The Shift to a New NATO Force Model as an Indicator of Strategic Evolution and the Potential Intentions of Western Democracies
https://doi.org/10.31249/kgt/2024.06.10
Abstract
By the mid-2020s, the armed forces of most NATO member states had seen little to no growth. At the same time, NATO’s overall military power has been increasing rapidly. The political determination behind this trend and its possible consequences are examined through the example of the transition to the New NATO Force Model, initiated in July 2022. Changes in the structure and deployment of troops reflect the actor’s probable strategic intentions. These plans may not necessarily be implemented, but they must be taken into account in foreign policy forecasting – especially in the context of a shifting world order, where the importance of the use of force is growing significantly. The article traces the evolution of NATO’s permanent troop groupings from the mid-2000s to 2024. The expansion of the NATO Response Force (deployed from depth) and Forward Presence was based primarily on the use of resources from the “old” European member states. This principle also underpins the New NATO force model (NNFM). It provides the United States with built-in control over the use of European partners’ potential and greater freedom of maneuver in deploying its own forces (primarily for the containment of China and Iran). The elites of European member states have provided a practical guarantee that the Alliance will continue to function even in the event of a critical reduction in the U.S. contribution. At the same time, this has created the effect of strengthening the autonomy of European actors – though in reality, this autonomy remains closely tied to the interests of the White House. As a result, these states have found themselves on a path-dependent trajectory toward deepening confrontation with Russia.
About the Author
Ph. O. TrunovRussian Federation
Philipp O. TRUNOV
PhD (Political Sciences), Leading Researcher, Department of Europe and America
Nakhimovskiy Avenue, 51/21, Moscow, 117418
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Review
For citations:
Trunov P.O. The Shift to a New NATO Force Model as an Indicator of Strategic Evolution and the Potential Intentions of Western Democracies. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2024;17(6):167–185. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.31249/kgt/2024.06.10