In this article major mechanisms and different stages of the  Bolshevik party’s transformation into a “party-state” are examined.  The Communist party has been brought to the surface of political life and power by the Russian revolution; the organizational  principles of the Party along with its approaches to political process  have to a larger extent evolved as results of the revolution.  Therefore the system of power which has reached its peak during  Stalin’s rule has both been the product of continuity as well as  change of the Russian political tradition. The Communist ideology  has served as main instrument of communication between the  authorities and the people. The Party occupied central position in  that system of communication; one of the most important tools of  the Party’s control over the Soviet society was propaganda. However the process of the communist regime acquiring legitimacy  has been rather lengthy; it was completed only by the late 1920s.  The basic principles of “unity” within a ruling group were rejected  when rivalry for power ended in Stalin’s favor. The central element in  the Communist party’s system of power was the ruling  elite – nomenclature. During World War II the institution of “party- state” has reached the highest degree of centralization; but  on the other hand, the decision-making system was rather flexible and adaptable as compared with the previous period. After  the War even within Stalin’s dictatorship the contours of oligarchic “collective leadership” were emerging. N. Khrushchev used  the same instrument as Stalin did – control over the Party apparatus – while consolidating his power. One of the important  results of Khrushchev’s rule was the institutionalization of the ruling  bureaucracy. Maintaining “stability” became the slogan for the new  stage of the Communist regime’s evolution. Socio- economic system  was getting increasingly complex and less manageable; different hierarchies, including local and industrial elites, have been failing to  make timely and correct decisions due to their rigidness and  sluggishness. The Party was attempting to compensate those  deficiencies, but was less and less capable of doing so. Gorbachev’s “Perestroika” which was based on the idea of democratic socialism  has finally ended the rule of the “party-state”. Having lost its internal  integrity the system of power has rapidly deteriorated.

The article analyzes contemporary political processes in the newly  independent states of post-Soviet Central Asia. The peculiarities of  functioning of their centralized political systems, as well as the  interaction of the executive (the president and the government) and  the legislative (parliament) branches of power are considered in the  context of the authoritarian type of government that prevails in most  countries of the region. Attention is drawn to the use by the  ruling elites for the purposes of political mobilization of procedures  for electoral democracy (elections, etc.), which is mostly of a formal  nature. The place in the power structures of both officially  recognized political parties and opposition ones is defined, which are  divided mainly into secular and religious (Islamist). Informal political structures that function in a number of cases in the form of regional  communities, territorial or ethnic clans are considered in the article as a specific characteristic of Central Asian societies. Based on the analysis of the political process in the Central Asian countries, it  was concluded that the whole period of post-Soviet transit has come  to an end and that authoritarian but consolidated regimes of a new  type are emerging in the region; they form a sovereign statehood  and an independent foreign policy strategy.

Sixty years old Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) history is very  representative for study West European far-right parties and  movements. In last decade West Europe are going through the  unprecedented rise of right-wing populism in conditions of citizens’  dissatisfaction with traditional parties’ politics and its institutions.  Trying to retain their power the governance parties are involving in  the common political trend: use narrative of right-wing populism, are ready to previously unthinkable party alliances erasing usual  ideological boundaries. FPÖ exclusive characteristic consists in its special interpretation of Austrian identity combining German  nationalism and Austrian patriotism. This position loyalty allows FPÖ  to have its own stable electoral foundation and to hope for its  support in crisis situations. FPÖ went through several intra-party conflict and experienced periods of serious falls and successful  upgrades. At present the party is on its political rise supported by almost one third of Austrian electorate. FPÖ chairman Heinz- Christian Strache became the Vice-Chancellor of Austria after  Austrian legislative election in 2017. FPÖ had 6 of 13 seats in the  government led by Sebastian Kurz. Set of specific to the Austrian  society circumstances, such as denazification minimize and imitation  of Austrian identity formation in the postwar period, politicization of  the immigration issue escalated in 2015 by European migrant crisis,  is making FPÖ a dangerous player on the Austrian political scene and  an encouraging example for the far-rights parties of neighbor  countries. 

The article studies the phenomenon of left populism in Western  Europe. On the example of France, the author examines the specifics  and historical origins of left populism, its ideas and  slogans, electoral technologies, factors of presence on the political  scene. The author focuses on the political activities of Jean-Luc  Mélenchon, his election campaign for the presidential and  parliamentary elections in 2017 in France. The article considers the  key stages of Mélenchon’s political career, the features of his political discourse and program, the creation of the Left front, the conditions for the rise and the specifics of left populism in France.  Among the specific features of French left populism, anti-elitism,  antisystem, egalitarianism and the demand for social justice,  pacifism and criticism of the neoliberal version of globalization are  highlighted. The author believes that the rise of left populism in  France has led to significant changes in the balance of political forces during the presidential and parliamentary campaigns of spring  and summer of 2017, putting it to the forefront of political  struggle. In the light of the evolution of the political situation in  France, the article analyzes Mélenchon’s subsequent activities  related to his position around the debate on the reform of labor  legislation, social protests in autumn 2017 and spring 2018, relations with other left-wing parties and movements, structural  changes within the “La France insoumise”. The article emphasizes the undeniable leadership of the Mélenchon movement  among the far left organizations; it is noted that the preservation of the horizontal structures of “La France insoumise” (social networks,  Autonomous initiatives, activism), media strategy, the specifics of  political discourse and appeal to different layers of the electorate,  participation in social protests allow us to talk about the French left  populism and Mélenchon as the main political rival of President Macron.

The phenomenon of a right populism in modern France is analyzed.  In such context, the theoretical approaches of leading French  historians, sociologists and political scientists to the definition of  populism are considered. The main differences in the definition of  populism by different specialists are shown. Different manifestations of populism such as the left-, rightwing, and  emanating from the masses and the ruling elite are characterized.  The features of a modern right-wing populism are reviewed on the  example of the National Front Party (NF), headed by Marin Le Pen.  The political, cultural, electoral and institutional factors that led to  the growing popularity of the NF are studied. The specifics of the  success of the “fronts” in various elections, beginning in 2012, are  presented in a “long-term”, “medium-term” and “short-term”  perspective. Weaknesses in governing the country of systemic ruling left and right parties, and the growth of distrust towards them  by civil society are shown. The evolution of the National Front  since the founding of the party by Jean-Marie Le Pen and internal  party crises are considered. The author comes to the conclusion  that, despite the fact that in the doctrinal plan the “marinists” have  not moved away from the “national populism” that followed the NF  congress on March 10-11, 2018, tactical actions and a change in the  name of the party suggest that that the party is trying to become  the second system right-wing party in France. Besides, the strong  assertion of populism in global political culture has become a  challenge to liberal democracy in the 21st century, so it could be  expected to manifest itself in other far-right associations.

On the threshold of elections designed to be held in February 2019,  the first after the military junta seized power in 2014, it is important  to define the role of parties in the political process of Thailand, which  as other developing countries of Asia, faces  challenges in democratic state building. The contemporary political  history of kingdom represents the confrontation of two tendencies –  authoritarianism and democracy what has a reverse impact on  political parties, their character, structure and ability to represent  interests of the society as a whole. The author analyses the process  of party evolution in the historical retrospective in the context of  transformation of political system – from bureaucratic to  semidemocratic subjected to economic modernization and changes in  socio structure of society where traditional form of organization patron-client is persisted. The author defines three  stages of evolution of party system in Thailand The first is  characterized by the full control of civil-military bureaucracy over  parties. The second stage is closely related to the formation of provincial political clientele groups. The third stage marks the  evolvement of party of “power” with the implication for  strengthening the parliamentary democracy in the beginning of XXI  century. And as the result of it – to the destabilization of political  system, based on the relative balance of power between two main  political forces – bureaucracy and army interested in reservation of authoritarian government, and bourgeoisie supporting the  liberalization of political institutes. With the emergence of party of “power” supported by the majority of population advocating  parliamentary democracy political spectrum has changed. The arising conflict of interests subjected to collision of positions  regarding the model of political governance was overcome by  military coup. Analyzing the political spectrum on the threshold of  elections the author comes to conclusion that the restoration of  compromised model of political governance sample of 80-90 years of  XX century is the most likely option of political development of  Thailand in the near future. Though it differs in one aspect – the  social structure has changed, there is the rise of that groups of population that intend to participate in the political process, what  will force the power to be more transparent and social oriented. These challenges face the political parties as well.

In the political system of post-war Japan there emerged a unique phenomenon of the ‘1955 system’, which contradicted, in its  form and in its essence, to the principle of the changeability of power inherent for the democratic systems. The Liberal-Democratic  Party retained majority in the lower house of Diet for the 38-year period, which allowed it to form the government without joining coalitions with any other parties. “The 1955 system” was a form of  adaptation of the political power to the specific conditions of cold war era. In the sphere of foreign policy, the bipolar model of the  Japanese political system reflected the ideological choice between  the capitalist system led by the United States and the socialist  system led by the USSR. In the economic sphere, the dominant  party system was the most appropriate response to the specific  needs of the mobilization economic model, in which first fiddle was played by bureaucracy, whilst the political power performed  rather decorative functions. The authoritarian features in the LDP  power system that can be imagined to be the result of its  monopolistic rule, in reality did not have a distinct manifestation because of the de facto absence of unity in its top  management and the preservation of a viable faction system well  adapted to the electoral model of the multimember  districts. The  end of ‘the 1955 system’, associated with the end of the cold war,  manifested itself in the loss of the LDP’s dominant position in the  party system and in the beginning of the era of coalition  governments. The issues of ideology in the post-bipolar period lost  their significance as a form of axis in the inter-party division. Currently, the LDP holds the leading positions in the political arena  as the main political force in the Diet. The ruling party faces serious  problems, among which one can mention the decline of the LDP  authority in the Japanese society against the background of resonant  political scandals, the absence of intra-party democracy  and the authoritarian style of Abe’s rule which raises the risks of  political mistakes, as well as the lack of reliable mechanisms of  succession of senior positions in the party hierarchy. However, the  specificity of the electoral system, as well as the chronic state of split and the absence of strong political leaders in the opposition camp,  give the LDP substantial advantages against other parties, feeding  the conclusion that the LDP will remain the dominant political force  of Japan in the foreseeable future.

The article, India taken as a case study, is focused on civil  society/party system interrelationship. Among origins of comparative  advancement of India’s party system are such  historical constituents as: lasting existence of “centre- periphery” relations, ambivalent role of “pragmatic” British imperial  rule in country’s development, availability of proactive social forces susceptible to absorb overseas industrial culture as well as  political democracy. In the ultimate analysis, these and other  “motives” were instrumental in India’s choice for representative  institutions as most functional mode of governance. India’s civil society and party system are examined from  the “classic”/ west European political economy perspective.

About four decades Iran has been under Islamic ruling, a unique  system of state governing combining both secular society rules and  religious principles. While the contradictions between the clergy and  the republicans’ institutions may remain their internal affair, at the  same time they may become evident. The electoral system is one of  the fundamental principles of the state governing in Iran. The  changes in the ratio of Islamic principles and republicans’ rules  (laying behind the political course), depends on the political forces getting the majority in the state governing bodies following the  elections. Often these changes result in the form of mass protest. Notwithstanding the adjustments to the Iran’s state governance have been made, the system fundamentally has been operating within the scope of principles proclaimed by Imam Khomeini. The research  article studies the Iran’s political system distinctions as well as its  evolution triggered by the situation inside the country and the  external factors, that both act in different directions in respect to the modernization processes.

At the end of 2017 Latin America has entered the electoral super  cycle, which runs until the end of 2019. In the region will take place  the elections of all levels: presidential, legislative, local, as well as referendums. The countries covered by the electoral race, provide  80 per cent of regional GDP, ballot will involve about 2/3 of  the voters in the region. Fourteen Heads of State will be elected in  the countries with a presidential form of Government. Elections are  held in an atmosphere of political instability, discredit of the power  structures, the degradation of the ruling elites, fragmentation of  party systems, volatility of the preferences of the electorate. In the  region, there are strong antielite moods, a slowdown of democratic  processes, and the low level of support for democracy. This article  analyzes the reasons for this situation. Considerable attention is paid to the characterization of the political systems prevailing in the  countries of the region and focuses on the evolution of the institute  of Presidency in the 21st century, the causes of the emergence of a  new leadership and the formation of regimes of personified  authorities. The author is of the opinion that the imbalances of  presidential systems laid down in the regulatory and legislative  framework, contribute to the consolidation of different models of  ideological personification colors and offer opportunities for  concentrating power in the hands of the head of State. Hyper power  of the Presidents and the weakening of the control functions of  parliaments contributed to the flourishing of corruption that has  taken epidemic proportions in recent years and among the highest  echelons of almost all countries. Corruption scandals in turn cause  presidential resignations and impeachments, lead to institutional instability. The fight against corruption becomes the  main leitmotif of election campaigns. The article presents the results of the election campaigns of 2015-2017, traces the  dependence of electoral preferences of the population of the region  from the situation in the economy and the social conditions, and  underlines the special role of the new middle class in the political  life. It is argued that Latin America is on the threshold of the  emblematic changes but to predict election results and the nature of  future change is not possible.

In face of the relative success of the right and left populists, among  representatives of the intellectual elite on the West arose a  conviction – in order to restore the liberal order and prevent the final victory of populists, traditional parties will have to make not  only rebranding. They must develop policies through which  globalization can serve the middle and working class. In fact, the  problem is even wider than the opposition to the right and left populists. The transformation of party systems takes place in the  context of the effects of globalization, generating new lines of  social tensions and divisions in society (including “globalized elite” –  “anti-globalistminded masses” opposition); under framework of  democracy deficit, when a significant part of the electorate of  developed Western countries clearly realizes that they “can change  the government, but not the policy” and from time to time under the influence of situational factors involve in the “protest voting”, in  support of alternative to political establishment political forces; in the context of fragmentation of the political field due to the crisis  of “Grand ideological narratives” and the appearance of so called  “molecular ideologies” and “one question” parties. Entering the  political arena in a number of countries of the far right and far left  forces is rather situational, but it becomes a consequence of the  current crisis trends – the migration crisis, terrorism, economic  recession. The rise of populist parties of all kinds (right, left, right- left) has its limits. But the process of party systems adaptation to a  new type of conflict between the globalized postmodern elites and  the majority of “nationalized” citizens of national states is only  developing now (both in developed and developing countries). The  question is in which degree the party and political systems of  different countries are ready to it and how the modern political elites  are flexible and adaptive to a new political challenge.

The dynamics of Euroscepticism intensity of some French parties is  analysed in the given article with the use of Attitude to European  integration index. The degree of criticism of the EU is evaluated  quantitatively (1-13 points) based on the following data extracted  from 2010-2017 party manifestos: attitude to the principal idea of European integration, affective and instrumental support or  discontent of the EU, the perception of the EU as an (un-)  accountable institution. The elaborated method was proven to be  instrumental and reliable for Euroscepticism studies by finding  correspondence between the quantitative values of the Index and  Russian scholars’ qualitative estimates. This standardized approach  to measurement allowed not only to reveal the general attitude of a  particular party towards European integration, but also to compare the obtained estimates with indicators for past years, for  other parties, and also in other countries. The developed scale let  ascertain some strengthening of National Front’s and J.-L.  Melenchon’s supporters’ (nowadays – from “Unbowed France”)  Euroscepticism and weakening criticism of the EU by gaullists from  the “Union for the Popular Movement” and the “Republicans”.  Relatively stronger Euroscepticism of the French Communist Party in  comparison to the Socialist Party has been confirmed.

This article deals with the modern mechanisms of the political parties financing in Russia and Spain. Nowadays the parties may be  effective if they are effective in fundraising. That’s why we may say  that all and any democratic country shall create a balanced model of  parties financing. Such model shall minimize the influence of private  money and at the same time of public funds. For this purpose, it is necessary to take into consideration the peculiarities of the  political system, order of parties funding and the practice. It is also useful to learn the experience of parties funding of foreign  countries. The subject of this study is the legal regulation of sources  of political parties financing if Russia and Spain. The special attention  is paid to public funds and principles of legal regulation of  it. Such principals are rule of law, transparency of parties funding as  well as reasonableness and compliance with voters’ support. The  authors analyze recent amendments of law on political parties in the  field of state subsidies. A great attention is paid to private sources of  parties financing. The study reveals the tendency of tightening of  legal regulation of political parties funding especially concerning the amount of donations, donors and credits. The legal comparative  study and analyze of financial reports helps to look at the problem of parties funding from other side.

The article makes focus on the rise of Western Europe’s far-right  parties which act with anti-immigrant agenda amid 2010s European  migrant crisis. Massive influxes of refugees and migrants have  accumulated huge political significance and triggered off a wide  range of conflicts (both on international and national levels). The  migrant crisis has indicated many social-political challenges for  European countries. The crisis has been synchronous with a rise of popularity of right populist political movements (old ones as well  as new ones), which promote restrictions of immigration etc. At the  same time it cannot be ignored that West European right-wing  populist political movements achieved some success in previous  decades, well ahead of the current migrant crisis. Immigration issue  has been a centerpiece of political discourses of West European right-wing parties (National Front in France, for instance)  since late 1970s – early 1980s. But it is quite obvious that the 2010s migrant crisis became a trigger for revitalization of the far-right  movements which are outspoken critics of the European Union as “a  supra- national body” dictating its conditions to the member  countries. Besides, the crisis gave a boost to a rise of new populist  movements (for example, “Alternative for Germany”). In 2017 the  populist right-wing parties in Europe won the largest support over  the three past decades. Recently the right populist forces appeared  in elections in a number of European countries (Germany, Austria,  France etc.) as tough competitor of traditional mainstream political  parties and won parliamentary representation and/or representation in the government coalitions. Furthermore, these  movements demonstrate attempts to change their image to shift to  political mainstream. However, in the foreseeable future, any  cardinal breakthrough and far-right anti- immigrant parties’ coming  to the power in Western Europe’s coutrnies is hardly possible.