Thoughts on the «charismatic features» of the new US president are a direct accusation of the American leader in the potentially authoritarian nature of his government. Meanwhile, Donald Trump does not show any desire to change the Constitution and violate the principle of «separation of powers». ax Weber by no means identified «charismatic» and «authoritarian». Moreover, Max Weber by no means identified «charismatic» and «authoritarian». The objective reality that lies behind these accusations is the desire of the American political establishment to guarantee itself against accidents connected with the outcome of any democratic elections. In essence, this is another form of manifestation of the contradiction between the global nature of the economy, the collective nature of the security system and the national character of democratic politics which is most likely to be resolved not in favor of the latter.

 

The article examines the political views and practices of Russian liberals in the early twentieth century. Russia’s political destiny of this period directly depended on building constructive relations between the authorities and society. Liberal ideas had a significant impact on the educated public. At the same time, the constructive cooperation between the liberals and the government was the most important condition for the possibility of application of these ideas in domestic political practice. The article examines the political experience of the two largest liberal political parties in Russia – the Cadets and the Octobrists. The author comes to the conclusion that the Russian liberal politician of the early twentieth century could not get out of the role of an idealist oppositionist. He was incapable of recognizing the existing realities and the need for political compromises, which were often perceived as a sign of impotence or immorality. The liberals perceived themselves as the only force capable of bringing Russia to the right, «civilized» path. In the opinion of the liberals, this path was inevitable, therefore, under any circumstances, the liberal movement should have retained its leading role. In the spring of 1917, the liberal opposition was able to defeat its historical enemy (autocracy), but retained power for a very short time. The slaughter of the state machine, which the liberals themselves did not intend to preserve, led them to defeat. Thus, the state was the only guarantor of the existence of a liberal movement in Russia.

 

Russian conservatism as a current social thought, consistently turned into political action is formed at the turn of the XVIII-XIX centuries. The goal of its constant aspirations and efforts was creative protection that meant adaptation, modernization, development of the historical Russian autocracy as a response to the liberal-egalitarian challenges of the time. N.M. Karamzin, who went through the accumulation, comprehension and generalization of the empirics of domestic historical experience, developed a system of apology for an autocratic monarchy, which, combined with the atmosphere of the patriotic upsurge of 1812, led to the abolition of the liberal political agenda initiated by Alexander I. The era of Nicholas I was the longest experience of a stable and progressive conservative domestic and foreign policy that ended with the death of her symbol and realizer because of the accumulated contradictions, mistakes and omissions that destroyed her prestige in Russian public opinion. The policy of the liberation reforms of Alexander II in the short term strengthened the autocracy, but in the long term generated social and political dynamism that bore the constant threat of its fall with catastrophic consequences for Russia as a whole. The conservative turn of Alexander III was an imperfect attempt, without losing the prospect of economic progress and the consolidation of the Russian great power in the rapidly changing world of modernity, to take the path of long-term sociopolitical stabilization. After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which resulted from both the grave strategic mistake of Nicholas II and the uncorrected systemic errors of his predecessors, the discrediting of the autocracy took an avalanche character.

 

The paper analyses the relation between political elites and political leaders. It is demonstrated that social shifts in the ranks of the elite are reflected in the profiles of heads of state, and the coming to power of a new president results in the renewal of elites. For years of existence of the Fifth republic several generations of political elite were replaced. At the time of Che. De Gaulle highest public servants were the main political actors. The logic of appointments in the system of executive power changed, a new type of political career was created. During the rule of F. Mitterrand, decentralization expanded the ranks of political elite, strengthened the positions of local elites. The president’s fellow party members came to power, political parties turned into an effective mechanism of recruitment of elite cadres. With E. Macron’s election there was a renewal of the deputy corps; reforms which will lead to further changes in the ranks of elites are planned. The paper investigates political biographies and career paths of presidents of the Fifth republic: the path of a notable, the path of a party functionary and the path of a member of administrative bureaucracy. The path of a notable assumes that the politician starts their career from election in local authorities and gradually works their way up through the ranks of power. The path of a party functionary demonstrates that the politician is rooted in party structures. The path of a bureaucrat assumes ascent to the political Olympus through promotion in the executive power branch and also by entering the immediate environment of the president, prime minister, key ministers. Local rootedness, good knowledge of public administration are characteristic of French presidents. Until recently it was thought that to achieve presidency in France it was necessary to be supported by a strong party. The new French president is an exception to this rule, and the movement he created is not a party in the traditional sense but a network entity. The study further brings to light qualities which the leader has to possess. The role of communication in the life of the French president is explained and it is shown how communication shapes the president’s image and influences public trust in the institution of presidency.

In the 1970s, the Spanish monarchy, represented by King Juan Carlos I, appeared in an unexpected role of the initiator of radical social change. Juan Carlos, the grandson of King Alfonso XIII, deposed in 1931, was brought up by Franco. After the death of Caudillo in November 1975, he assumed the post of head of state. Initially, the king, who shared liberal views, was in a very difficult situation. He was considered as a heir of Franco, he was deprived of democratic and dynastic legitimacy. Juan Carlos managed to appoint his trustees – T. Fernandez-Miranda and A. Souares to key government posts. They had carried out a number of reforms and as a result dismantled the authoritarian Franco regime and led the country to democracy. The king himself, remaining behind the scenes, acted as an arbiter, a “motor” and patron of the process of changes. In Spanish society, the indifference and even the negative attitude towards the monarchy was replaced by confidence in the necessity and usefulness of this institution. Unfortunately, in the last years of the reign of Juan Carlos, his popularity fell sharply due to corruption scandals in the royal family. However, giving an overall assessment of the role of Juan Carlos in Spanish history, the first place should be given to his services, not mistakes. The Spaniards at one time adopted a monarchy, because they were subdued by the king, and not by the monarchy as an institution.

 

In the 1960s after the collapse of the colonial empire, the European direction became more important for Britain than relations with overseas territories. For Britain membership in the EEC and subsequently in the EU was a forced measure for the lack of an alternative. Britain gained a strong position in the integration group, but became “an inconvenient partner” in it, demanding special conditions. In the country there was a constant interand intra-party struggle on the “European question”. Eurosceptics were concerned about the country’s loss of national sovereignty and identity, dissatisfied with the social model of the EU in the spirit of social democracy. Euro-optimists considered self-isolation from the continent as disastrous for the country. The logic of integration led to deepening not only economic cooperation, but also political, which caused the rise of europetceptism in Britain in the conditions of the economic crisis of 2008- 2009, the crisis of the Eurozone and the migration crisis. Against this background, Prime Minister D. Cameron was forced to hold a referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU. The results of the referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU demonstrated a split in society: just over half of the British voted for the country’s withdrawal from the EU. The country is divided on social, age, and regional grounds. Not only socially vulnerable, but socially prosperous sections of the population voted for Brexit. As a result of globalization, the former concern immigration, the latter – the shift of economic power to the East. The political consequences of Brexit are serious. The political consequences of Brexit are serious. Scotland, having voted for the EU, is aiming to hold a new referendum on independence, Northern Ireland is wary of closing the border with Ireland. In the political arena, the struggle between eurosceptics and euro-opportunists did not stop, prompting the replacement of the leader and the Prime Minister (Conservative Party) and the aggravation of the crisis in the Labor Party. The successor of D. Cameron as head of the cabinet, T. May had to announce early parliamentary elections, hoping to strengthen the position of the ruling party and supporters of its line on the eve of difficult negotiations on the conditions for Britain’s withdrawal from the EU.

 

The history of mankind knows a lot of examples when individuals abruptly changed the course of the history of countries and peoples. On March 5, 2013, one of the most influential politicians of Latin America passed away. However, the identity of Hugo Chavez is still the subject of debate and dominates in the Venezuelan political agenda, leaving behind the present President Nicolas Maduro. Paradoxically, Chavez’s approval rating even remains almost 50% after almost five years after his death. Maduro and his government have to be content with a modest rating of 20% and accusations of corruption and bringing the country to a collapse. The article sets the task to analyze the factors contributed to the emergence of the phenomenon of Hugo Chavez and the consequences of the charismatic leadership for the political processes in modern Venezuela.

 

The article examines the process of formation of identity of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – a charismatic leader, an adept of “moderate Islamism” one of the founders of the Justice and Development Party. Historically strong centralized authority was always normal for Turkey and the need for Turks in the charismatic leaders is evident even at the present time. Erdogan is stubborn and consistent, thanking to religious education in his family and in religious Lyceum Imam Hatib. He was always religious and since his student years, joined Islamic politicians. In his student years he became the head of the Istanbul Youth organization of the Islamist National Salvation Party, in whose ranks and files he received good practice of a political organizer. The crisis in the ranks of the Islamists after repeated bans of the Islamist party led to a split in its ranks and Erdogan and his associates established the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Creating the AKP, Erdogan and his colleagues received a very important support from the well-known Muslim preacher, writer and philosopher Fethullah Gülen living in Pennsylvania (USA). The political support of Gülen who has millions of followers in Turkey and a well-organized educational system of the “Hizmet” Movement operating not only in Turkey but also in 140 countries helped the AKP to win the elections to the Turkish Parliament. Numerous graduates of private schools, colleges and universities of F. Gülen has occupied leading positions in business, police, juridical structures and the armed forces of Turkey and became supporters of Erdogan. Economic reforms of the AKP has substantially strengthened the Turkish economy, increased the income of the population and managed to cope successfully with inflation. On this ground Erdogan’s credibility consequently grew in the face of voters who saw him a successful leader and skilled politician. However, Erdogan gradually returned to the daily life of Turks the Islamic religion, which caused discontent among the supporters of secular development of the country. Repeated attempts to remove the AKP from power were not successful. Using strong support from F. Gülen’s structures in the judiciary, Erdogan managed to organize high-profile lawsuits against the army leadership, politicians, and journalists – supporters of secular development of the country. In a popular referendum, the army was excluded from influence on the political system of the country. However, constant criticism of the policies of Erdogan from the side of F. Gülen led to the crisis of union between the two leaders. Using the failed coup attempt Erdogan accused in its organization Fethullah Gülen and began a wide crackdown against his supporters.

 

In the article, the party system of the Netherlands is examined in the focus of two key factors: the historically inherent pillarization system that shaped the current party segmentation, and the European integration that left its impact on the party programs (the authors’ intention was to analyze especially Euroscepticism of several Dutch parties). The Dutch party system was shaped under the influence of the early 20th century corporatism, and, unlike other elements of the pillarization that was eroded in 1960-1970 years under the pressure of exogenous and endogenous factors, it is still based on the pillars backbone. This backbone largely remains as a form of institutionalization, while the party ideologies (except for orthodox Calvinist parties) moved to the center; it should also be noted here that, as a part of the depillarization process and the pan-European tendency of antiestablishment party formation, several “new type” and “new wave” parties were created. The European integration, intensively institutionalized after 1992, left an impact on the programs of all parties, old and new; soft Euroscepticism is inherent in all of them, being largely a reflection of the fear that small EU countries have towards supra-nationalization and the loss of sovereignty (in the case of clerical parties, it is also fear of the further liberalization of societal order). However, in most cases, Euroscepticism is just a background element (except for right-wing populist parties); programs are largely focused on socio-economic aspects, and the Eurosceptic features do not influence directly electoral mobilization.

 

Considering the role of the media in modern society, we need to understand that public opinion about football fans in general is formed out of the information transmitted by the media. The objective of the study is to analyze the different views and aspects of the Euro 2012: its influence on countries development; its profitability but also the behavior of fans – their cooperation and rivalry. However, contemporary scholarship on sports sociology and football fandom subcultures does not recognize class impact on the near-football movement. European Football Championship 2012 showed problems of development and regulation of football fanaticism. It is essential to see how events on Euro 2012 in Poland, collision and confrontation Polish and Russian fans were reflected in Russian, Polish and UK press “Sport-Express”, “Soviet Sport”, “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, “Gazeta Polska”, “The Independent” and “The Guardian”. Football fans’, organization, and culture require precise studies, not only for understanding of current situation, but, perhaps, also for the development of an adequate strategy of interaction with them in the run-up to the World Cup in 2018. It is also necessary to identify not only the relationship of this movement to the different sectors of society, but also a subculture itself and its image in public opinion shaped by the media. In the era of globalization, understanding of youth subcultures is complicated and leads to a paradox. At the moment, there is a modification of the fan movement. On the one hand, we see the transition from bullying to the cultural «fanatism»; on the other hand, the question arises, if the bullies were an integral part of this culture, do we talk about the death or rebirth of culture? Youth subcultures in the era of postmodernism and globalization are transformed, into the phenomenon of «postsubculture», and may enhance the destructive tendencies in the spiritual life of the young generation, increasing the level of nihilistic attitudes. It should also be noted that the movement of football fans is becoming mainstream. There has been an increase in the popularity of fandom in society. This is due to the attention to this phenomenon in the media, in the cinema and fiction.