The Transformation of Analytical Centers as an Element of Chinese “Soft Power” in the 2010–2020

Transformations in China’s cultural and ideological narrative since the 2010s have required the establishment of specific Chinese “think tanks of a new type,” which are formally institutionalized in Chinese legislation. In the initial period of their development (2013–2018), thinktanks were tasked with becoming a significant “soft power” tool to promote and explain key political and economic ideas, including Xi Jinping’s initiatives, so say to “reconceptualize” official ideas at the expert and analytical level and translate Chinese ideological initiatives language into the generally accepted language of expert discussion. However, since 2019–2020, being challenged by creating an anti-Chinese alliance, think-tanks were required to carry out not only expert-analytical work but also to develop draft decisions on critical issues of external and internal development. China’s political leaders seek to create a new type of analytical culture, stimulating the development of new types of centers and completely transforming the old ones. Of the four types of centers – governmental, academic, university, and public (non-governmental) – the governmental and public centers have proved the most effective. In contrast, the centers that grew out of academic institutions and university structures have been criticized for being slow and impractical in their judgments. At the same time, a number of public analytical centers have grown into giant corporations: today, they have branches in dozens of Chinese cities and abroad, maintain ties with Chinese Huaqiao, and advise the country’s authorities on crucial issues of political and economic development.

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