ARMY AND SOCIETY IN ISRAEL: PAST, PRESENT AND VECTORS OF THE FUTURE
https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-3-110-129
Abstract
Israel is largely considered to be a nation greatly marked by the vital role of the military that ensures the very existence of the state whose independence is something that most of the neighboring nations in the Middle East region still cannot accept. Naturally, the Israeli political elite is traditionally believed to be made up of mostly retired high-ranking military personnel. However, that view has nothing to do with the actual strategic and political reality. Over the last forty years, the Israel Defense Forces have not been involved in any war against foreign states and their regular armies, and due to various circumstances, one in two Israeli citizens does not actually serve in the military. Currently, the Israeli government officials maintain unprecedentedly stable and cooperative ties both with their American and Russian counterparts. The main threat to the national security is no longer a full-scale war but rather the terrorist activity perpetrated by illegal, mostly (but not exclusively) Islamist armed guerilla groups. High-ranking military personnel are still highly regarded in the Israeli society, though their social status has lowered dramatically in the recent years. Only one of the ten incumbent members of the Security Cabinet turns out to be a retired General Staff member who still happens to hold a civilian office within the government; moreover, none of the possible candidates for prime minister has an advanced military background.
About the Author
A. D. EPSTEIN
Open University of Israel
Israel
Israel
Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication, Open University of Israel
1, Derekh ha-Universita St., Ra’anana, Israel, 4353701
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Review
For citations:
EPSTEIN A.D. ARMY AND SOCIETY IN ISRAEL: PAST, PRESENT AND VECTORS OF THE FUTURE. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2017;10(3):110-129. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-3-110-129
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