FROM GUARDIANSHIP TO CIVILIAN CONTROL: HOW DID THE TURKISH MILITARY GET HERE?
Abstract
This article examines how civilian-military relations in Turkey have transformed from a guardianship of the military to civilian control. To this end, it covers the following issues. It surveys the ways in which the military has instituted its influence over civilians from the 1960 military coup up until the early 2000s. It elaborates major events and processes that took place during the 2000s under the AKP governments. Then, the paper describes the reasons behind the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, before concluding with a discussion of the implications of the coup attempt. There will be both immediate and long-term implications of the radical changes that the Turkish government made to civilianmilitary relations and to the organizational structure of the armed forces after the recent failed coup attempt.
About the Author
Acar KUTAY
Eastern Mediterranean University
Cyprus
Cyprus
Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University
10, Mersin St, Famagusta, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5000
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Review
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KUTAY A. FROM GUARDIANSHIP TO CIVILIAN CONTROL: HOW DID THE TURKISH MILITARY GET HERE? Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2017;10(3):68-82.
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