The article considers the state of the modern international system, in connection with which are disputed the affirmations concerning its multipolarity or the already emerging bipolarity, embodied by the United States and China. Neither the first nor the second definition is based on the concept of “pole”, as it was formed during the years of opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The current situation can rather be described as a “geopolitical disorder”. Traditional and emerging powers are fighting for a higher place in the new hierarchy, forging new alliances, often opportunistic, that predetermines the volatility and instability of the system. For States that are inferior in total national power to the United States or China, particularly for Russia, this creates new opportunities, especially in the framework of multilateral diplomacy. At the same time Russia, due to its economic weakness and the threat of a general technological backwardness, risks losing its status of power or, at least, being seriously squeezed by competitors. Hence the need for it to moderate its ambitions as a power and concentrate on implementing reforms aimed at modernizing the economy. The predicted decrease for some time in the resources of the state, due to this, will also require to adapt its foreign policy priorities and to focus on vital national interests.

Trilateral diplomacy is a common format of interaction in international relations, which forms various configurations of the balance of power within the framework of triangles. The concept of a “triangle” is characterized by ambivalence, has a variety of characteristics and principles of formation.

The article provides an overview of the theoretical discourse on strategic triangles, as well as of practical examples of trilateral diplomacy of the past and present day. The main characteristics of strategic triangles and the features of changes in their configuration are identified (the case of USA–PRC–USSR triangle). Classification of both symmetric and asymmetric triangles (unicenter and bicenter) are given, the concept of buffer states, as well as regional conflicts with the participation of a great power as a defender, are presented.

The most influential countries at the global and regional levels, forming geopolitical triangles, are identified basing on the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The concept of pivot states is analyzed permitting to indicate relatively small but geopolitically important countries, forming triangles together with influential states.

The main strategic triangles of the modern world order are analyzed, presenting mostly countries of Asia (China, Japan, India), Russian Federation, USA and EU. The main trends of global competition based on geopolitical triangles in the XXI-st century are identified.

The article analyzes the current state of Russian foreign trade and its impact on the development of the economy. The main changes that occurred in the global economy during the crisis caused by the new coronavirus pandemic are considered. It is concluded that most of the trends that formed in the global economy before the crisis are likely to receive additional acceleration after its end. In this regard, additional restrictions may be imposed on traditional Russian exports. It is stated that foreign trade should become one of the key factors that ensure the stability of the Russian economy in the medium and long term. The requirements for the balance of payments and the exchange rate that ensure the stability of the macroeconomic dynamics and parameters of foreign trade are determined. Given the current trends in the parameters of the world economy and trade, it should be assumed that the structure of Russian exports will not undergo significant changes over the next 15 years. This means that for the next 15 years, the development of the export potential of the fuel and energy sector, the diversification of the geography of energy supplies, remains one of the key tasks of the foreign economic strategy. The key restrictions of the integration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are evaluated.

The Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) as a legal format of trade between countries has been actively developed within the last decades. Russian involvement in RTAs until recently was modest. However, after the EAEU creation in 2015, trade policies of the member countries have changed. Setting up the RTAs has become an important priority of the EAEU’s common trade policy. In this study, the assessment is made of the significance for the Russian domestic policies of the already signed and planned FTAs. The focus of the methodology of the study lies in computations of three trade indices: export significance index (suggested by authors and based on the revealed comparative advantage index), trade intensity index and symmetric trade introversion index, which were calculated for the totality of trade partners of Russia for 2019 (193 countries) in order to identify the most promising countries to conclude new FTAs. Authors come to a conclusion that the already signed Russian RTAs and newly planned Russian common FTAs on behalf of the EAEU have a potential to generate trade. Another important result of the study is that it provides the list of the first-priority countries for the new-coming FTAs for Russia and the EAEU partners in terms of efficiency in generating trade, that are - Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, Republic of Korea and Mongolia. The authors suggest to make similar calculations for other countries to support the revealed pattern.

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space actualize the topic of several individual organizations prospects considering current trends on the international scene, particularly the ODED-GUAM. This formation is specific because it was initially created without the participation of the Russian Federation and also formed as an alternative to the Common-wealth of Independent States and other integration projects where the leading role was recognized for the Russian Federation.

The study consists of two parts. The first part examines the development process of the ODED-GUAM organization and high-lights the main stages of its existence. The transformation of the conceptual ideas of the organization’s development from a global to a local actor in world politics was also mentioned in the article. The study conducts a broad analysis of the organization’s source base, evaluates the results that the organization has achieved and the reasons of its composition change.

The second part of the study is devoted to the analysis of the prospects for the development of this organization from the standpoint of neorealism (structural realism) taking into account the combination of endogenous and exogenous factors.

The totality of moments related to the specifics of the ODED-GUAM conceptual component evolution, the episodic nature of its activities, the presence of the internal conflict of interests among participating countries, the leading international actors positions towards the organization, allows us to consider the integration entity is mostly the artificial construct that unified states that were for one reason or another out of key integration projects of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space. It is also relevant to consider the ODED-GUAM as a tool for promoting the interests of such actors as the United States and the EU in the post-Soviet space, as an instrument of information, ideological, and economic pressure on Russia and its partners in integration entities.

In fact, the prospects of the ODEDGUAM organization are directly dependent on the position and policy of external actors who consider this organization as one of the platforms to influence the Russian Federation as well as the People’s Republic of China and the integration projects implemented by these countries.

Against the background of political instability in Belarus and unsuccessful attempts to “deepen integration” in 2019-2020, the political economy of Russian-Belarusian cooperation as a subject of study goes far beyond academic interest and is of great practical importance. The article suggests that explanation of the integration difficulties in inside the nature of the existing Belarusian political and economic model, which becomes the main object of analysis. By analogy with the political economic model of “Putinomics” by С.Miller and the results of a comparative analysis, the political economic model of “Lukashenomics” and its main strategies (centralization of power, a high level of social obligations, state control of the economy, extraction of “political rent” from relations with Russia and the priority statehood over state solvency) are explained. On the basis of the model of resilience and stability of state systems developed earlier by the author as part of the team, the influence of the “Lukashenomics” on the resilience and stability of the state system of Belarus is determined. The fundamental incompatibility of the existing Belarusian and Russian political economic models is revealed and the prospects for the development of Russian-Belarusian relations in the context of possible scenarios for the transformation of the Belarusian model are determined.

Russia’s so-called “turn to the East” policy has become one of the widely discussed issues among other issues in contemporary international relations. The new strategic relations with China and the beginning of a new era in Sino-Russian bilateral relations are the most representative results of the “turn to the East”. The history behind these relations is a factor with tend to be ignored by those discussing the matter. However, the historical view of Sino-Russian relations can provide us with new horizons in their interpretation. This article analyses the “turns to the East” from a historical point of view and theorizes new approaches towards their conceptualization. From the historical point of view, Russia’s “turns to the East” can potentially help the two countries overcome very profound obstacles in bilateral relations, such as the problem of Russia’s image in China after the border disputes with the Qing Empire. Undoubtedly, the “turns to the East” policy’s implications in the economic development of Russian Far East is one of the central topics. As well, the historical analysis of this policy can enrich nowadays discussion about Russian identity and Russia’s position in the East-West paradigm. Also, this article draws attention to the commercial aspect of Sino-Russian relations, which nowadays still represent an important criterion in judging the “turn to the East” policy’s effectiveness. By including examples of other countries’ relations with China, we tried to underline how history has become an instru- ment for developing relations with modern China and how this opportunity is applicable in the Sino-Russian context too.

The article is devoted to examine Russian-Turkish relations in the historical retrospective review. The regional and geopolitical goals which Russia had to realize in XVII – beginning XX centuries and which is stipulated the necessity to ensure Russia security and further economical development are revealed. The factors which led to push of Russia and Turkey interests and which became the cause of Russian-Turkish military conflicts which is occurred at interval of cooperation and partnership in this period are represented. The results of Russian military and political efforts which allowed realize the tasks to liberate Crimea, for Russia passage to Black Sea and to Mediterranean Sea basin, to support Balkan peoples to win their national independence, what strengthened Russian regional and geopolitical positions considerably are examined. The character of Russian-Turkish relations in Soviet period which passed the stages of the cooperation and confrontation which caused “Cold War” is revealed.

The main attention is allotted to analyze in details the recent stage of Russia – Turkey relations. The character of the actual Turkish ruling elite, which is represented of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which is confessing the ideology of the moderate Islamism and Neo Osmanism is exposed. The internal social and economical politics of JDP is examined. The goals and intentions, which Turkish leadership pushed forward, are analyzed and their influence on Russian-Turkish relations is inspected. The activity of the Turkish foreign politics on the different directions in the Arab World, Europe, countries of CIS, Moslem regions of Russian Federation is examined. In the conclusions the differences and common interests in the foreign politics of Russia and Turkey and the possibility of their cooperation are analyzed.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, relations between Russia and Greece entered a protracted period of stagnation, which continues to this day, despite numerous attempts by both countries to intensify political dialogue. One of the reasons is the general degradation of Russia’s relations with the Western countries, which intensified in the middle of the last decade against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, the “sanctions wars” have become an important, but not the only reason for the reduction in bilateral contacts. There were other factors as well: Greece’s dissatisfaction with the excessively close cooperation between Russia and Turkey, different views on NATO’s Eastern enlargement, as well as interchurch disagreements.

On the economic plane, Russian-Greek cooperation was hampered by the desire of Greece to diversify its energy supplies, the food embargo regime introduced by Russia against the EU countries, as well as the policy of investment protectionism pursued by Greece towards Russian companies.

The greatest success has been achieved in the humanitarian field. Due to the cultural and historical closeness of the two peoples, as well as due to the disappointment of the Greeks in the results of European integration, Greece remains one of the few countries where most people treat Russia with sympathy. At the same time, the perception of Russia by the Greeks is distorted and often fragmentary. The positive effect of Russian-Greek humanitarian cooperation is often overshadowed by negative coverage of Russian foreign policy in the Greek media.

Recently new problems have arisen that have complicated Russia’s foreign economic relations with foreign countries. The countries of Northern Europe were no exception. The economic situation in many countries was far from optimal. Problems with economy took place in the euro area. A significant drop in oil prices led to a slowdown in economic growth in the Russian Federation and a sharp decline of ruble exchange rate. Since 2014, various Western sanctions have emerged, followed by retaliatory sanctions from Russia. Against this background, the analysis of the dynamics of Russian economic relations with the Nordic countries is of particular interest. A sharp decline in foreign economic indicators occurred in 2015–2016. Subsequent development has shown different dynamics. On the one hand, by the end of the 2010s foreign trade with Finland and Sweden did not reach the level of 2013–2014 (primarily due to the decline in oil prices), but on the other, foreign trade indicators with Denmark and Norway were exceeded (due to Russian exports). Year 2020 brought new problems – the coronavirus pandemic and the associated restrictions on the movement of goods, services and people, as well as the rupture of production chains, which had an impact on foreign economic relations – and exacerbated the old ones: a new sharp drop in oil prices and a new depreciation of ruble. The article reveals the features of the general dynamics and commodity structure of foreign trade with each of the observed countries. The significant dependence of Russian exports, primarily on energy supplies, is considered in detail. Special attention is given to the general dynamics of foreign direct investment in Russia. The problems of modern development of Russian export and import were analyzed.

The article examines the dynamics and features of the trade and economic partnership between Spain and Russia from 2014 to the present, considering the latest challenges. The once promising trajectory of the development of bilateral trade and mutual investment has undergone significant tests: in addition to the sanctions pressure of the collective West countries, the situation has been complicated by the global crisis in the world economy, significant changes in world markets for goods and services, and the COVID-19 pandemic. In these conditions, the study of indicators of Russian-Spanish trade and economic interaction is of interest both from the point of view of forming a forecast for the development of bilateral economic relations and highlighting those industries towards which the emphasis in trade and investment is gradually shifting. The question arises: is it possible to return to the indicators of bilateral trade and investment inherent in Russian-Spanish economic relations before the imposition of sanctions? The data on the bilateral trade presented by the Russian and Spanish national statistics differ insignificantly in terms of the total trade turnover but have severe differences at the level of the trade balance. Based on both countries’ statistical databases, the author of the article presents the possible reasons for such discrepancies and considers the general dynamics of the state of foreign trade between Russia and Spain. In addition to stating the negative trends in foreign trade, there are problems in investment cooperation, which until recently was considered one of the “strongholds” of bilateral cooperation under the pressure of sanctions.

The article shows that during the two decades of the 21st century, a new reality of trade and economic relations between the Russian Federation and Latin America (Latin-Caribbean America – LCA) has been formed and filled with concrete content, which, it can be argued, has passed the test of complementarity, and in a number of cases reached the level of large-scale partnership. According to the author, these relations are not artificially done geoeconomic construction, but a consequence of both objective factors that bring Russia and the LCA closer together (including in approaches to achieving the sustainable development goals and restructuring of the existing system of world economic relations), and the efforts of state bodies, business circles, representatives of the expert community interested in the development of Russian-Latin American cooperation. Of course, over the past decades the dynamics of trade and economic relations between Russia and Latin America has not always been stable, at some point it was largely lost, there was some pullback and “surrender” of some significant positions. This happened in large part because in the conditions of increased turbulence in the international markets and rapid global changes, the parties sometimes lost a promising vision of the future of Russian-Latin American economic cooperation, did not find opportunely new areas of cooperation attractive to both sides. In fact, positive introductory approaches to strengthening relations on the principles of strategic partnership have been periodically tested, especially in times of renewed international instability that has eroded the established world order. But each time the parties mobilized existing internal reserves and offered extraordinary areas of interaction. An example of the most recent time is the Russian vaccine Sputnik V, which has crossed political boundaries on the map of Latin-Caribbean America, became the core of the so called “vaccine diplomacy” and opened a “second breath” in the relationship between Russia and the LСA in the key area of business cooperation.

Russia is strengthening its geopolitical influence. An example of this is the holding of the first Russia-Africa summit and economic forum in Sochi in October 2019. This event showed how important Africa is for Russia and how important Russia is for Africa. It was an epoch-making event that demonstrated to the world the degree of Russian-African mutual interest.

With what has Russia approached this event and how will economic cooperation develop? This work is devoted to this. The article deals with the issues of mutual trade between Russia and African countries. The main African trade agents of the Russian Federation in recent years have been identified. The state of trade between Russia and African countries has been analyzed, according to which the indicators have grown significantly due to the increase in the volume of Russian exports to African countries. This, especially in the context of solving the import substitution program and developing new markets, is extremely promising, since the African market is large and Russian goods are competitive on it, which opens up new opportunities for increasing trade and cooperation.

The main export and import positions have been determined. According to the study, it is necessary to revise export positions on the part of Russia, in particular, the transition from the fuel and energy direction to industrial goods, the provision of services and new technologies. Diversification of African exports is also necessary, by increasing the added value of goods, a transition to the industrialization of production and the use of high technologies.

In this regard, the most promising seems to be the strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Africa in the direction of increasing the volume of trade, promoting Russian education, high technologies, services, medicine, increasing investment in the fuel and energy complex of African countries, cooperation in agriculture, fish farming, construction, water purification and other mutually beneficial directions. This will strengthen the positions of Russia and Africa as leading players in the world arena and will serve to strengthen the polycentric world order.