Before the 2025 elections in the Republic of Korea (ROK), both leading presidential candidates put forward proposals to amend the electoral block of the country’s Constitution. Unlike in previous years, when talk of changing the number of presidential terms was perceived by society as a method of distracting the masses from the real problems of the state, this time the amendment of the Constitution was widely discussed, largely in the context of the political crisis of 2024–2025. The article aims to reveal the reasons for the increased relevance of constitutional reform in the Republic of Korea in the mid-2020s, to compare the options proposed by the main political figures, and to determine the prospects for changing the ROK’s Basic Law in the medium and long term. The authors apply historical and comparative research methods. The article concludes that the political crisis of 2024–2025 highlighted a number of problematic elements in the ROK’s Constitution, whose electoral bloc no longer meets the demands of the time. However, the Democratic Party, which has come to power, is postponing the revision of the Basic Law, guided by the short-term interests of the political struggle. At the same time, unresolved issues of interaction between the executive and legislative branches of power lay the foundation for new crises, keeping the task of modernizing the country’s Constitution on the agenda. Further prospects for introducing amendments with the aim of creating a more stable system of presidential power focused on long-term results will largely depend on the development of the domestic political situation.

The article analyzes the results of the elections to the House of Councillors of the Japanese Parliament, held on July 20, 2025, in which the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito was defeated and found itself in the minority. The author examines in detail the reasons for the electoral success of the right-wing opposition parties, above all the Sanseito party, which significantly displaced the LDP in the upper house. In addition to the poor economic situation in the country, the voters’ disappointment with the LDP’s insufficient measures to eradicate political corruption, and the shrinking of Komeito’s electoral base, an important reason was the general crisis of public confidence in Japan’s traditional political establishment, as well as a sharp increase in anti-systemic sentiments in Japanese society. A significant segment of the conservative electorate swung towards the political alternative provided by the populist parties – Sanseito and the Democratic Party for the People. These parties have found a new and very effective tool for influencing the masses – social media and streaming channels, through which they have managed to mobilize the “floating votes” of the conservative electorate. Thus, the failure of the LDP and Komeito and the successes of the opposition parties were facilitated by a surge of public interest in the elections against the background of widespread public discontent with the current government.

The article analyzes the results of the national and pan-European parliamentary elections in the European Union and its leading member states: Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, France, Sweden, Finland, held in 2019-2024, and their impact on the transformation of their party and political systems. According to the results of the study, the balance of power between pro-European and Eurosceptic forces represented in both national parliaments and the European Parliament has significantly changed in these countries, which has influenced their own future development and that of the European Union. Based on the election results, the author concludes that although pro-European forces (conservatives, socialists, liberals and greens) have retained a dominant role in the governments of their countries and in EU political institutions, dissatisfaction among a significant number of European citizens with the lack of democracy and transparency in the formation and activities of their leadership persists and, in some countries, is growing. Following the results of the 2024 Eurovision elections, the third largest right-wing conservative Eurosceptic group, Patriots for Europe, was formed in the European Parliament, declaring itself the main opposition force of the pro-European coalition. The most radical members of the European Parliament, united around the Alternative for Germany party, formed the even more rigidly eurosceptic Europe of Sovereign Nations group, which, although the smallest in number, may pose a great danger to Euro-optimists and their supporters in the future. In the near future, this may lead to real threats to the stability of the political institutions of the EU and its member states.

The article analyses the origins and trajectory of populist projects in the Polish party system in 1990–2025, demonstrating that in this country populism emerged as a result of the radicalisation of mainstream parties. Growing tensions in Polish society, dissatisfied with the outcomes of systemic transformations and neoliberal reforms, led to rising discontent with both national elites and the Brussels bureaucracy. The inability of mainstream political forces to overcome accumulated crises undermined their authority and contributed to the growing popularity of radical right-wing political ideologies. It is noted that 2015 became a turning point, when the migration crisis brought issues of security and sovereignty to the forefront, ensuring the electoral success of a right-wing conservative agenda. This shift was also linked to the redistribution of influence within the right-wing camp and the consolidation of a national-conservative bloc around the Law and Justice party. However, in 2023 populists lost their monopoly on executive power. The 2025 elections did not put an end to populism in Poland; on the contrary, they led to a transformation of the institutional forms of its presence. The article also analyses the ideological and programmatic profile of Polish populist parties using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey methodology.

The dramatic events that took place in Romania after the first round of the presidential elections in November 2024 caused a political crisis in the country and concern on the part of Euro-Atlantic structures. The results of these elections, in which the right-wing radical Calin Georgescu unexpectedly won, were annulled, but they showed the authorities, sociologists and political strategists the need to more closely study and understand what the real Romanian electorate is, how to build the electoral process in order to avoid dangerous imbalances in the country’s political life. The results of the November 2024 elections were the result of voters’ strong dependence on dishonest propaganda on social media. Previous findings by sociologists that Romania’s electoral landscape is strongly dependent on regionalization and demographic factors were also confirmed. Regions with a high degree of economic development, urbanization and education support right-liberal pro-European discourses and are less inclined to trust sovereigntists. Residents of small towns and rural areas are more susceptible to the discourse of populist far-right groups. As the first round of the 2024 presidential elections showed, they are more susceptible to political technologies and manipulations on social networks. All this was taken into account when organizing the new round of elections. The victory of the liberal and Europeanist Nicusor Dan in the repeat presidential elections in May 2025 did not come easily, but it showed how the activation of wealthy and highly educated voters in large cities changed the electoral landscape of Romania in favor of the Euro- Atlantic course, against the far-right nationalists advocating unification with the Republic of Moldova, inciting hatred towards the large Hungarian diaspora inside the country, nostalgic for the legionary past of “Greater Romania”, part of whose territories are now outside the borders of the Romanian state.

The article deals with the phenomenon of brandmauer (firewall), which means the prohibition on established parties cooperating with the rightwing populist party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). The research aims to reveal the influence of the brandmauer on political and electoral processes in Germany. The author analyses the historical roots and theoretical basis of the phenomenon, the effect of the restriction on government formation, and how firm the prohibition is at the federal, state and municipal levels. The article draws the following conclusions: the brandmauer is based on a critical reflection on European and German history, as well as the concept of militant democracy. The moral and political nature of the brandmauer, on the one hand, ensures the stability of the concept but, on the other hand, leads to the absence of a strict definition and regulation. Unlike previous practices of restricting cooperation with parties, the brandmauer became stronger with the growth of AfD support. Nevertheless, the strict prohibition coexists with the growing “grey zone”: cooperation between established parties and the “Alternative for Germany” at the municipal level, and support for the same initiatives. The brandmauer complicates the election campaign and coalition formation. In 2026, Germany may face a challenge in the state elections in Saxony-Anhalt, where the AfD enjoys significant support.

The article examines the development of political marketing and the use of marketing technologies for achieving electoral success in Italy. The study uses the example of the parties forming the current centre-right ruling coalition (“Forza Italia”, “Lega”, and “Fratelli d’Italia”). The research considers the transformation of Italy’s political system following the transition from the First to the Second Republic, as well as the evolution of citizens’ electoral behaviour, including the rise of undecided voters. The authors analyze the state of political marketing in Italy, which combines two main approaches: a narrow one, focused on the use of specific campaign techniques, and a broad one, aimed at building long-term relationships with the electorate. Through the cases of “Forza Italia” led by Silvio Berlusconi, “Lega” by Matteo Salvini, and “Fratelli d’Italia” by Giorgia Meloni, the authors explore strategies for personal brand formation, media strategy integration, and the use of social media and digital platforms. The authors conclude that the success of these parties is driven by a combination of factors: personalization (the creation of a strong leader’s personal brand), integration of media strategies, adaptation of communication to the digital environment, and effective engagement with undecided voters through clear, consistent, and compelling messaging.

This article examines the political economy of transforming electoral processes in the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and identifies signs of a “model crisis” in party- political structures. The aim of the study is to assess the key features of the crisis and changes in the electoral systems of the Benelux countries and to characterize the factors that prevent their destabilization. The paper identifies several features that could be considered key characteristics of the electoral systems of these countries. These include traditions of consociational democracy, a relatively high level of political participation, fragmentation of the party landscape, etc. It can be said that within these systems, symptoms of a rather serious crisis have emerged, including a gradual decline in satisfaction with democracy, a decline in trust in key institutions, the growing influence of right-wing populist forces, a rather serious and at the same time “new” polarization, and so on. Political-economic factors play a significant role in the formation of these symptoms: the growing influence of economic issues in the political process, the peculiarities of shaping rational political choice in new conditions, and imbalances between supply and demand in the political market. Despite these problems, the political systems of the Benelux countries have so far demonstrated a high degree of resilience. Key elements include the flexibility of political culture and the de facto formation of a “mass political consumer society,” continued high trust in elections, the institutionalized segmentation of the Belgian system, and the ability of traditional mechanisms to contain new dividing lines. Thus, despite the growing crisis phenomena and “new fault cleavages” in the political systems of the Benelux, their resilience has not yet been significantly undermined.

The article focuses on the different factors contributing to the rise and development of Political Islam movements, as well as its conceptions and doctrinal directions. The methodology is represented by principles of the historisme, scientific objectivity and authenticity. The study aims at analyzing the attempts of Islamist movements’ leaders to adopt the stance of the “Islamic democracy” which, in their rhetoric, is similar to European “Christian democracy”. The article also examines the role of Political Islam movements that advocate for the “Islamic project” to be established in the social and political development of Muslim society at the present stage. To these ends, the countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Syria are selected for study. Political Islam movements in these countries have most significantly demonstrated their influence on both electoral processes and socio-political dynamics as a whole. Islamist challenge for Russia is examined. Special attention in the article is paid to prospects for political Islam movements to develop a more receptive stance toward democratic principles grounded in “Islamic democracy”.

The article focuses on the Government of National Unity formed in South Africa in June 2024. Its establishment followed the general elections, in which the ruling African National Congress (ANC) underperformed, receiving only 40.18% of the votes. In this regard, the ANC leadership put forward a proposal to establish the Government of National Unity (GNU) and engaged in consultations with other parliamentary parties. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, the government included ten parties, including the Democratic Alliance (DA), which had previously been the leading opposition party. However, two other major parties (the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MKP), led by former South African President and ANC leader Jacob Zuma) remained outside the GNU. The article subsequently examines the activities of the GNU, with a particular focus on the tensions between the ANC and the DA, the latter having unsuccessfully attempting to establish its own “government” within the GNU. The paper concludes by outlining possible future scenarios for the GNU.

In the book “Classless Politics. Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian Legacies in Egypt” by Hesham Sallam, the author attempts to examine and analyze the conditions for the formation of a multi-party system in Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser and his associates were opposed to the very idea of a multi-party system, because they believed that a multi-party system would result in the restoration of the monarchical system in the country. On the recommendation of the United States, the Egyptian leadership, headed by Sadat, began building a multi-party system. Three “platforms” appeared within the Arab Socialist Union – left, right and centrist. Anwar Sadat personally wanted to integrate Islamists into this emerging system in order to counterbalance leftist forces. Under Hosni Mubarak, the political system developed amid the emergence of new socio-political forces, including the youth. A feature of Egypt’s development under Mubarak was vigorous (for Egypt) economic growth. However, the population growth was even more significant, which in 2010–2011 led to an aggravation of contradictions between a society demanding better living conditions and the authorities headed by an elderly president. The social upheaval became an inevitable consequence of the economic development model chosen by the country’s ruling circles. It is clear that the Egyptian authorities must actively pursue socioeconomic reforms and implement progressive modernization to mitigate potential social upheavals in the future.