Both academic research and political debate have focused on the European Union’s much-mentioned but little-understood ‘democratic deficit’. By contrast, this article shifts the emphasis to the issue of the EU’s crisis of legitimacy. It begins by suggesting that neither the process nor the outcomes of EU-wide decision-making appears to command majority support. Is this lack of democratic legitimacy merely the result of institutional ‘design faults’ or does it reflect a wider and deeper crisis underpinning the EU’s entire political project? My argument is that the dominant models of integration – neo-functional supranationalism and liberal intergovernmentalism – rest on three errors: (1) the primacy of economic integration over political union, which has led to a marketstate that is disembedded from society and a citizenry that is subordinated to the joint rule of the economic and the political; (2) a premature process of constitutionalisation that culminated in the rejection of the 2005 Constitutional Treaty and the flawed Lisbon Treaty; (3) the current institutional arrangements that concentrate power in the hands of supranational institutions and national governments at the expense of the Union’s citizenry. The first section puts the question of democratic legitimacy in the context of the EU’s current slide towards disintegration. Section two provides an account of the EU’s crisis of legitimacy and explores the main causes that have led to this predicament. Section three suggests that some of the origins can be traced to the inception of the European project in the post-1945 era. Section four argues that the prospect for a core EU (around the Eurozone countries) is rapidly receding. Section five outlines a new settlement that focuses on the idea of a Europe of nations, while the final section develops this thinking in the direction of a civic commonwealth that is grounded in the shared culture of European countries.

The article contains analysis of three interlinked topics: the European policy in Germany, an impact of European integration on internal political order of the country and modern state and perspectives of German euroscepticism. The German government has been a proactive leader of both the EU enlargement and deepening of European integration. The author considers the roots of the European policy in Germany and critically assesses its strengths and weaknesses. It is stressed that during the period of rapid growth of the EU in 1990s – beginning of 2000s Berlin played a significant role in the process. However, the crisis of the EU development which had been taking place since the first decade of 2000s remains to be a crucial reason for Germany to correct its European policy and leads to the appearance of unprecedented discourse of euroscepticism, which previously existed only in a form of marginalized narrative. The author presents an analysis of the reasons of German euroscepticism, its organizational structure, electoral support groups and some problems of its appearance and perspectives. Considering some unique characteristics of the German case, the author names such aspects as the absence of direct demands for exit, moderate character of articulated demands and organizational disunity. From the author’s point of view, euroscepticism is closely linked with nationalism, what especially stressed in the German case. The author concludes by saying about potential depletion of political and socio-economical agenda constructed by eurosceptics. It is stated that for German political elites the rise of euroscepticism is a factor which prompts them to rethink European policy and its further development.

The phenomena of euroscepticism in France is analyzed in the paper. The participation of France in key projects of the European construction is examined. The models combining supranational initiatives with French national interests are described in this context. Main differences between federalist project of J. Monnet and R. Schumann and confederalist plans of Ch. de Gaulle and F. Mitterrand. The positions of French eurosceptical parties and movements and second half of XX century are researched. The particularities of evolution for leftish eurosceptics are analyzed in the cases of the French Communist party, Trotskyist forces, left souverenists and antiliberal left of J-L. Mélenchon. The specifics of development for right-side eurosceptics is outlined by the examples of Gaullist parties, right neogaullist souverenists, ultra-right conservative and antiglobalist forces including the National Front. Common and different features in the agendas of leftish and right-wing eurosceptics are shown, the referendum agenda of 2005 is among them. Contemporary trends in the development of French eurosceptics, their positions and social base in the presidential elections of 2017 are examined. The author concludes that despite the rising of leftish and right-wing eurosceptics, electoral alliances between them could be just tactical. The promotion of common candidate by both leftish and right-wing eurosceptics seems to be unrealistic in the near future – as well as the French “exit” from EU. Nevertheless eurosceptics – the ones who reflect protest sentiments – will keep influencing the French society: they will force the establishment reacting to urgent issues promoted by eurosceptic agenda. 

The primary focus of the paper is on the contemporary sociopolitical discussion in France about the problems of European integration. One of its key aspects, the debate among the eminent thinkers, philosophers and historians, is analyzed. The French intellectuals always emphasized the problem of the united Europe building considering the continent as the field for the France’s economic, political and cultural expansion. Since the second half of the XXth century the vision of the country’s future has been inherent in the European project’s realization. From the French thinkers’ point of view the European community turned into a kind of superstructure over the liberal democratic states that neutralized the risks of their interaction as well as opened the prospects for mutual development. At the same times these institutes were a sort of temporary construction. The French commentators point out that from the very beginning they had no the firm political foundation. This preconditioned the current crisis. The problem of the legitimacy of the European institutions turned out to be insoluble. The idea to construct them beyond the field of the common nationhood on the ground of latent economic integration removed the possibility to create a kind of superstate in the form of federation. The post-statist model based on the idea of European civil society remained nothing but the abstraction. The mechanisms of the redistribution that could help creating the united social field are absent. The choice in favor of the so called value legitimacy was made that to the French thinkers’ mind produced an illusion that the European institutions can be stabilized. In fact this laid the groundwork for their deconstruction in the future. The most of the French intellectuals are united in the pessimism as of the EU’s prospects. Their evaluations of the latest signs of the crisis only vary in what concerns the point of view on the problem.The eurooptimists remain in minority while the eurosceptics are debating the measures that should be taken in order to reconstruct the EU. Some of them come to conclusion that this question should be regarded as part of the reforming of the contemporary liberal democratic state as such. 

The United Kingdom has been developing due to political compromise that has a positive impact over British political system to solve dichotomy between the principles of Parliament sovereignty and regional home rule. These principles seriously depend on selfidentification processes that reflect significance of Britishness and ethno-national (regional) identities in consciousness and political culture of citizens. Struggle or reconciliation of the identities was complicated after Great Britain had become a member of European Common market. It is evident that European identity has enforced regional ones, for it is better to be a people among other peoples in Europe than just an ethno-national minority in the state. However, Britishness keeps its positions due to British global project, and it was proved by Brexit. Anyway, Brexit revealed demarcation lines, based on identities, and the threat of territorial integrity of the United Kingdom.

The article analyses the changes in the interaction between the EU institutions and civil society organizations. The article first sets the conceptual stage by examining the role of civil society in the political arena and specifically in the context of the Europeanization. It then identifies 3 major phases of European activism: 1) 1993–2001, the period in which institutional channels were opened for civil society at the European level; 2) 2001–2014, the period in which civil society played a full role within the EU governance; 3) 2014 to present day, in which the emergence and consolidation of anti-EU establishment civil society has become a central political issue for the EU. Three specific European master frames are analyzed, before the focus is shifted to the global level. Concluding remarks are presented on the critical issue and the future prospect for the EU with reference to the impact of social mobilization from below in a context of crisis. 

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the attitude of the political establishment and the societies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the European Union after Brexit. Being the most “obedient” members of the EU, the Baltic countries were dramatically concerned with the results of the eferendum. If NATO is perceived in the Baltic States as a cornerstone of “hard” security, the European Union is traditionally considered as a guarantor of social and economic stability. In this regard, the Baltic countries are trying to assess the future of the EU optimistically, despite the crises of recent years. The article analyzes political platforms of both systemic and marginal political parties, as well as public attitudes towards European integration and specific EU policies. Euroscepticism in the Baltic States is not institutionalized and is rather poorly consolidated within the party system. At the same time, the parliamentary parties use moderately Eurosceptic rhetoric for populist purposes, in practice pursuing state policy of intensifying European and Euro-Atlantic integration. On the contrary, non-parliamentary and marginal parties (both right-wing and left-wing) are distinguished by a more radical Euroscepticism, including appeals to withdraw from the EU and NATO. The grass-root sentiments in the Baltic states can be characterized as unsystematic Euroscepticism. Having a critical stance towards specific EU policies (especially those that threaten the cultural identities of quite conservative Baltic societies), residents of these states actively enjoy freedom of movement and the opportunity to work in any EU country. The Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia is traditionally something specific. Having the opportunity to benefit from the EU membership, they are much more prone to Eurosceptic sentiments, since membership did not justify their hopes to eliminate the “democratic deficit” (restrictions on rights and freedoms related to the use of the Russian language or belonging to a non-title ethnic group). 

Nowadays in Europe there is an increasing number of political forces who call themselves eurosceptics. Italy, as a countryfounder of the EU, is no exception. Today, public opinion polls and the voting results indicate that the Five stars Movement (“MoVimento 5 Stelle”) is the most popular party in Italy. Among other things, the Movement stands on the position of euroscepticism, in particular, it is in favour of holding a referendum on the country’s withdrawal from the Euro zone. The paper examines the place and role of the party “MoVimento 5 Stelle” in the political landscape of Italy, its’ history and general points of party programme.

Euroscepticism is a comparatively new political phenomenon. It consists of many aspects, such as critics of Europeism as a political ideology of the EU. This ideology is syncretical and includes different elements of famous political thoughts by Hobbes, Locke, French Enlightenment and German classic philosophy. The core principles of europeism are principles of progressism, universalism (which is known as ground for the ideas of liberal democracy). Today europeism has replaced traditional ideologies of conservatism and socialism and created new types of quasi-religions. The main principles of this ideology are formed and implemented on the level of supranational European institutions. On contrary, euroscepticism restores principles of traditional ideologies, being a significant oppositional actor in relation to europeism. During the last years, euroscepticism has been taking strong positions on both national and supranational levels. Especially, this can be seen referring to the experience of Central Eastern Europe, which, nontheless, has a successful story of European integration. The case of Central Eastern European countries shows a nationalistic character of euroscepticism (in its economic and political senses) and illustrates the people’s reaction on practices of the transfer of values and political practices. In Bulgaria euroscepticism remains weak – its membership is still seen as the only alternative, keeping in mind the destroying effect of the country’s shift toward democracy and market. Bulgarian euroscepticism connects with the people’s hopelessness in relation the EU as an actor, which is to deal with national problems.