The Twilight of the Big Battalions. Historical Study of the Military Conflicts of the Future
https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-4-245-270
Abstract
The article provides a description of the military evolution of the XIX–XXI centuries. The development of the operational forms and organizational principles are on focus. October war of 1973 and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 prove the new principle of deployment of troops. A continuous strategic front is no longer the predominant principle of deployment in the theater of operations. Although war had rose to a higher level of scientific and technological development, modern organizational and operational forms are increasingly reminiscent of the local conflicts of the XIX century.
Keywords
politics,
strategy,
front line,
communication line,
operational art,
theater of operations,
WW II,
OIF
About the Author
A. A. Krivopalov
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
PhD in History, Senior Researcher, Center of Post-Soviet Studies
117997, Profsoyuznaya St., 23, Moscow, Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Krivopalov A.A. The Twilight of the Big Battalions. Historical Study of the Military Conflicts of the Future. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2019;12(4):245-270. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-4-245-270
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