Analyses of modern trade and economic relations in Asia-Pacific region. Research of the roles of the United States of America and China under the conditions of protectionism initiated by the D. Tramp’s administration and stagnation of mega-projects. Crisis of leadership and role of USA and China in regional mega-project (APEC, TPP, RCPEC). Ability of the USA and the PRC to create regional economic priorities, as well as to determine the course of integration processes. Analysis of the main obstacles of realization of American and Chinese leadership potential. Regional integration project initiated by Japan, India and the Republic of Korea and prospects for Indo-Pacific Asia. China-USA competition and main trends of regional integration. Comparative study of opportunities
and prospects for bilateral and mega-regional economic projects. As an example, observation of South Korean initiative “New Economic Map” is presented and analyzed. Role of “New Economic Forum” initiated by Bloomberg with support of global big business is examined also. Initiative of Indo-Pacific region, Japan-India economic cooperation are examined, as well as Washington policy to counterweight China foreign economic and political expansion. Analyzing of prospects and consequences of competition between USA and the PRC in Pacific regions. Main issues, opportunities and challenges of Russia’s economic expansion in Asia-Pacific region. Close interconnection between policy, security and economic
cooperation in the region: influence on Russia’s Pacific priorities and diplomacy. Characteristics of some problems of Russian “East Policy” during last several years. Some arguments are presented in favor of Russia’s strategy of “policy of focused partnerships”. This kind of policy means prevail of business activity in some special projects as well as in some geographic areas. It is also stressed that it is in Russia’s long-run interests to use of all kind of diplomatic measures in order to minimize any attempts to oppose India to China. But try its best to support cooperation between Russia, China and India in Pacific, as well as in Indo-Pacific region. 

The article aims to specify the influence of the projects the Greater Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific Region on the prospective relations between Russia and ASEAN. The key component of its novelty is the authors’ original criteria of comparing the two projects: the degree of consolidating agenda of cooperation between their current and prospective participants, the congruence with the East Asia’s – assuming that it will be the economic driver of the forthcoming Greater Eurasia and Indo-Pacific Region – modality of multilateral dialogue and the preconditions for the survivability of both projects in the long-term perspective. Making this comparison, the authors substantiate the view that the Greater Euraya  sian Partnership is far more competitive that the Indo-Pacific Region. Exploring cooperation between Russia and ASEAN through the prism of their forthcoming strategic partnership, the authors offer an original interpretation of the reasons behind the presently insufficient cooperation and its most likely future directions proceeding from the mutual influence of Russia’s and ASEAN’s prospective planning and the emerging global context. In the near future, combating international terrorism and strengthening connectivity will come to the forefront of Russia’s and ASEAN’s priorities, with the focus shifting from Southeast Asia to the Eurasian area. In the authors’ view, if the present trends continue the aftereffects of the Indo-Pacific Region can stimulate downward trends in the Russia-ASEAN relationship. This will be premised upon the decrease in effectiveness of the Asia-Pacific multilateral dialogue platforms, likely Russian-Chinese joint maneuvers in the South China Sea and the necessity to specify, along with lack of impressive results, the essence of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and Vietnam as the foundation for the Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership. In its turn, the Greater Eurasia offers Russia and the association new promising possibilities, among which of particular importance are the development of connectivity narrative in Eurasia and combating international terrorism by means of adopting the ASEAN-led dialogue platforms ARF, ADMM+8 and EAS to the future system of security, cooperation and co-development from Lisbon to Jakarta. The realization of the forthcoming shift from the Asian century to the Eurasian century and the emergence of the Greater Eurasia as the second center in the global politics will allow Russia and the association to expand and diversify their cooperation and, in perspective, to develop it on the self-supporting and self-reproducing basis. 

The People’s Republic of China marks in December 2018 the 40th anniversary of the economic reform start. Its integral part was external economic openness of the country which replaced former Mao Zedong’s policy of autarky. The article deals with the main achievements of China’s foreign trade in goods and services and cross-border investment cooperation of the country during reform period. Shortcomings and problems in these spheres are shown. The article analyzes the formation of the second stage of foreign economic openness in China, which is associated primarily with the initiative to build land and sea “silk roads” and with the creation of a number of experimental free trade zones in the country. The possible prospects of further development of China’s foreign economic relations, taking into account various internal and external factors, are analyzed. Briefly summing up the results of China’s foreign economic openness policy in the years of reform, we can say that it has played a crucial and irreplaceable role in the modernization of the country and its transformation into one of the leading powers in the world, in absorbing norms and rules of the world market. China has become one of the world leaders in terms of trade, attracting foreign investment and investing abroad. Beijing has adapted itself well to the process of globalization of the world economy and has become one of its main beneficiaries. China’s official position is currently distinguished by its commitment to globalization, resistance to protectionism, and support of active economic cooperation in all areas. This position is quite natural, since foreign economic relations will remain one of the leading factors in China’s development for the foreseeable future. On the way to achieving the goal proclaimed by Beijing – to turn the country from a “big” trading power into a “powerful” – China has much to do in order to overcome the weaknesses revealed in its foreign trade and foreign economic relations in general, and also to take more fully into account the often fair claims and demands of its trade and economic partners. Beijing is working hard on a strategy for further development of foreign economic relations. Particular importance is attached to the formation of a wider network of trading partners along the routes of land and sea “silk roads”. It is necessary to significantly increase the share of China’s Western  territories in country‘s foreign trade and investment activities abroad. Beijing is planning to form a group of multinational companies with Chinese capital, which have high international competitiveness. The development of products with high value added, the struggle for the high prestige of goods of famous Chinese brands, the search for new ways of trade in services and goods, the formation of new interstate free trade zones will be continued. In practical terms, one of the most important steps is the formation of pilot free trade zones in China itself. They are designed to work out the transfer of China’s foreign trade and investment activities to advanced international standards, to prepare further opening of the Chinese market (including financial, social, educational services) for foreign investors.

In 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EAEC), one of the key supranational bodies of the Union, received the mandate to conduct all negotiations on trade liberalization, including negotiations on FTAs with other countries, became the main operator of the conjunction of EAEU and One belt One road Initiative (OBOR), – and, thus, an important agent of promoting the interests of member states in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in the future we can expect the expansion of the Commission’s mandate to other areas of international cooperation affecting the economic interests of Russia. In the context of the policy of the Turning to the East that Russia has pursued in recent years, such a redistribution of roles between the national and supranational levels requires further study. However, due to the young age of the association, both in the Russian and foreign literature, we can find relatively few studies on the international role of the EAEU and, in particular, of the EAEC. This article analyzes the Commission’s international tracks with Asian countries that are currently open and attempts to study other formats of international interaction that might involve the Commission in the future according to its current mandate. The results of the study indicate that bilateral tracks remain the dominant ones for the Commission, and the transition to multilateral negotiations within the EAEU-ASEAN or EAEU-RSEP formats can only occur in the medium term. This conclusion has been confirmed by the analysis of open information about the negotiations of the Commission, and a series of expert interviews conducted during the research.

The DPRK has become one of the most striking news-maker of 2018. Kim Jong-un took decisive steps to establish cooperation with the ROK – the parties had quite coordinated interaction during the Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, and hold three Inter-Korean summits in April, May and September 2018. Kim Jong-un have hold three meetings with Xi Jinping. The summit of Kim Jong-un and Trump in Singapore was equally resonant. The President of the Russian Federation during the WEF invited Kim Jongun to Russia, earlier the leader of North Korea had a meeting with S.V. Lavrov and V.I. Matvienko. These steps look  particularly important against the previous period, when the DPRK was mainly presented by the United States and other states as a security threat. However, despite the changes that took place and the fact that Kim Jong-un is attempting to build a dialogue in different areas, the position remains about the real interests and intentions of the DPRK and the future of the North Korean regime remains ambiguous. The article analyzes existing points of view on the issue and identifies and the prospects’ of the problem development. At the beginning of the study, a comprehensive analysis of the problem of the Korean Peninsula is presented. It examines the features of the interaction of the DPRK with key  international players, the question of sanctions against the country, and the peculiarities of the internal political line of the DPRK. Further analysis focuses on the current foreign policy line of Kim Jong Yin, assesses the results of major international meetings, including the opinion of experts and the analysis of the significance of specific agreements for understanding possible scenarios. Specific attention is payed to the Russian policy towards the inter-Korean settlement and Russian potential role in this process.

In the face of deteriorating the regional security environment in East Asia, a noticeable growth of Japan’s defense capabilities and Tokyo’s departure from most self-restraints in the field of security policy look quite expected and natural process. At the same time, Japan continues to rely on the alliance with the United States. On the other hand, relations between Washington and Moscow are now at their lowest point since the Cold War. Japan itself has territorial claims to Russia. This means, based on confrontational logic that returns to the international agenda, that Japan’s traditionally reserved attitude towards Russia should be maintained. However, today we are witnessing a different situation. After the start of regular personal meetings between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the dialogue is intensified on a wide range of issues, including those related to international security, and especially its regional aspect. Although certain background for that was noted before the Sochi meeting between V. Putin and S. Abe, this foreign policy turn, and, in particular, its speed, came as a surprise not only for Tokyo’s Western partners, but also for many Japanese politicians and experts. This article is devoted to the analysis of its possible causes, as well as the search for an answer to the next question.
Is the dialogue between Russia and Japan a situational political maneuver or a step towards cooperation on security issues?

By the mid-2010’s China has continued to impress the world with high economic dynamics, major achievements in social transformation, development of science and technology. The fifth generation of Chinese leaders is determined to offer the country a serious update that signifies, as authors believe, a transition to a new stage of evolution. This stage is characterized by accomplishment of modernization and transition to intensive development, consumer, techno-scientific and ecological revolution. Global economic expansion is an integral part of the new reality.
China’s global expansion is of complex nature including credit and overseas investment. Initially it was started by the state after accession to WTO and becomes both more intensive and natural with accomplishment of modernization. At the same time, Beijing stresses the need of self-reliance, particularly in technology. 
Although in new century China’s expansion to the growing extent was based on economic and market forces including prospering population, by the mid-2010’s it met sharp opposition in the West, notably, the US. That confirmed the notion of emerging new bipolarity in international relations.
Moving closer to China, Russia reacted peacefully to Chinese expansion, moreover, a vision of deepening mutual interaction has formed at the political level. This interaction includes multilateral format including countries of Central Asia, interconnection of Eurasian Economic Union with the “Belt and Road” Initiative.

The crisis of Australian-Russian relations after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the set of factors that caused it have received little attention from scholars of international affairs. The article contributes to addressing this research lacuna. It examines the 2014–2015 crisis in bilateral relations from the point of view of both Moscow and of Canberra. The author analyses the evolution of these relations before 2014 to understand whether the Ukrainian crisis was the cause of their sharp deterioration in 2014–2015, or it only accelerated the process that began much earlier. He demonstrates that Australia had no close political and economic ties with Russia, and the two countries did not consider each other as priority partners. The article finds that in 2014–2015 the Kremlin did not take into account a number of factors, such as very limited interest of Australia in commercial exchanges with Russia, Canberra’s growing suspicions about Moscow’s foreign policy intentions and view of Russia as a revisionist power (especially after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war), a strong sense of solidarity with the West among Australia’s political elites, and Russia’s increasingly worsening public image in Australia, that negatively affected Canberra’s stance towards the Kremlin even before 2014, and which greatly contributed to the crisis in bilateral relations. As for future development, the author identifies two factors that may have a negative impact on Russian-Australian relations: 1) rising energy demand in China and India, making Russia and Australia potential competitors in Asia’s gas markets; 2) a too close rapprochement of Moscow with Beijing, fraught
with the risk of embroiling Russia in a web of conflicts in the Western Pacific.

Both Russia and the United States consider the Asia-Pacific as the center of the world economy and politics and assume the active presence in the region crucial for their security and economic development. They did not have such sharp contradictions there as in Europe or in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, some of their interests in the Asia-Pacific Region coincide – such as preventing Chinese hegemony. In this regard, the Russian-American dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific could be an important pillar of the positive agenda of their relations and a factor in their sustainability. 
Due to foreign policy inertia, the inflexibility of the agenda of Russian-American relations and the inability of the parties to go beyond the usual pattern, such a dialogue has not even begun. Both sides demonstrated strategic myopia. This weakened the resilience of US-Russian relations in the face of new challenges and accelerated their deterioration and disruption to a new confrontation. The Asia-Pacific has become another theater of the US-Russian systemic confrontation. However, it is in the interest of both
Russia and the United States to separate relations in this region from their general confrontation. This will create favorable conditions for Russia to build a balanced partnership system in the Asia-Pacific, which is necessary to consolidate its role as an independent global great power. In addition, the Russian-American dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, or at least the weakening of their confrontation in this region, will reduce its polarization and prevent tensions between the US and its Asian allies and partners.

The foreign policy course “Turn to Asia”, taken by Russia in the early 2000s, was not accompanied, however, by the expansion of interaction with the countries of South East Asia. Despite creating a certain foundation for the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, its potential is far from being fully explored. The presence of objective factors hampered its expansion and limited the active involvement of Russia in regional integration processes. The article assesses the prospects for the development of relations with Southeast Asian countries in the context of Russia’s strategic and economic interests in the region and the emerging conditions for their implementation. The authors note that the region has begun to acquire strategic importance for Russia, firstly, for economic reasons, given the dynamics of its growth and the possibility of its involvement in Russian integration projects,
secondly, for geopolitical reasons, based on an assessment of its contribution to the formation of a security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, the principles of which are generally consistent with Russia’s strategic interests, which are realized within the framework of diplomatic and militarypolitical
rapprochement with the countries of South East Asia. The article notes that in building their relations with them, Russia proceeds from the fact that its more active participation in regional affairs may become a factor hindering the establishment of hegemony by one of the great powers in the region, which generally meets the interests of the Southeast Asian countries themselves. At the same time, the authors come to the conclusion that in search of a force  capable of ensuring stability in the region, the choice of Southeast Asian countries is unlikely to stop only on Russia, whose real level of political influence in the region is still low. As for economic cooperation Russia with the countries of South East Asia, in recent years, the interaction between them in the framework of bilateral relations has strengthened, primarily in trade. Russia has a positive balance in trade with the countries of the region. However, investment cooperation between them is small in scope and does not play a significant role in the economies of the counterparty countries. The article provides a detailed analysis of the problems that complicate Russia’s economic cooperation with the countries of South East Asia and offers recommendations for solving them, taking into account the specifics of Russian business and the particularities of the local market development. The authors come to the conclusion that the success of Russia’s economic relations with the countries of South East Asia will largely depend on whether we recognize them as equally important partners as China or India. No political steps taken by Russia in South East Asia will lead to a strengthening of its position in the region, if they are not accompanied by its economic expansion. 

The article considers the origins and current perspectives of the concept of the “Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” (IOZOP). It was formed within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. The concept was supported by the countries of the Indian Ocean Region as the opportunity to avoid the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of conflict between the great powers. Initially formulated very vaguely, in the end the IOZOP concept was reduced mainly to the requirement for non-regional powers to stop testing weapons and deployment of military forces and assets on the islands of the Indian Ocean. Despite the proclamation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace by UNGA in 1971, the Western powers ignored this decision, refusing to withdraw its military
forces and bases from the region. The subsequent disagreements between the regional actors, some of which feared increasing India’s power, and the dramatic change in the political situation in the world led l
to a decline in interest in this idea. However, in 2014, India, and Sri Lanka expressed their readiness to put this issue on the agenda again. The author analyzes the history of origin and attempts to realize the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the reasons for its failure, highlights the positions of the main countries concerned, key moments that hinder and contribute to the formation of a zone of peace. He concludes that under current conditions, the IOZOP concept can be implemented in an updated form as part of a potential ocean management structure that could be formed on the basis of regional structures such as IORA and IONS.

The article analyzes Russia’s policy from the point of view of goals formulated by the government in response to challenges in international politics, economics and security, as well as challenges associated with the threat of losing the status of a great power, maintaining territorial integrity and independence. Russia’s dissatisfaction with the existing order of things – when its interests were not taken into account, and the West did not set any limits for itself, advancing its geopolitical interests –had been growing for a long time, however, most clearly manifested itself in the landmark 2014 when Western sanctions after the Crimean events pushed the Russian authorities and business to more active in the Asia-Pacific.

The authors formulate a number of signs of the new regional order of the Asia-Pacific countries, which may develop into a new international (global) order. This type of system, according to the authors, will be more competitive and less hierarchical, within its framework there will not be a single dominant force or ideology, it will be based on a multitude of centers of power. Such a world order is more attractive for Russia than the unipolar Atlantic order. It will give the country the opportunity to use its own comparative advantages, such as territory, resources, hard power, a fairly rigid political organization and the ability to mobilize resources for strategic purposes. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the modern non-Western world is still very amorphous, its future contours are blurred, and Asian business is still weakly responding to the Russian “turn to the East”.

The article is devoted to the problems of the development of modern relations of Russia, China and the  Pacific states of Latin America. Author focuses on potential of cooperation of these states in multilateral  formats and dialogues and the reform of the economic and institutional order in the Asia-Pacific. The  relevance of such cooperation is increasing due to the crisis of the international order that has emerged  in the Asia-Pacific region. This crisis manifests itself in two aspects. First, we may observe a certain lack  of institutions of regulation of economic relations and ideas for their further development. Such a  complex agenda is shaped by Russia and China in relation to Eurasia (the concept of “Greater Eurasia”),  but the promotion of a similar agenda in the APEC faces many contradictions. Second, the Asia-Pacific region is becoming an area of confrontation between the United States and China, which is also  manifested in the struggle for the future configuration of the regional order in the region. The Pacific  countries of Latin America were not affected by either the Russian or Chinese mega-initiatives of recent  years, which are aimed precisely at creating a new international order. Meanwhile, these countries are  APEC members and participants in many regional initiatives, as well as potentially significant economic  partners for both Russia and China. Moreover, the author believes that a similar level of economic  development and similar needs objectively bring together the views and approaches of the leading  Eurasian powers and the Pacific states of Latin America to the development of multilateral institutions of  the regional order. However, the historically established institutional and political linkage of these  countries to the United States currently determines their support for American initiatives. This provision, however, is not a given, and some irregularity of the American regional policy under the Trump  administration makes the development of dialogue with these countries on the broad problems of  multilateral cooperation in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region even more in demand. The author  considers the proposed analysis and some conclusions as an opportunity for academic and expert  discussion on the identified issues.