What lies behind Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its confrontational policies towards Ukraine? This article challenges the widely held perspective that President Putin’s personality and his security-service background is the central driver of Russia’s Ukraine policy. Instead, it puts forward a geopolitical explanation that emphasizes three factors: Ukraine’s geographic location; the EU’s increased activism in Eastern Europe; and the pro- western orientation of the new government in Kiev. Together, these three factors provide Russia with a strong incentive to pursue an assertive policy towards Ukraine. Moscow’s main aim is to regain some control over Kiev’s foreign policy orientation and, if that is not possible, to establish a belt of pro-Russian provinces in Ukraine’s east. The findings of this article suggest, moreover, that the West ’s current policies towards Russia are ineffective and potentially counterproductive. A major readjustment is urgently needed.

 

The article looks at structural analogies between the strategic situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 and in East Asia today, with particular emphasis on the probability of the outbreak of a major war. The author examines analogies regarding the nature of the international system, i.e. is the international system characterized by outright anarchy or by a more or less developed and institutionalized understanding among the main actors about the way to preserve peace and to organize economic exchange? The article addresses domestic factors (nationalism, democratic, authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes) and investigates military dynamics against the backdrop of geography and the availability of military equipment and technologies. Possible routes of military escalation are also discussed. Special attention is paid to states that have isolated themselves and that dispose of military means that might promise swift victory. The article comes to the conclusion that there are very few similarities between Europe in 1914 and East Asia today, but that both the high degree of militarization of the Korean peninsula and the evolving military competition between the US and China in the region do imply the possibility of a major armed conflict in a not too distant future.

 

The spate of violence all over the world including the West makes us to pay attention to the factor of force in world politics. During the past decades Western countries tried to reduce the problem of force to the discussion about so-termed soft power. As a result they were not politically and morally ready to the outbreaks of the use of force in its traditional meaning. This fact to large extent explains their pained reaction to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the ups and downs of their politics in regard to China.

China is currently the only member of the UN Security Council that is actively increasing the quality and quantity of its nuclear potential. Exactly how far China is willing to go in developing its nuclear forces remains a subject of discussion. The prevailing view is that China is seeking to implement a limited increase in its nuclear arsenal in order to secure the potential for a guaranteed re taliation in the face of the US continuously improving its missile defense systems. Since late 1990s, the development of air and naval forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a subject of increased attention both in Asia and in the world at large. Nuclear potential was not perceived as a priority for China’s development of its military power and remained in the background. However, the events of recent years have shown that the world does not quite realize the true scale of China’s efforts in creating strategic nuclear forces. At this point, it can be perceived as a fait accompli that China has managed to implement most of its long-term program for the modernization of its nuclear forces without attracting too much attention from other major countries and, above all, from the world’s sole superpower.

The article deals with the problem of slowdown of scientific and technological progress in the military sector resulting from rising costs of developing frontier technologies. Nowadays, the military power of a state is a reflection of its economic and technological opportunities. However, before the start of the scientific and technological revolution, no such correlation could be found, and so, in the past, great European powers were at a relatively similar military and technological level. The power of a state was not so strictly limited by scientific and technological or economic potential of a country. Due to the fact that, even after the start of the scientific and technological revolution, progress in the sphere of military equipment retained its cyclical nature, a question arises: could the world revert to a position of relative technological stagnation that has become a norm during centuries of human development? And if so, what would this mean in terms of big politics and grand strategies? Could this fact play in favour of the countries that challenge the global hegemony of the United States? Will they receive a chance to close their relative gap in the sphere of technology, how and within what timeframe?

 

In spite of officially moderate and mitigating Chinese stance on Taiwan issue we cannot neglect conflict potential of the situation. Victory of the oppositional Democratic Party on the latest elections is able to initiate new spiral of tensions. However contemporary American position isn’t this still solid -the unsinkable Taiwanese carrier can probably be exchanged on strengthening the regional stability. Under these circumstances China can be delegated a part of responsibility for maintain peace on the Pacific.