Union and the United States of America in 1992-2018. Since the mid-90s the Byelorussian political situation has been criticized by the West. The West imposed sanctions against Byelorussia to force the country to comply with its requirements. In response, Byelorussia began to strengthen integration ties with Russia. To counteract the Russian-Byelorussian rapprochement the European Union began to offer Byelorussia opportunities for integration into Europe. In 2009, Byelorussia became a member of the Eastern partnership. That organization was aimed to act against Russia. The European Union realized that the Byelorussian regime wanted Byelorussia to look like a European country. After the Crimea separation from Ukraine and its accession to Russia, the Byelorussian opposition and government were afraid of Russia capturing Byelorussia, although Russia did not give rise to such fears. The European Union began to cooperate more closely with the official Minsk, not paying attention to the violation of human rights and the presence of political prisoners in Byelorussia. In 2017, Byelorussia voted against Russia in the session of the OSCE parliamentary Assembly. Almost all sanctions were lifted. The United States of America also started treating Byelorussia neutrally, but in mid-90s they imposed sanctions against it. The US were more consistent in the application of sanctions. In 2008, Byelorussia demanded the American Ambassador to leave Minsk. But soon the US and Byelorussia began to look for closer contacts. After 2014, the Americans began to support the anti-Russian phobias of the Byelorussian elite. In 2018, Byelorussia was declared a reliable Bastion against Russian neo-imperialism country. Today Byelorussia seeks to expand contacts with the West to be able to distance itself from Russia. Maneuvering between the West and Russia is necessary for the Byelorussian President to maintain his power.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan combine their membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) - the most large-scale and dynamically developing integration association in the Post-Soviet space -with an active participation in projects and programs of the European Union (EU). This economic and political alliance is aimed at the regional integration of its 28 member countries located mainly in Europe. The EU is simultaneously actively involved in the economic and political processes in the Post-Soviet space, including its Central Asian segment. The EU strategy in the Central Asian region is aimed at bilateral and regional cooperation with its partners, among which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan occupy an important place. The bilateral partnership and cooperation agreements concluded between them and the EU have become the main instruments providing the European Union with influence in these countries. The EU accession in the Central Asian region and the promotion of a united Europe’s interests combine with the attention of the EU institutions and structures to important areas of Central Asia development. Among these areas are transport networks, energy, security, government, education and human rights. Although the integration in the EAEU and the EU, as well as the terms of trade and economic agreements concluded by the participants of the EAEU with the EU, has a number of distinctive features, this does not become an obstacle to the aspirations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan for in-depth cooperation with the EU -both in politics and economics. The EUs tactics of distancing itself from the EAEU, positioning the united Europe as a kind of an alternative to this integration union becomes a serious geopolitical challenge both for the EAEU and for the prospects of integration in Central Asia while maintaining Russia’s leading role in this process.

The article is devoted to the analysis of one of the main causes of the Russian-Belarusian crisis of 2018-2019 -the Pro-Western vector of the Belarusian foreign policy. Since the establishment of the Union state of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation (1999), Minsk’s policy towards the European Union and the United States has always been of a special non-bloc nature. Minsk traditionally links its foreign policy with the task of preserving the sovereignty and independence of Belarus. At the same time, the Belarusian leadership has always stressed its status as Russias “only ally”. However, gradually the foreign policy of Minsk began to acquire a Pro-Western character, which began to have a negative impact on the Russian-Belarusian integration. Over time, Minsk for a number of reasons began to shy away from supporting its ally in the foreign arena, the foreign policy of Belarus has acquired the character of balancing between Russia and the West. The policy of balancing allowed Minsk to ignore the lack of political and economic balance of interests within the framework of Russian-Belarusian integration for more than twenty years. For many years, Minsk has used the Western vector of its foreign policy to stimulate Russian economic support for the Belarusian economy. In 20142018, amid the escalation of the confrontation between the West and Russia, the policy of balancing Minsk began to gradually reformat into a slow geopolitical turn of the Republic to the West. Currently, the Belarusian leadership uses the Western vector of its foreign policy to mask the gradual change of the geopolitical vector on the one hand, and to maintain access to Russian financial and energy resources on the other hand. By 2018, both formed opposite trends against the backdrop of the aggravation of the Ukrainian crisis resonated, which led to a crisis in relations between Russia and Belarus and jeopardized the preservation of the Union state.

Commercial and geopolitical realities drive Central and East European (CEE) countries to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports and enhance security of supply. While, in general, these countries are heavily dependent on Russian gas, they have different conditions, varying approaches towards dependence and security of supply, and thus give differing energy policy answers. Diversification is a means of reducing dependence and enhancing security of supply. There are many types of diversification. To understand this complexity and assess CEE countries, we have developed a scheme of different CEE diversification options for Russian gas imports. In this article, we analyse these options and achievements for one specific country, Poland, which seeks a level of diversification that would enable ending Russian gas imports. We find that since the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken concrete action, and it has finally made huge progress in gas import source diversification. New pipeline and liquefied natural gas capacities could allow Poland to reach its goal, though the existing import portfolio still lacks a supply contract for Norwegian gas imports to be supplied through the yet-to-be-built Danish–Polish Baltic Pipe. Without these amounts, Russian supplies could be necessary, or at least Russian molecule supplies. In contrast, domestic gas production does not seem to provide a grounding for diversification. Albeit energy efficiency and conservation are significant opportunities, reducing total gas consumption is also not possible, mainly due to the movement away from coal. From this point of view, sectoral diversification has limited real relevance, as it can only limit further gas demand growth. With the termination of large-quantity long-term Russian gas supplies, transit diversification will also bear less importance. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the termination of Russian (long-term) gas supplies will actually serve security of supply, as diversification alone does not inevitably lead to achieving this goal.

Britain has been able to remain one of Russia’ foreign trade leading partner so far and still one of the ten largest investors in our country. The article attempts to identify the factors driving shifts in the Russia-UK economic relations Over the recent two decades they have been abundant with ups and downs. Nowadays, the Russo-British relations are going through hard times. The causes behind worsening trends are both economic and political. The major reason after 2014 is the changing political context in which relations between Russia and the UK are developing. These relations are negatively affected by anti-Russian sanctions imposed by western countries and uncertainty caused by the forthcoming Britain’ withdrawal from the EC (Brexit). Particular attention in the article is being focused on the investment co-operation. The point these two countries have in common is the low level of capital accumulation. The problemof scarcity of domestic investment resources and its impact on economic output has been increasingly discussed by researchers and policy-makers in Russia and Britain. Hence, great importance that is attached to the external sources of capital, inflow of foreign, first of all, direct investment.