The Status of Strategic Offensive Arms Limitations: Bridging the Present and Future.

This article examines the current state of strategic offensive arms control since the onset of the Biden administration, analyzing the causes and implications of the suspension of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty). This analysis is undertaken within the broader context of Russian-American relations and global security. Despite the growing number of recent publications and statements asserting the purported obsolescence of traditional arms control frameworks, the findings of this study highlight the enduring significance of arms control, particularly in the critical domain of strategic offensive weapons. The article provides a comparative analysis of Russian and American positions on key aspects of strategic arms limitation. Official Russian statements emphasize that progress in this sphere is contingent on mutual de-escalation, specifically requiring the United States to abandon its antagonistic stance toward Russia. The article also assesses prospects for future dialogue in this area are also assessed, with particular consideration given to the implications of the United States’ electoral cycle. While discussions of a perspectives of second term for Donald Trump have been linked to possible shifts in U.S.-Russia relations, the likelihood of substantive progress in arms control remains uncertain. Nevertheless, without meaningful advancements in limiting strategic arms, the collapse of the legal and treaty-based framework governing arms control appears imminent, significantly heightening the risks of military confrontations, including those involving nuclear weapons

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