Scientific Legacy of Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov and the Problems of Modern Strategy
https://doi.org/10.31249/kgt/2023.05.12
Abstract
This paper represents an effort to bring new light to the unique scientific legacy of the Soviet Marshal B. Shaposhnikov. By applying his cautionary advice to the present day, we can identify the underlying causes of the decline in strategic thinking among the world’s leading powers. Strategic theory, as a method of scientific analysis, sits at an intersection of disciplines. Born of military thought, it soon caught the attention of historians. Today, the field of strategic theory is being increasingly contested by political scientists and foreign affairs analysts. The disconnect between strategy and policy remains one of the most dangerous pitfalls in state governance. While the problems, achievements and contradictions of strategy usually appear topical and relevant, they are best revealed in a wider historical context.
Keywords
politics,
Stalin,
strategy,
Shaposhnikov,
military science,
the General Staff,
the Great Patriotic War,
diplomacy
Supporting agencies: This research was funded by the grant from the Russian Science Foundation, Project no. 23-28-00622 “Strategic Culture of the Great Powers in the 20th – 21st Centuries: A Comparative Historical Analysis (as illustrated by the cases of Russia and the United States)” realized at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, INION RAN.
About the Author
A. A. Krivopalov
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Alexei A. KRIVOPALOV, PhD (History), Senior Researcher at the Center for Post-Soviet Studies
Profsoyuznaya Street, 23, Moscow, 117997
References
1. Augier M., Barret S.F.X., Mullen W. (2021). Assumptionists in Strategy. Strategy Bridge. June 21. Available at: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/6/21/assumptionitis-in-strategy, accessed 10.11.2023.
2. Balandin R.K. (2005). Marshal Shaposhnikov. Military Adviser to the Leader. Moscow: Veche, 409 pp. (in Russian).
3. Erickson J. (1962). The Soviet High Command. London: Macmillan and Co., 889 pp.
4. Ganin A.V. (2009). “Comrade Sklyansky – Stand up...”. General Staff and Chekists in the Civil War. Rodina. No. 11, pp. 78–83 (in Russian).
5. Ganin A.V. (2016). The Choice of the Marshal of Victory. Why Boris Shaposhnikov Went After the Reds and What Price He Paid for It. Rodina. No. 11. pp. 37–41 (in Russian).
6. Gorelik Ya.M. (1961). Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov: A Brief Outline of Life and Work. Moscow: Voenizdat, 108 pp.
7. Gray C.S. (2010). The Strategy Bridge. Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 328 pp.
8. Harrison R.W. (2010). Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II. The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson. Jefferson N.C.; London: McFarland, 411 pp.
9. Hines J.G. (1995). Soviet Strategic Intentions 1965–1985; an Analytical Comparison of U.S. Cold-war Interpretations with Soviet Post-Cold-war Testimonial Evidence. Doctor of Philosophy Thesis. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, xiv + 346 pp.
10. Istoriya… (2020). Zolotarev V.A. (ed.). The History of Russia’s Military Strategy. Moscow: Kuchkovo field; Polygraph Resources, 588 pp. (in Russian).
11. Ken O.N. (2004). Stalin as a Strategist (between Two Wars). In: Pavlovsky G.O. (ed.). Russian Journal 2004. Wars of the XX century. Moscow: Russian Institute, pp. 51–71 (in Russian).
12. Ken O.N. (2008). Mobilization Planning and Political Decisions (late 1920s – mid-1930s). 2nd ed. Moscow: O.G.I., 510 pp. (in Russian).
13. Kokoshin A.A. (1988). Svechin on War and Politics. International Life. No. 10, pp. 133–142 (in Russian).
14. Kokoshin A.A. (2013). Outstanding Russian Theorist and Military Commander Alexander Andreevich Svechin: His Life, Ideas, Works and Legacy for the Present and the Future. Moscow: Moscow University Press, 404 pp.
15. Krivopalov A.A. (2023). Inversion of U.S. Strategy. Marginal Notes for On Strategy: A Primer. Russia in Global Affairs. Vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 200–212. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2023-21-1-200-212.
16. Luttwak E. (2012). Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace. Moscow: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 390 pp. (transl. into Russian).
17. McGrew M.A. (2011). Politics and the Operational Level of War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 58 pp.
18. On Strategy… (2020). Finney N.K. (ed.). On Strategy: A Primer. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, xvi + 256 pp.
19. Shaposhnikov B.M. (1929). The Brain of the Army. In 3 books. 3rd book. Moscow, Leningrad: State Publishing House Department of Military Literature, 379 pp. (in Russian).
20. Shaposhnikov B.M. (1974). Memoirs. Military Scientific Works. Moscow: Voenizdat, 574 pp. (in Russian).
21. Shlykov V.V. (2000). Does Russia need a General Staff? Military Bulletin. No. 7, 40 pp. (in Russian).
22. Shtemenko S.M. (1989). The General Staff During the War. 2nd ed. Moscow: Voenizdat, 560 pp. (in Russian).
23. Svechin A.A. (1927). Strategy. 2nd ed. Moscow: Military Bulletin, 263 pp. (in Russian).
24. Uroki strategii… (2023). Ivanikhin P.M. et al. Lessons of Marshal Shaposhnikov’s strategy. Military Thought. No. 11. pp. 136–145 (in Russian).
25. Vasilevsky A.M. (1983). The Matter of My Whole Life. 4th ed. Moscow: Politizdat, 544 pp. (in Russian).
26. Zhukov G.K. (1985). Memoirs and Reflections. In 3 vol. 6th ed. Vol. 2. Moscow: APN, 325 pp. (in Russian).
Review
For citations:
Krivopalov A.A. Scientific Legacy of Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov and the Problems of Modern Strategy. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2023;16(5):204-221. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.31249/kgt/2023.05.12
Views:
267
Email this article 