THE BALTIC STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF BREXIT: EURO-OPTIMISM VS EUROSCEPTICISM

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the attitude of the political establishment and the societies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the European Union after Brexit. Being the most “obedient” members of the EU, the Baltic countries were dramatically concerned with the results of the eferendum. If NATO is perceived in the Baltic States as a cornerstone of “hard” security, the European Union is traditionally considered as a guarantor of social and economic stability. In this regard, the Baltic countries are trying to assess the future of the EU optimistically, despite the crises of recent years. The article analyzes political platforms of both systemic and marginal political parties, as well as public attitudes towards European integration and specific EU policies. Euroscepticism in the Baltic States is not institutionalized and is rather poorly consolidated within the party system. At the same time, the parliamentary parties use moderately Eurosceptic rhetoric for populist purposes, in practice pursuing state policy of intensifying European and Euro-Atlantic integration. On the contrary, non-parliamentary and marginal parties (both right-wing and left-wing) are distinguished by a more radical Euroscepticism, including appeals to withdraw from the EU and NATO. The grass-root sentiments in the Baltic states can be characterized as unsystematic Euroscepticism. Having a critical stance towards specific EU policies (especially those that threaten the cultural identities of quite conservative Baltic societies), residents of these states actively enjoy freedom of movement and the opportunity to work in any EU country. The Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia is traditionally something specific. Having the opportunity to benefit from the EU membership, they are much more prone to Eurosceptic sentiments, since membership did not justify their hopes to eliminate the “democratic deficit” (restrictions on rights and freedoms related to the use of the Russian language or belonging to a non-title ethnic group). 

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