The  view  of  both  Moscow and Washington on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for a long time rested on the principle, formulated in the late 1960s, which held that anti-missile systems for defense of the territories were destabilizing, therefore limiting them would strengthen strategic stability. Since that time the USSR and then Russia always adhered to this principle, while the US at times rejected it (i.e. the SDI program of the 1980s) and by now has finally given it up altogether.

Meanwhile , the majority of the independent leading experts assess the chances of the existing US missile defense to tangibly affect Russia’s nuclear strike capability as extremely  low.  However, the  US  unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 seriously undermined  political trust between Moscow and  Washington.  The unwillingness of the US to provide Russia with a legally binding commitment  not to direct its BMD system against it (including technical constraints) contributes to the problem. In addition, the US missile defense system is being built as an open-ended system with no future restrictions on its expansion and improvement.

Russia has responded to the creation of the US national missile defense system with the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces and initiation of its own Air-Space Defense (ASD) system.

The difference of the concepts of the BMD system development in the United States and the ASD system in Russia lies in that the US system is intended to defend against limited attacks of intercontinental ballistic missiles against the North American continent or of medium-range missiles against the US allies in Europe and the Pacific region. The Russian ASD is a multilayered system designed to protect against a protracted air-space of-fensive by the US/NATO involving high-precision conventional weapons (including future hypersonic and  space-based systems) and limited use of nuclear weapons. Although there has been a long break in a meaning ful US-Russian dialogue on missile defense, it is still possible to reach some positive agreements. If the US and Russia resume negotiations on limitation  and reduction of strategic offensive arms, it might open a window for a compromise on missile defense.

Such a compromise can be based on  an agreed threshold  separating,  on  the  one hand, missile defense systems that can significantly  affect  strategic stability  by  in-tercepting a large number  of US or Russian ICBMs and SLBMs and, on the other hand – systems that will allow the US and

Russia to protect their territories against at-tacks by third states or rogue regimes and would thus strengthen their mutual security. The first class of BMD systems would be subject to restrictions, while the second one would be given a green light. Moreover, in the second case there would reemerge an opportunity of the development of a joint defense systems of the two powers, which was declared in 2002 but never came true.

 

The new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), published in January 2018, stipulates a “tailored” strategy towards each country  which  Washington  sees as presenting a nuclear challenge to the United States. Yet  each “tailored”  strategy is based on the same reiterated assumption that the U.S. measures and programs are developed in response to external hostile actions. The NPR cites other countries’ aggressive behavior and military buildup as the reason to reinstitute the role of nuclear weapons as the key component of the U.S. deterrent, modernize the U.S. strategic triad and dual-capable aircraft, develop new small-yield warheads, create sealaunched cruise missiles, and reinforce the C3 systems to support them. These initiatives go along with the new expanded understanding of “extreme circumstances” which allow for a U.S. nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack, as well as with other new features of the U.S. nuclear doctrine: the creation of “more  usable”  types of nuclear weapons, the integration of nuclear and conventional elements of planning and  operations, the enhanced focus on cyber threats, and the prioritization of “flexibility,” “uncertainty,” and “hedging” – which all increase the danger of an actual use of nuclear weapons. The NPR presents Russia as a higher threat compared to China, while China – as a major challenge to the United States in the Asian region. Yet the NPR does not call these two states “adversaries”  and  stresses the need to avoid confrontation and an arms race. Besides Russia’s  “aggressive  policies,”  military programs and bellicose declarations, the NPR focuses on its alleged adherence to the concept of “escalation for de-escalation”  – early first use of nuclear weapons to end a conventional conflict on favorable terms – a notion that the NPR sets to counteract. The requirements  formulated by the NPR towards Iran and North Korea include ensuring their non-nuclear status, countering their growing influence in the respective Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, preventing the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies and sensitive materials to third parties and states, and convincingly demonstrating that their aggression, including a conventional one, would be met with resolute action by the United States and its allies. Yet, in a shuffle of a kind, opposite to how the Obama Administration renounced military solution to the Iran problem and chose negotiations with this country with no preliminary condition, – and at the same time preferred the tactics of isolating North Korea and disregarding its claims, – now it is with Seoul that Washington  may engage with, while simultaneously demonstrating a tough line towards Teheran. Yet the shifts towards a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, along with certain signs of restraint in the NPR, offer some grounds to hope that  – given political will and active international  efforts – the worst-case scenarios and  further deterioration of international  situation may successfully be avoided.

The article analyses the dynamics of development of nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. The authors identify two central factors in competition between India-Pakistan  in  the  sphere of nuclear weapons. First, India-China  border war in  1962 and  PRC’s accession to the “nuclear club” in 1964 which left India with no alternative to the “nuclear option”. Secondly, India – Pakistan armed conflicts of 1965 and 1971, which prompted the Pakistani  ruling circles to develop own nuclear weapons. The article examines and evaluates main stages in the development of nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan and analyses their impact on the geopolitical situation in the region. The authors draw attention  to invisible presence of  the  “Chinese  factor”  in  their  bilateral relations and influence of “all-weather friendship” of Pakistan and PRC on the political processes in South Asian region. Attention is drawn at the need for the creation of system of collective security in the Asian Continent.

Against  the  background  of the coupling of a number  of crisis in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Syria, Yemen, Iran) the Donald Trump  administration is elaborating its basic strategy toward those conflicts and toward the region as a whole. The centerpiece of the strategy is the task to counter Iran, foremost its nuclear program. From now on the American approaches to other regional crises are determined by this Anti-Iranian logic. It might mean in particular that the developments in Syria are being perceived in Washington primarily in context of the growing US confrontation with Iran. And only in the second turn – in context of seeking solution in Syria and for Syria itself.

The New American  strategy toward Iran came across open misunderstanding on the side of the Washington’s partners in Europe who launched a campaign with the aim to resist the Trump’s line as well as to keep on the world community’s deal with Iran concluded in  the year 2015 (JCPOA) which bears on restricting the size of the Iranian  nuclear program versus gradual lifting of international  sanctions from Iran. With intent to minimize  the damage from Trump’s withdrawal from the deal for the European companies in Iran the EU applied two defensive tools in the financial domain  – The Blocking Statute  and  The Special Purpose Vehicle pertaining to secure the financial transactions with  Tehran. Such a clear EU’s withstanding with the USA can hardly prove effective taking into account that the Washington’s stake on countering Iran seems to let Trump’s team to achieve many of the declared objectives in the Middle East. Among them – to mobilize the Sunni community  in the region, to make it get closer to Israel and finally to reestablish the military dominance in the Persian Gulf with ability to control the oil export’s roots there.

The result of the implementation of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program was the creation and successful testing  of  a  thermonuclear  explosive device. Over a fifty-year period, the nuclear industry was established in the country, including all the necessary enterprises, from uranium ore mining, enrichment, the production of uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride, and the production of special materials such as ultra-pure graphite, lithium-6 and lithium deuteride. The nuclear complex in Yongbyon played a central role in the implementation of the program, a reactor was built for the production of weapons-grade plutonium  and tritium,  production of fuel for this reactor was created, chemical reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel with separation of plutonium  was created, and uranium enrichment production plant was put in operation.

The task of the complete controlled and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK, put on the agenda, will require complete information  about the North Korean nuclear weapons  program  and  the  nuclear weapons complex that  was developed. However, the presented review shows that information about the state of the nuclear programs of the DPRK, due to the extreme closeness of the country, is very scarce and contradictory. In  this  regard, the  implementation of denuclearization will require extraordinary effort, time, and a step-by-step approach.

The focus of the Chinese nuclear strategy is still unclear and the actual size of nuclear arsenals of the PRC has never been published officially. According to the official Chinese nuclear policy, the PRC can use nuclear weapons only as means of “effective retaliation“ in the credible second strike. Despite the official Chinese stance, we have to recognize that the PRC now is the third nuclear power in  the world. That follows from the pragmatic assessment of the size of its nuclear arsenals and the variety of nuclear weapons, which China managed to design and deploy. Note that China is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council which has been actively improving and expanding its nuclear arsenals after the demise of the bipolar world.

For many years the development of the Chinese nuclear forces had lagged behind the pace of the arms race set by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The things had changed since the 1990s. Against the background of the superpowers’  deep cuts of nuclear weapons the PRC managed the radical modernization of its nuclear forces, and their shape has changed drastically. A full-scale deployment of the improved mobile solid-propellant IRBM,  SLBM and  ICBM  raises the Chinese nuclear forces to a new level. According to some assessments, China may work to achieve strategic parity with the U.S. and Russia.

At the same time, the PRC is almost not bound  by obligations of the international  arms  control  regimes,  apart  of  the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Intense modernization of the strategic nuclear forces and lack of obligations are raising an issue of China’s involvement in international arms control regimes. It seems reasonable to conduct the pilot trilateral negotiations (China,  Russia, and  U.S.) on precision-guided hypersonic weapons, boost-glide in particular.

Israel  is  widely  believed to possess nuclear weapons, but has never confirmed the existence of its nuclear program. Historians have for a long time largely relied on limited access to U.S. government documents and on the oral histories of those with inside knowledge of Israel’s nuclear program. However lately declassified documents demonstrated a semi-official recognition  by the US Department  of Defense that Israel a de facto acknowledgement by the US as a nuclear power. While the documents confirm what is already known regarding Israel’s nuclear arsenal, the political implications are potentially far-reaching, particularly in relation to Israeli’s negative attitude  to Iran’s  alleged nuclear program. Israel nuclear program is an essential part of long-term Israeli national security strategy and a security doctrine. National security has been at the forefront of the Israeli experience for seven decades, with threats ranging from terrorism, to vast missile arsenals, and even potential existential nuclear dangers. Israel state’s national security doctrine, in its broadest sense intended to protect and promote the state’s national security interests. One of the main features of this nuclear program development is the specifically nuclear relationship between  Israel and US which acting as official guarantor of Israel security and consider it as the main recipient of American protection. The aim of this article is to describe and analyze nuclear strategy’s concept from a historical perspective-that is, to trace its evolution. Israel has long enforced a policy of opacity with regards to its nuclear program even though its existence is a common knowledge throughout the world. Today Israel considers Iran as the main geopolitical enemy. Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, it would be a “game changer” in the region and spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Israel faces a threat to its national interest in that Iran could become a greater relative regional power. Israel has been particularly outspoken in the opposition to the JCPoA signed in 2015 as it concern was that even if Iran acts rationally according to realist understandings of national interest, it still may not be receptive to diplomatic efforts to stop its nuclear program.

Argentina and Brazil were among the first developing countries that have undertaken  the development  of nuclear energy. In these largest South American States, the interest in atom was born in the depths of the military establishment and was spurred by the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for leadership in the Latin American region, especially during dictatorial regimes. In those years, in both countries there were plans to develop its own nuclear weapons, determining  their negative attitude  to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the plans of making Latin  America  a nuclear-weapons-free zone. With the return to the democratic forms of government the projects to create their own nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the agenda, and the relations between Buenos Aires and Brasilia transformed into strategic cooperation, and engulfed the sphere of peaceful atom. In the international arena, the two countries came to oppose weapons of mass destruction and to support nuclear disarmament. It may be noted that, having passed a long way of mastering the power of the atom, Argentina and Brazil have found their own place in the global nuclear industry. Both countries have built research reactors and nuclear power plants, established enterprises of nuclear fuel cycle, conducted fundamental and applied research in the nuclear field. Argentina  has exported nuclear technology and equipment, including modern low-power reactors, Brazil became the world’s only non-nuclear country building a nuclear submarine. To date, nuclear generation occupies but a modest place in the energy balance of these South American countries which, among other things, is due to other rich sources of energy in their possession. But the very logic of scientific and technological development pushes Argentina and Brazil to broader and more diversified use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, encourages to increase their efforts in this regard, deploy national programs and expand the range of international interaction.

By the end of the las decade, a new “nuclear” status quo was asserted in Europe as a result of deep reductions of non-strategic weapons of Russia and the US, the elimination of Russian and American intermediate-and shorter-range missiles, and the reduction of the arsenals by Great Britain and France. The commitment of NATO states not to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and the mutual commitments of Russia and the members of the alliance to exercise restraint in stationing of conventional forces are important elements of this status quo. Twice during the past decade, different options of amending this status quo were on the NATO’s agenda. In 2010–2012, proposals were put forward to unilaterally completely or partially withdraw the remaining American nuclear bombs from Europe. In 2014–2016, in the context of NATO’s returning to the policy of deterring Russia, debates concentrated on the expedience of returning to a fully-fledged nuclear deterrence that would imply an increase in the stockpile of non-strategic weapons and a different geography of their deployment in Europe, including the option of deploying them in the East-Central European countries. However, both rounds of the debates resulted in a draw. The nuclear status quo established in Europe after the end of the Cold war was preserved. Against the background of the Ukraine crisis, the option of a full or partial withdrawal of American non-strategic weapons is off the agenda for a foreseeable future. The option of mutual  negotiated further reductions of Russian and American non-strategic weapons is currently not considered either. At the same time, the proponents of strengthening nuclear deterrence in Europe failed to convince their opponents within the alliance of the expedience of returning to the Cold war time strategy. It is premature to conclude, however, that the testing of the nuclear status quo is over. Ongoing debates are further affected by the critical status of the 1987 INF Treaty and the continued erosion of the conventional arms control regime in Europe.

This paper is devoted to the consideration of some aspects related to the development of the Israeli nuclear program. In the first part of it, the main literature and sources on this subject are considered and classified. The second part of the work presents an author’s analysis of the reasons why the newly independent state of Israel decided to implement an unprecedented project in terms of its scale and level of risk. The third part of the article is devoted to the study of France’s role in the formation and development of the Israeli nuclear program. The paper shows that all information about the Israeli nuclear program can be divided into five groups: personal documents of people who somehow related to the formation of the concept of the country’s nuclear program and its implementation; Israeli and foreign official documents relating to the subject matter under study, including transcripts of meetings and speeches; articles, notes, blogs on the Internet in various languages; mentions of the Israeli nuclear program in monographs devoted to a different subject; monographs devoted directly to issues related to the development of the Israeli nuclear program. To the reasons that prompted Israel to launch its own project on creating nuclear weapons, it should be attributed: the trauma of the Holocaust, the irrational fear of total destruction of the Jewish people and the consequent need to ensure the security of the only Jewish state. The paper shows the key role of France, and especially the military establishment of the Fourth Republic, in the emergence of the Israeli nuclear program; the motives that prompted the French elite to render effective assistance to the young state in implementing such an ambitious project are examined as well.