The author attempts to define the most relevant formats of civil- military relationships. In order to do it, the author refers to the  experience from the USA, Western Europe, Russia and China.  Classical Western system of civil-military relationships can be found  in the USA and Western Europe and characterized by the strict  separation of an army from politics and vice versa. This leads to the  situation, when an army has no influence on the spheres of civic power, while also weakening the link between politics and  strategy. The author claims that the western approach to the  regulation of civilmilitary relationships cannot be implemented outside of the West. Thus, although Russian political  system is characterized as a system with weak political institutes,  the Russian model demonstrates the ability of state to control military forces. In China, where political elite dominates an army, the system of civil-military relationships is also tacit. Many  aspects of the Chinese system with the communist party`s control of  an army has much in common with the Soviet experience.  However, it does not reduce the significant unique characters of the Chinese system. Thus, the image of warrior in the Confucian  culture never found such a great level of popularity, which was  relevant for the Christian Western culture. The efficiency of the civil  control of army can not be compared, according to some uniform criteria. Such systems and mechanisms in a range of states are not  defined in a normative way. In order to assess the informal status of  an army in a society, we have to consider such an indirect aspect as  the ways of the organization of the military high command system.  The author concludes by stating that there is no mechanisms and  systems of civil-military relationships, which can be implemented universally. All of them are determined by the  country`s history and cannot be understand outside the political  context. Besides, all of the considered models have both: dvantages and disadvantages.

The article represents the review of the development of practice and  theory of civil and military relations (CMR) in post- Soviet Russia.  The problem of their reorganization sharply rose in latest years of  existence of the USSR due to the change of the model of social  development, decay of the country and its armed forces that  possessed nuclear weapon. There was a danger of loss of control  over army and of its transformation into independent political force.  In these conditions emerged complex application-oriented and  theoretical problems of CMR which resolution was aggravated by the  absence of scientific development and specialized institutes, and by  the resistance of conservative circles. During the post-Soviet period  there was created the legal basis of CMR and specialized non-state  institutes appeared. Public and military authorities were adapting to  the changing conditions. In 2004 the domination of the Minister of Defense over the General Staff was legislatively fixed. Positive changes also happened in the sphere of transparency of  army for society, the expert activity of institutes of civil society  connected to the sphere of security and defense gained  development. So in Russia was approved the model of CMR that  provided the prevalence of the policy over army and it was the result of wide range of political, legal, social and economic,  organizational-administrative, image and educational measures. The  developed model reflects specifics of the Russian policy: violation of  balance of the authorities towards executive power, its personification; palliative and declarative character of the legal  regulation, etc. It is necessary to mention the absence of steady  institutional guarantees against usurpation of the power in a long-term perspective.  Democratic evolution of CMR didn’t acquire irreversible character. The intensive phase of theoretical consideration of CMR  came to the end by the middle of the first decade of the new century that can be easily explained by the lowering of attention of  the citizens to the army due to the measures taken, absence of the  request for researches, etc. Thus, CMR in Russia have wide range of  theoretical and practical problems that need solution.

To understand the impact President Donald J. Trump might have on  civil-military relations in the United States of America, requires a  historical dissection and understanding of how the American military  came into being and its relationship with political institutions over  two centuries. Relying on historical antecedents, the future of the  Trump administration’s foreign policy and relations with its military  will likely remain stable in status quo terms. However, Trump’s  demonstration of a “hands-off” approach to national security strategy appears to have given the US military more  autonomy than is typical of most presidential administrations. While  this would likely be a dangerous decision in most other countries, the institutional resilience of the American military and its  normative and legalistic dedication to the United States government suggests that this newfound authority will likely prove beneficial given the complexity of the international system in the  21st century. Finally, I introduce the concept of post-Civil Military  Relations where a military can still be dedicated to the political  institutions of the state regardless of perceptions about credibility  and legitimacy. Understanding such ideas will provide a framework of  how American national security strategy will be  developed and executed in the era of President Trump.

This article examines how civilian-military relations in Turkey have  transformed from a guardianship of the military to civilian control. To  this end, it covers the following issues. It surveys the ways in which the military has instituted its influence over civilians from the  1960 military coup up until the early 2000s. It elaborates major  events and processes that took place during the 2000s under the  AKP governments. Then, the paper describes the reasons behind the  failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, before concluding with a  discussion of the implications of the coup attempt. There will be both  immediate and long-term implications of the radical changes that the Turkish government made to civilianmilitary relations and to the organizational structure of the  armed forces after the recent failed coup attempt.

The article contains an analysis of the reasons and foundations for  the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) appearance in the  Islamic Republic of Iran. The author sheds light on the process of the IRGC development and its current state. For almost 40 years of  its existence, IRGC has transformed from a set of ill-armed and weak organized groups, functioning mainly as the guarding structures, to a unique governmental structure. For now, the set of IRGC`s  functions includes such spheres as military, police and gendarme,
and religious sphere (which includes “special operations”). IRGC also bears some political and financial-economic functions, among which ensuring internal security of the Islamic regime in the Islamic  republic of Iran by struggling with political opposition; suppression of anti-governmental demonstrations; control for the political, civil and nongovernmental organizations, private companies and firms; defense from political aggression from outside; making reconnaissance and counterespionage; prevention the country from the Western ideological and cultural flows; management of the resistance forces “Basij” and civil defense; monitoring the compliance by citizens the Islamic life and moral norms; implementation of the conception of the “Islamic Revolution export”; fighting drug-related business and banditry; participation in the state borders` defense actions (if required); involvement in large-scale governmental economic projects. In military terms, the IRGC has such military troops as land forces, air and naval forces, resistance forces “Basij” and Special Forces “Qods”. The IRGC is a high-class component of the military forces in the Islamic republic of Iran, which includes an Army itself. However, the range of the IRGC commitments is much broader than standard military ones. Thus, nowadays, the IRGC plays a significant role in politics (both internal and external) and fulfils special tasks outside of the IRI. Having large financial and economic assets, the IRGC controls from 25% to 35% of the Iran`s economics. Today the IRGC exists as a corporate union of the military, intelligence, police and gendarme, political, ideological, economic and financial structures of the modern Iran. In fact, the IRGC is a cross-functional mega holding, leading by the Supreme leader and his surroundings. Modern IRGC is the essential foundation for the IRI`s statehood, it is a state within a state.

Israel is largely considered to be a nation greatly marked by the vital role of the military that ensures the very existence of the state whose independence is something that most of the neighboring nations in the Middle East region still cannot accept. Naturally, the  Israeli political elite is traditionally believed to be made up of mostly  retired high-ranking military personnel. However, that view has  nothing to do with the actual strategic and political reality. Over the  last forty years, the Israel Defense Forces have not been involved in  any war against foreign states and their regular armies, and due to various circumstances, one in two Israeli citizens does not actually serve in the military. Currently, the Israeli government  officials maintain unprecedentedly stable and cooperative ties both  with their American and Russian counterparts. The main threat to the national security is no longer a full-scale war but rather the  terrorist activity perpetrated by illegal, mostly (but not exclusively) Islamist armed guerilla groups. High-ranking military  personnel are still highly regarded in the Israeli society, though their  social status has lowered dramatically in the recent years. Only one of the ten incumbent members of the Security Cabinet turns out  to be a retired General Staff member who still happens to hold a  civilian office within the government; moreover, none of the possible  candidates for prime minister has an advanced military background.

The subject of the study are civilmilitary relations in African  countries. A view on the issues of these relations in the colonial period, in the postcolonial period, as well as at the present  stage is presented, beginning with the formation of the “Force  publique” until the formation of a modern army structure – the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The focus  put is on armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the  problems of army building and reformation process, participation in  military actions of various social groups, including child soldiers and women. The issues of their social adaptation are reviewed. The  problem of observance of human rights is analyzed. Facts from  documents of non-governmental organizations on violations of  human rights among servicemen are cited – the use of torture and  sexual violence against civilians, which, as a result, provokes a mass exodus of people from conflict areas. Among the main violators of  human rights are representatives of law enforcement forces and, first of all, regular army servicemen, including high-ranking  officers. The impunity of crimes gives fertile ground for the  emergence of new flash points of conflict, which entail humanitarian catastrophes and victims. It is reported that one of the key reasons for the critical situation in the legal sphere is the  involvement of the military in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The methods of empirical political science made it  possible to identify the reasons for the collision between the army  and society, to determine the scopes of their further interaction within the framework of the contradictory political  process in the DRC. The author concludes that the interaction of the  army and society is an unreliable model and is largely conditioned by  the military-political situation in the country. Most African  countries are classified as so-called “failed states” – failed countries, where from the moment of independence until now, armed conflicts that hinder the development  of democratic  foundations do not stop. As a rule, in most African countries the national army, if it exists, is unable to independently perform the  functions assigned to it, first of all, the reliable defense of state  borders. In the situation of incessant local conflict, we often have to speak more about the collisions of the army and the civil society,  rather than about their interaction.