Since the 1950s, India, the birthplace of Buddhism, has been witnessing a revival of this ancient religious system; recently, this process has received full support from the Indian state, including its top leaders. As a result, some old international Buddhist organizations have been revived on Indian soil, while new ones have been created from scratch, and large events with international participation are being held, aimed at promoting India as a dialogue playground on a global scale. Meanwhile, traditional places of Buddhist pilgrimage are being turned into busy international tourism hotspots and even the ancient hub of Buddhist learning, the University of Nalanda has opened its doors to students after several centuries of oblivion. This paper shows that by doing this, the government tries to solve its own problems as it positions itself as a spiritual center of global importance. The Modi administration, which represents Hindu nationalists, is trying to deliver to the global audience the ideas and slogans of radical Hinduism, thus leveraging Buddhism’s popularity. It also observes, that despite the revival, ordinary Buddhists in India find themselves in the unfortunate position of a religious minority whose faith is not persecuted or suppressed, but rather appropriated.

The purpose of the article is to reveal how the new stage of reforming the Chinese economy will affect its place in the hierarchy of the global economy and the very architecture of the economic world order. To this end, we analyze the features of the implementation of modern Chinese strategies for the development of “new-quality productive forces,” “dual circulation,” “Artificial Intelligence +” (AI), and “newtype industrialization,” as well as trends in globalization, the transnationalization of Chinese companies, and the development of international production chains. It is shown that in China, AI is becoming the most important factor in production and competitiveness, one that is not available to foreign businesses either for organizing production or for sales in the domestic market. In addition, Chinese companies are creating a global-scale production network abroad, invisible in direct investment statistics, with control based on technological dependence on product development in China. Western MNCs are moving production out of China, but at the same time becoming even more dependent on it, since only China can provide the supply of all the necessary materials and equipment, which are compatible only with Chinese R&D and AI. Thus, while Western MNCs compete with each other in goods, China gains monopoly power by providing them with the opportunity to develop and produce these goods quickly, cheaply, and efficiently. The United States remains the world leader in AI and its infrastructure, but unlike China, which has six million factories, American AI is limited in its application. Thus, a transformation of the World System is already taking place, in which the outlines of a more advanced Core are emerging above the post-industrial Center. The countries that enter it will be considered developed. It is proposed to call this new, fourth tier of the world economy “ICT-industrial,” since it is based on ICT infrastructure but generates a synergistic effect only under conditions of industrial sovereignty.

Chinese sea ports serve as central elements of the transport infrastructure, ensuring the integration of different types of transportation and acting as international trade hubs at both national and regional levels. The evolutionary path of development in China’s port sector is closely linked to dynamic changes in the country’s economic indicators and the structural transformations of its national economy. The implementation of the economic openness strategy has given impetus to the growth of import-export operations and contributed to the intensification of modernization processes in port infrastructure. Currently, the main drivers of the development of Chinese ports are digitalization of the Chinese economy; the restructuring, increasing complexity, and transformation of production-logistics chains involving China; and new requirements for international competitiveness. The research methodology is based on monitoring results from primarily Chinese sources, followed by a comparative approach, and descriptive and statistical analysis. The study analyzes the dynamics of key indicators in the port industry and related sectors in China since the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy; explores changes in state investment policies toward the port complex and its management; examines the current structure of China’s port industry, which forms an agglomeration effect through optimizing the placement of production capacity and adapting industrial structures to meet the needs of the leading sectors of the Chinese economy; and identifies key trends in the development of China’s seaports.

The objective of the study is to identify and assess the impact of the Western sanctions policy on the long-term dynamics of the volume and structure of FDI in the Far Eastern Federal District (FEFD) since the early 2010s. The first part of the article examines the stages of the development of the sanctions policy, the formation of its subjects, goals and objects, as well as its methods and mechanisms. The second part of the article is devoted to a synchronous comparative analysis of the stages of the sanctions policy and changes in the volume of FDI inflow and accumulation in the FEFD, their geographical structure, and sectoral distribution. The final section highlights the key changes in the dynamics of cross-border investment in the FEFD and puts forward assumptions about the factors behind these changes and the role of the sanctions policy among them. It is concluded that the damage caused to the inflow and accumulation of FDI in the FEFD by the sanctions was relatively smaller than at the national level, which was largely due to the system of Far Eastern development institutions created in the second half of the 2010s. At the same time, the preferential policy was unable to prevent the concentration of FDI in the extractive sector of the macroregion and the rapidly increasing dependence of its economy on the movement of Chinese capital.

The article analyzes the role of the oil factor in the development of Russian-Saudi relations at the present stage. It is shown that despite significant geopolitical differences between Moscow and Riyadh on key issues of the Middle East agenda, energy cooperation between the two countries continues to develop progressively. Particular attention is paid to the formation of the OPEC+ format, which has become an effective tool for coordinating the oil policies of the largest hydrocarbon exporters. The main stages of the development of bilateral relations are examined – from the early 2000s, when the parties overcame their first differences, to the COVID-19 pandemic, the beginning of the acute phase of the Ukrainian conflict and the subsequent crisis phenomena in the global oil market. The author emphasizes the special role of personal contacts between the leaders of Russia and Saudi Arabia in resolving emerging contradictions and reaching compromises on regulating oil production volumes. Riyadh’s modern diplomatic strategy demonstrates a multi-vector approach, in which Russia is positioned as an important partner in the energy sector, with significant influence on the global oil market.

In the late 2010s to early 2020s, the presence of so-called “middle powers” in Africa, including Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), significantly expanded. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others, which act as regional “centers of power,” have leveraged competition among major global states (China, India, the U.S., France, etc.) to advance their interests. These middle powers increasingly influence the political and economic development of African nations by participating in peacekeeping missions and peace negotiations, supporting allied regimes, intervening in conflicts (including through arms supplies to conflicting parties), and boosting investments in key sectors of African economies while expanding development assistance. The UAE has emerged as one of the largest geopolitical players in Africa, actively pursuing multidimensional cooperation with countries across the continent. Geographic proximity, religious ties with many African states and peoples, substantial investments, and development assistance have positioned the Emirates as one of the most desirable partners for African nations, including SSA states. This status is further reinforced by the UAE’s accession to BRICS in 2024. While acknowledging the positive effects of UAE-Africa economic cooperation, the authors also highlight the negative consequences of the Emirates’ interference in the internal affairs of African countries.

The paper analyzes the flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA) into Ethiopia. The study is structured along two primary dimensions: by donor countries and by recipient sectors within the Ethiopian economy. Particular attention is paid to emerging donors – primarily members of BRICS – and traditional ODA-providing organizations, as well as to the opportunities for the rational utilization of these funds to improve the living standards of the local population. The research investigates the interdependence between incoming foreign ODA and its role as a factor in Ethiopia’s economic growth. A developed econometric model with a time lag incorporates factors of Ethiopia’s institutional environment – such as political stability, the quality of governance, and corruption mitigation – in relation to achieving economic growth targets. The findings indicate a correlation between the quality of Ethiopia’s economic institutions and the volume of incoming ODA. However, the subsequent absorption of this assistance remains ambiguous due to corruption and the misallocation of incoming foreign financial resources.

Thе article provides an analysis of the main economic policy directions of Brazil in the first half of the third presidential mandate of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula) – from January 1, 2023 to the end of 2024, as well as the prospects for the country’s development until 2026. The article offers a diagnosis of the current state of the Brazilian economy and public finances, and assesses the opportunities and risks of the ongoing transformations. The central points of Lula da Silva’s economic policy are strengthening the role of the state in modernizing industry and infrastructure in accordance with the requirements of technological and environmental transition, increasing the country’s competitiveness, improving the business environment, and creating conditions for attracting private investment in ongoing projects. The current government is striving to focus its efforts on strategic areas of reform, while also addressing the challenges of balanced economic growth and financial sustainability. One notable achievement has been the implementation of a fiscal reform aimed at achieving greater fairness in the taxation of Brazilian citizens’ income, reducing the tax burden on businesses, and promoting flexibility and accountability in budget management. According to the author, progress in these areas is crucial for Brazil’s prospects of becoming a global leader in economic and technological development.

In recent years, global political and academic circles have shown a significant increase in interest regarding the problem of countries’ access to critical materials and the know-how required for their exploitation, in particular lithium and rare earth metals, which are essential for progress in high-tech industries. The article examines the development of the rare earth metals and lithium industry in Iran in the context of the national modernization model implemented by the state. The dynamics of the formation and evolution of the Iran’s national rare earth metals and lithium industry are traced, taking into account domestic scientific and technological developments and opportunities for international cooperation. The factor of U.S. sanctions pressure on Iran’s mining and metallurgical industry is also taken into account. The author argues that the development of the rare earth metals and lithium industry can contribute to achieving of a number of key principles of the “resistance economy” doctrine: ensuring high rates of economic growth, preventing the negative impact of sanctions on the relevant industry, utilizing domestic capacities, achieving self-sufficiency in strategic goods, reducing dependence on oil revenues, and contributing to the creation of an innovative economy. Given the significant control of rare earth metals and lithium markets by certain states or company cartels, Iran is interested in developing national industries for these critical materials, which in the long term is key to achieving the state’s strategic goals.

Open source technologies are increasingly gaining traction in BRICS. The digital infrastructure within these nations – encompassing government services, social networks, and artificial intelligence systems – is predominantly built upon open source solutions. However, BRICS countries are not only interested in the use of open source but are also seeking to foster the development of their own digital products in an open environment. Following this strategy makes it possible to facilitate the accumulation of resources and expertise, enable effective marketing of digital products outside their country of origin, and establish long-term relationships with consumers as well as other stakeholders. Yet, researchers have predominantly focused on the experiences of Western nations that have institutionalized the open approach to digital technology development and have subsequently led the field. In this context, an important question arises: what are the experiences and perspectives regarding digital technology open sourcing within BRICS? Investigating these matters will enhance our understanding of how BRICS nations strategically benefit from the open approach, particularly with respect to their technological sovereignty, the acceleration of innovation, and their competition for technological leadership. The purpose of this study is to analyze digital technology open sourcing within BRICS. This encompasses understanding of open source as an external factor, the transformation of its perception, and promising opportunities for cooperation in the realm of open source, particularly based on the activities of organizations that are open sourcing their digital products. These aspects have not been collectively examined in a single study. Furthermore, the contextual insights provided in this study will be beneficial for managers and corporate strategists.

The article presents a review of the monograph by British political scientist R. Sakwa ‘The Lost Peace. How the West failed to prevent the Second Cold War’. The book raises the question of the causes of the Second Cold War in relations between Russia and the West. As Sakwa notes, the preconditions for this confronta tion were laid back in the late 1980s and 1990s, when the first Cold War ended and the foundations of a new system of international relations were being established. According to the researcher, after the collapse of the socialist camp, the development of world politics could have followed two paths. The first one implied the creation of an international security system based on the provisions of the UN Charter, which in turn required taking into account the interests not only of the West but also of other states. The second model was based on the principle of Western domination, primarily by the USA. This is why the development of international relations in the 1990s and early 2000s followed this path, creating the preconditions for future conflict. Sakwa pays considerable attention to the Ukrainian issue, which has become the main cause of the current crisis. The book analyzes Ukraine’s strategic position, diplomatic manoeuvres, and the interests of the parties involved. At the end of the study, the author shares his predictions about the future of international relations.