Russian Military Opportunities in the Context of Ukrainian Crisis

The crisis in the Ukraine not only has maximally escalated the relations among Russia, Europe and the USA but also brought Moscow to the brink of direct military conflict with Kiev. In the context of the civil war outbroken in the Ukraine an opportunity to confirm its demands in the sphere of foreign policy by open force is vital for Russia. However, the nature of two level Ukrainian conflict is such that a direct military confrontation is still possible either between Novorossiya and Ukraine or between Ukraine and Russia if the latter makes a decision to support Donbass at a critical moment. But a conflict is impossible between Russia and NATO because an outbreak of an open war will be prevented by the existing strategic nuclear balance. The presence of a nuclear factor makes military demonstration the most rigid form for confirmation of the demands in the sphere of foreign policy by the conflicting parties. Its most possible scenario is a frontal extension of the Russian ground forces deployed on the Ukrainian border to the west even to the Dnieper line and the border with the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic in the Black Sea region. The article sequentially discusses the he strengths and weaknesses of the group of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border, then - the opportunities of the USA and NATO to organize an air bridge to disrupt a possible a possible extension of the Russian troops to the west. The author makes a conclusion that the first units of the rapid deployment forces could arrive to the area near Kiev not earlier than 10-15 hours. Full deployment of the US expeditionary brigade may take from 14 to 18 days. Such a period seems to be excessive. Two-week cushion of time will allow the Russian military to perform all the tasks in the Levoberezhnaya (leftbank) Ukraine while the US troops at the best case will manage to protect the Ukrainian capital. In the nearest time, NATO will tackle obvious difficulties in all the issues related to the projection of force to the South East of the Ukraine. However, in the future in the course of the development of military infrastructure and accumulation of forces this advantage of Russia will be decreasing.

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