The article is dedicated to the possibility of joining the Russian and Chinese integration initiatives on the EEU space from the side of business-actors. The author stresses the necessity for a wider type of analysis, which would not be limited by such narrow research object as perspectives of the so-called Silk Road Economic Belt. The study is based on the statistic analysis of the partnerstates foreign trade and official information, as well as expert evaluation of the investments` scale and structure. Besides, the author collected data about the direct investment provided by Chinese and Russian TNC in order to support the EEU member-states (directly or via third states). The significant part of the article is dedicated to the issues of competition between the Chinese and Russian TNC in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and possibilities of the fruitful cooperation between those businesses in Central Asia. The author also sheds light on the growing impact of the Chinese business in Belarus and Armenia, where Russian firms are the most powerful foreign economic actors, what, nevertheless, does not re duce the significant impact of the Western European and other TNC. Those considerations are followed by the author`s examination of the limitation of the ChinaRussia business partnership in Russia itself; the author also presents an original comparative analysis of the Chinese direct investments in Russia and vice versa. Finally, the author attempts to verify the hypothesis about the positive perspectives of the Russia-China economic partnership outside of the post-soviet space. The author claims that the lack of such a cooperation between Russian and Chinese TNCs in Africa or Latin America illustrates the power of political limiting factors, rather than the absence of mutual interest of the parties.

The article is dedicated to the one of the most important trends in current political process in China in period between 18th and 19th Communist party of China national congresses (2012–2017). The trend is characterized with the desire of current national leader Xi Jinping to provide support of regions by appointment of loyal regional leaders. That can be explained by the situation before 2012 when most of regional leaders were potentially opposite to Xi Jinping and his “faction”. It led to resistance to Xi’s policy in social and economic spheres and made Xi’s measures not so effective. As result, to strengthen “power vertical” (term referred to Russia initially but fit to China’s realities as well) current Xi Jinping initiated large-scale anti-graft campaign and change of regional leadership using practice of officials rotation. This process began after 2012 but culminated in 2015–17. Finally, before 19th CPC National Congress in October, 2017, the task has been fulfilled. Regional leadership in China now includes new leaders representing a row of new “factions” and “cliques” united by their loyalty to Xi Jinping. It lets Xi hope for more effective realization of his political course during next five years, as well as strengthening of his personal power at the expense of “collective leadership” practice. The article uses wide range of original sources representing official documents of Communist party of China Central Committee and regional governments, statistical and biography materials. It is first publication on the topic of regional leadership change under rule of Xi Jinping in Russian academic science. 

The article deliberates on the basic periods in the political biography of the present top Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The author believes that the concept of “generations of the CPC leaders” is the product of the Party’s official historiography and doesn’t fully correspond to the facts, and, besides, the CPC in fact hasn’t a system of transfer of power yet. As to Xi Jinping himself, he prefers authoritarian methods of leadership and his foreign policy is that of the growing assertiveness. It seems that the present Chinese leader has completely accepted and taken as an instruction for his policies the words said by Mao Zedong during the “cultural revolution”. The “great helmsman” said that “China had already become the political center of the world, it must also become its economic and military center”. During the years after ascending to the position of power the major part of Xi Jinping’s activities was devoted to strengthening of his personal positions and the control over China. The reforms announced at the 3rd plenum of the CPC have not been implemented in full. In the internal policy the fight against corruption plays an important part. It pursues several purposes including that of “ousting” Xi’s political rivals. The fact of importance is the worsening of China’s “credit history” on human rights during Xi’s rule. Special attention should be paid to the tragic destiny of the Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo. Xi Jinping’s highest priority is strengthening of position of the CPC as a dominant political force in China. At the 19th congress of the party which is going to open in a few days the most likely scenario is that of further strengthening of power and influence of Xi Jinping and his supporters. Trend for the personality cult of the Chinese present leader is obvious. Still the situation in China remains complicated, some unexpected events still could happen. It’s too early to give a final verdict on the rule of “chairman Xi”.

At the present stage, the thesis of the “Chinese demographic threat” has decreased to the lowest level, but has not disappeared completely from the mass consciousness, paradoxically combining with increased sympathy for China. The work of Chinese migrants, spreading throughout the country, plays a particularly significant role in the economy of the Russian Far East. In a number of places and a number of industries, Chinese migrants compete with Russians and even drive them out of the market; In other cases, their work is recognized as necessary. The Russian authorities pursue a policy of gradual restriction of foreign, including Chinese, labor, both to facilitate the employment of their own citizens, and to achieve geopolitical goals. The reverse side of this policy is the worsening of the already not very favorable investment climate in the country. The Russian administration has little control over the economic activities of Chinese migrants and even the dynamics of their numbers, but at the same time it tends to lease to the Chinese side large agricultural and forest territories, not seeking to maximize the labor potential of its people and creating a situation impending damage to the country’s economic sovereignty, that causes public outcry. Educational migration from China to Russia, which is not very large, is constrained by a set of causes, including unfavorable living conditions in Russia. The main reason is the low rating of the Russian diploma in the international labor market, including in China itself, and the very modest opportunities that it opens for career growth. The conjugation of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt, apparently, will open up wider opportunities for attracting Chinese labor migrants to the rise of the Russian economy, but their professional structure will hardly change qualitatively. The explosive growth of their number can occur if the EAEU and China decide to establish a free trade zone. However, this is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The Chinese diaspora, being undoubtedly useful for Russia, simultaneously carries a number of risks to it. They can be eliminated or mitigated by establishing clear control and regulation of migrants’ activities, but for this it is necessary to improve the mechanism of managing the economy of the country. 

The article is devoted to the modern approaches of the PRC to international problems and the main changes in Chinese diplomacy after Xi Jinping’s coming to power in 2012. The diplomacy of Xi Jinping is characterized by a gradual departure from Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy concept. The article reviews innovation, strategic ideas and new diplomatic initiatives of the Chinese leadership, as well as the challenges faced by China as one of the leading global players. From the author’s point of view, foreign evaluations of China’s foreign policy remain in the line with official Chinese concepts that tend to exaggerate the swiftness and revolutionary nature of changes in the diplomatic course of Xi Jinping. In reality, these changes occur more smoothly. In Beijing’s foreign policy there is a complex picture of the intertwining of various trends. External observers often take Chinese rhetoric for evidence of the allegedly emerging new quality of diplomacy. According to the author, in the 1970s. the true motives of Deng Xiaoping in the course of adopting a reserved and cautious foreign policy doctrine for China were not limited to saving Beijing’s limited resources necessary for internal development. He was moved by the fear of losing on the world chessboard to more experienced powers, which would mean an internal political discredit of the Communist Party and could undermine its power. Even today, China’s deep insecurity in its own strength continues to constrain its transition to a more ambitious foreign policy. Although China’s dependence on external conditions is obvious, internal political instability can not be compensated by any diplomatic successes and the most favorable external environment. The position of China as the world’s second economy is not automatically transformed into a global influence. Most of the changes that today are associated with the so-called fifth generation of Chinese leaders, in reality were initiated by their predecessors. Imaginary novelty is the continuation of China’s gradual adaptation to socio-economic changes at the national and global levels. The article concludes with an analysis of the prospects for changing China’s role in the world. 

Amongst top national goals of the contemporary China’s leadership, the Taiwan issue occupies a particular place. This issue bears a fundamental significance since it deals with national pride, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the PRC. Its resolution has also an applied significance – it promotes the legitimacy of the ruling China’s Communist Party and resolves some geopolitical difficulties China faces. Currently relying on the creation of island’s all-pervading economic dependency on China, yet not excluding military invasion as an option, Beijing expects to resolve the Taiwan issue by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC. By using economic statecraft and exerting pressure on the world’s countries and international organizations, Beijing has succeeded in narrowing Taiwan’s international space, thus coming close to the desired goal of bringing back the island. Still, a crucial impediment to the resolution of the Taiwan issue is the US’ support of Taiwan. The article reveals specifics of the so-called “One China” policy, a policy that the US pursues towards the Taiwan issue ever since 1970s. By analyzing in details the provisions of the documents that lay the basis of “One China” policy, the author identifies its enduring principles. The author emphasizes the dual character of the US’ “One China” policy, which is its simultaneous orientation to promote relations with the PRC and to support Taiwan. The author further explains the motivation of the American support of Taiwan. The nature of the China-Taiwan relations – either confrontational (which has been the case with a few exceptions) or peaceful (like in the beginning of the 1990s and 2008–2016) – is seen in the article as a major determinant of the formulation of the US’ Taiwan policy. Beijing’s readiness to return the island with the use of force and China’s rapid military power accumulation determine the US-Taiwan close military ties, including arms sales to the island. By analyzing the development of the situation in the Taiwan Strait through the examples of three Taiwan administrations (the ones of Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen), the author shows that in the 21st century Taiwan leadership’s policy towards mainland China and the independence issue plays the defining role in the Taiwan-China-US triangle relations. It concludes that changes in the basics of the US’s “One China” policy and the termination of Washington’s support of Taiwan are highly unlikely.

South-China Sea has been gradually becoming a place of collision of the USA as an acting global hegemon and growing China. Beijing is strongly interested in controlling this area for the purposes of national security as Washington intends to enhance its influence and containing Chinese expansionism. Both parties freely manipulate with the International law and simultaneuosly raise miltary activity within the South-Easat Asia that can cause a seruos conflict. Nevertheless, two contemporary centers of power likely to sustain complex interdependence relationship than start a global confrontation. Brand new vision of coercion is inspired by messian Belt and Road Initiative backing mostly on sealanes control. South-China Sea has been becoming vitally importatnt for China as it is a hub of international communications. The better Beijing controls mare nostrum the more stable its political system is. Respectively, Washington benefits from unstability in SCS for preventing sinization of the entire East Asia. Moreover, in the case of deteriorating bilateral ties America should be ready for implementation “geo-economic stranglehold“ strategy aimed to destroy the rival. South-East Asian nations do not tend to participate in the Great Game directly and choose ad hoc ally strategy as they are totally unable to form an Anti-China coalition. An attempt to resolve the dispute on the principle of international law factually failed – China doesn’t acknowledge Tribunal decision and recommendations but continues expansionist policy as well. The only positive moment can be found in introducing new negotiation positions among pretending ASEAN members – all the tensions are to be mitigated by investments and priveleges. This “smart power” instrument is able gradually to bring China a victory. 

The article is dedicated to the achievements and problems of the Chinese military-industrial complex and its role in the economy building during the Xi Jinping` s term (2012–2017). The evolution of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of the realization of the National Security modernization Program of China 2050. The author provides a description of the current state of military-industrial complex fields. Chinese atomic industry has been growing rapidly during the last years. There are significant achievements in the field of the rocket and space industry. Aviation industry, and in particular the aviation engine construction, has been traditionally considered as underdeveloped in comparison with the American, Western European and Russian aviation. In this sense, the Chinese government endeavors to improve the situation. Microelectronics, which has also been rather underdeveloped, is expected to obtain a new quality. The shipbuilding industry in China nowadays gives positive examples of design and building heavy-tonnage vessels, such as nuclear-powered submarines. Apart from the military and technological achievements, many efforts are put in order to reduce the level of the Chinese dependence on the import of foreign technologies. The author stresses the significance of the military industry conversion practices, which used to be one of the main driving forces of the
China`s economic growth in 1980–1990s. The so-called military civil integration is one of the most effective strategies aimed at overcoming the technological backwardness of the military- industrial complex. It contributes to the technological growth in the fields of security due to the practices of redirection the civil technologies into the military field. Such an approach allows China to avoid the Western military embargo.

In this article, the authors evaluates the perspectives of China to become the World`s leader. The suggested concept of leadership, which includes such basic factors as the strategical power, attractiveness of political institutions, ability to create ideas and find allies, is aimed to analyze the complex leadership potential of the country. The author believes that the so-called “Trump factor”, which explicitly refers to the USA`s withdrawal from TPP and the Paris agreement on climate change, will result in a rising demand for the Chinese leadership. However, in this case, there are certain questions to be answered: is China ready for such a leadership? Is it capable of taking such a great responsibility towards the international community? Does it have sufficient potential? The authors claim that during the upcoming 20–30 years China will not become the
global leader, because of the internal and external political issues.

About some recent trends in economic and political relations between Japan and China. The opinions and conclusions of Western Russian and Japanese scholars with regard to the Chinese policy of Shinzo Abe government and Japanese aspects of Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping are considered. Special attention is paid to the ambiguous attitudes of both states to territorial conflicts and their strategy of exploration of islands in the open sea. Evident traces of “double standards“ can be revealed in the political declarations and actions of both countries. Controversies between China and Japan are dangerously aggravating especially with a prospect of strengthening China’s positions in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless solving of territorial question will depend mainly on the outcome of economic rather than military competition between China and Japan.