The Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Strategy of the People’s Republic of China

The focus of the Chinese nuclear strategy is still unclear and the actual size of nuclear arsenals of the PRC has never been published officially. According to the official Chinese nuclear policy, the PRC can use nuclear weapons only as means of “effective retaliation“ in the credible second strike. Despite the official Chinese stance, we have to recognize that the PRC now is the third nuclear power in  the world. That follows from the pragmatic assessment of the size of its nuclear arsenals and the variety of nuclear weapons, which China managed to design and deploy. Note that China is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council which has been actively improving and expanding its nuclear arsenals after the demise of the bipolar world.

For many years the development of the Chinese nuclear forces had lagged behind the pace of the arms race set by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The things had changed since the 1990s. Against the background of the superpowers’  deep cuts of nuclear weapons the PRC managed the radical modernization of its nuclear forces, and their shape has changed drastically. A full-scale deployment of the improved mobile solid-propellant IRBM,  SLBM and  ICBM  raises the Chinese nuclear forces to a new level. According to some assessments, China may work to achieve strategic parity with the U.S. and Russia.

At the same time, the PRC is almost not bound  by obligations of the international  arms  control  regimes,  apart  of  the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Intense modernization of the strategic nuclear forces and lack of obligations are raising an issue of China’s involvement in international arms control regimes. It seems reasonable to conduct the pilot trilateral negotiations (China,  Russia, and  U.S.) on precision-guided hypersonic weapons, boost-glide in particular.

1. Arbatov A. A. (2012) The Prospects of Engaging China in Nuclear Arms Limitation. Perspektivy uchastiya Kitaya v ogranichenii yadernykh vooruzhenij [Prospects of China’s Participation in Nuclear Arms Limitations] (eds. Arbatov A.A., Dvorkin V.Z., Oznobishchev S.K.), Moscow: IMEMO RAN, pp. 52-67.

2. Arbatov A.A., Dvorkin V.Z. (2013) Bolshoj strategicheskij treugolnik [The Great Strategic Triangle], Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.

3. Baohui Zhang (2015) China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order, New York: Routledge.

4. Cochran T.B. (1995) The Problem of Nuclear Energy Proliferation. Energy and National Security in the 21st Century (ed. Clawson P.L.), Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, pp. 95-114.

5. Cordesman A., Kendall J., Colley S. (2016) China’s Nuclear Forces and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

6. Esin V.I. (2012) Yadernaya moshh’ KNR [China’s Nuclear Capabilities]. Perspektivy uchastiya Kitaya v ogranichenii yadernykh vooruzhenij [Prospects of China’s Participation in Nuclear Arms Limitations] (eds. Arbatov A.A., Dvorkin V.Z., Oznobishchev S.K.), Moscow: IMEMO RAN, pp. 27-35.

7. Fetter S., Frolov V.A., Miller M., Mozley R., Prilutsky O.F., Rodionov S.N., Sagdeev R.Z. (1990) Detecting Nuclear Warheads. Science & Global Security, vol. 1, no 3-4, pp. 225-253.

8. Karber P.A. (2011) Strategic Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall, Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Asia Arms Control Project.

9. Kashin V.B. (2015) K voprosu o masshtabakh proizvodstva strategicheskikh vooruzhenij v KNR: mezhdunarodnoe znachenie [On the Scale of Strategic Nuclear Weapons’ Production in China: In-ternational Context]. Kitaj v mirovoj i regionalnojpolitike. Istoriya i sovremennost’. Vyp. 20 [China in World and Regional Politics (History and Modernity). Issue 20] (ed. Safronova E.I.), Moscow: IDV RAN, pp. 154 - 172.

10. Kashin V.B. (2016) Razvitie yadernykh sil Kitaya: nachalo glubokoj transformatsii [The Development of Chinese Nuclear Forces: Start of a Deep Transformation. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, vol. 9, no 4, pp. 77-94.

11. Kristensen H.M., Norris R.S. (2016) Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 72, no 4, pp. 205-211.

12. Kristensen H.M., Norris R.S., McKinzie M.G. (2006) Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, Natural Resources Defense Council.

13. Kulacki G. (2015) The Chinese Military Updates China’s Nuclear Strategy, Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists.

14. Lewis J., Hua Di (1992) China’s Ballistic Missile Program. International Security, vol. 17, no 2, pp. 5-40.

15. Lewis J., Xue Litai (2012) Making China’s Nuclear War Plan. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 68, no 5, pp. 45-65.

16. Li Bin (2001) The Impact of the U.S. NMD on the Chinese Nuclear Modernization, Beijing: Institute of Science and Public Affairs, China Youth College for Political Science.

17. Ray J. (2015) Red China’s “Capitalist Bomb”: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

18. Saalman L. (2017) Factoring Russia into the U.S.-Chinese Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, no 1. Available at: https://www.sipn.org/publications/2017/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/factoring-russia-us-chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles, accessed 29.11.2018.

19. Wu Riqiang (2013) Certainty of Un-certainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics. Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 36, no 4, pp. 579-614.