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COVID-19: From Short Term National Resilience to Medium Term Multilateral New Normal

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ABSTRACT. COVID-19 has shaken the world and forced us to rethink our development strategies and the whole systemic framework. Although globalization facilitated the pandemic, deglobalization will not prevail. Globalization will be rather transformed to promote positive and reduce/eliminate its negative effects. Pandemic has, apart from negative effects (spreading the virus), demonstrated some very positive sides of globalization like scientific cooperation. Enhancing resilience has become the main strategy of the mankind not only in terms of containing the pandemic but also in ex ante preventing it in the long run. A combination of containing and ex ante preventing the pandemics looks like then best strategy, because viruses are here to stay among us. It can be done by resolving Rodrik's, to him, unresolvable trilemma, between autonomy, GLO and democracy on the national as well multilateral level.

On the basis of possible future scenario developments, we demonstrate how multilateral solutions are a must to create the stable and effective framework for the adjustments and redesigning of the strategies and behaviour of all agents (individuals, firms and states) in a proactive way by thinking out of the existing boxes. Such a multilateral framework has to allow enough space for the national actions when they are better suited to national priorities and to fill the gaps, if international institution fail to be successful in addressing new challenges. Rethinking of our mind sets and theories are required and even new types of education and training for the creation of new competences of micro agents.

KEYWORDS: COVID-19, crisis, VUCA world, new normal, globalization, deglobalization, strategy, resilience, multilateralism, Rodrik's trilemma, micro agents.

Introduction

COVID-19, as many other crises, came as a total surprise (Great Recession – GR is the nearest example), but it should not catch us unprepared. Many studies have indicated much earlier that pandemic may happen [Svetličič, 2021a] but were unfortunately ignored by policy makers. For one, because they have not fit in the prevailing development/systemic paradigms and policies/strategies on their basis, either they were not in the interest of dominant elites or they were too costly. Recognizing that, this and also other crises are vastly man-made, would reveal the misconceptions and incapacity to deal effectively with them. Pandemic has been so far considered to be externally induced, that globalization (GLO) is its mother [Svetličič, 2021a] and mainly poor nations disease. Now everybody started to be hurt, developed countries (DCs) even more urbanized than developing countries (LDCs). Such unpreparedness is perhaps one of the main causes for the huge costs of the pandemic for human lives and wellbeing with the huge short and long term consequences.

The implications of COVID-19 crisis are multifaceted and multidimensional. It is not only a medical/health crisis. It has evolved in huge socio-economic crisis unrevealing also many other burning crises under the surface, like inequality and environmental-climate crisis. Latour [Latour, 2021] has even posited “that the health crisis prepares, induces, incites us to prepare for climate change”. For him the pandemic is only a small sample of the real crises that will come later: other viruses, global catastrophes and, above all, global warming. Consequently, the solutions to such radical changes and complex crises have to be multidimensional. Cures for the existing and next pandemic cannot be only medical (vaccination), because it only contains the pandemic not addressing other vulnerabilities, such as the impacts of climate

change. OECD [Fostering Economic Resilience..., 2021, p. 11] thus concluded that:

“building resilient economies and societies requires a systemic approach to a diverse range of known and unknown risks, from pandemics and climate change to developments in globalisation and emerging technologies. Building protective social capital and trust may help to reduce the cost of future crises, such as pandemics and other crises, for which social behaviour and trust in institutions and science matter. This calls for reinforcing the capacity of the economic system to withstand or absorb a variety of shocks and to adapt or transform itself to bounce forward during the recovery. It also implies a need to mitigate risks, through efforts to detect and address distortions and externalities at their source, so that the chronic build-up of vulnerabilities and tensions within the system turn into acute events”.

The first response to the pandemic was, time wise, to prevent and contain the spreading of the virus, followed by enhancing ex ante readiness to similar crises in the future. Only later deeply rooted causes of the pandemic and related crises started to attract attention of the policy makers. All these policies have been initially developed mainly on the national scale and, only later, multilateral coordination and common policies in a multilateral framework gained importance. It was finally discovered that the only real solution to the problem can be traced in a multilateral framework.

Objectives and methodology

The objective of this article is to evaluate short and medium term reactions, policies to the pandemic in contrast with long, more systemic ones which is evaluated in the other article [Svetličič, 2021b]. Firstly, it will shortly evaluate the role of globalization (GLO), widely accused of

being the detonator of the pandemic and what should be done in this respect, how to improve the GLO by striking the right balance between its positive and negative implications. Secondly, how to enhance the virus resilience of the societies and ex ante preparedness for the pandemics/crises/ coming in the future. The third chapter is devoted to resolving the Rodrik's trilemma [Rodrick, 2011] between autonomy, GLO and democracy. Such solutions cannot be found individually but only as a multilateral action (fourth section). Lastly, how can the (micro) agents become better prepared for the new volatile environment with crises (including pandemics) now and in the future, to desirable Real New (post Corona¹) Normal².

The following general research questions will be addressed:

1) How to redesign globalization in order to contain or even prevent such crises to repeat?

2) How resilience against such crises can be established and retained in the long run.

3) Is the solution the resolving of Rodrik's trilemma?

4) Is the multilateral response needed or are more national actions necessary or what is the relationship between the two?

5) How can micro agents adjust and proactively respond to such multicity of crises?

In view of the novelty of COVID-19 crisis it is impossible to apply a robust longitudinal methodology in analysing it. On a basis of literature review of different diagnosis of the COVID-19 pandemic and proposals for solutions, the article will elaborate on what should be done in the "post" pandemic real new normal.

Redesigning GLO

After the COVID-19 outbreak, GLO started to be accused as a detonator of the pandemic. Consequently, GLO backlash started in practice (closing the borders for all different flows). But:

The COVID-19 pandemic is not the mother of de-GLO but rather its child. It facilitated the pandemic but not gave it a birth. The pandemic's conception is more deeply rooted in the capitalist system and its biggest elements [Svetličič, 2021a, p. 20]. *It was like E. Lorenz [Lorenz, 1963] butterfly hypothesis or chaos theory by which "a butterfly flaps its wing and sets molecules of air in motion, which would move other molecules of air, in turn moving more molecules of air eventually capable of a starting a hurricane on the other side of the planet."* Now the virus is spreading like the butterfly flaps not "from Brazil to Texas" but from Wuhan all around the globe.

The first consequence was thus the creation of a less open and less free world, since countries opted for national remedies, mainly closing the borders and limiting travelling. Economic nationalism also manifested in tests/masks trade war and later, vaccine nationalism. Globalization backlash started, resulting in slowing down GLO (slowbalization), relaxing of interdependence among countries. A rethinking of the type and role of GLO in development was triggered off. The opponents to GLO got wind in their sails. On the other hand, GLO was also stimulated. The R&D cooperation in the development of the vaccine and global policy coordination, synchronization between countries,

1 In fact, there is no post Corona Normal because virus is going to stay among us.

2 The term is semantically questionable since the situation after the pandemic crisis would be far from normal. Žižek questions the term normal because normality eclipses the real problems in the system maintaining the pandemic is a final blow to two ongoing problems of the world (he calls 'storms'), international conflicts and mental health, which are often neglected [Žižek, 2021]. Secondly, there is no one New Normal but many, adjusted to the specific country conditions, their level of development and value preferences.

started. Since pandemic is a global phenomenon, deficiencies in global governance³ and inability to find solutions only nationally, have been revealed. The Janus face of GLO as two edge sword was discovered again in the new context of coexistence of GLO and de-GLO trends.

The major future challenge regarding the role of GLO is thus to find a solution between these two extreme positions based on the objective evaluation of the role of GLO in the development, its benefits, and costs in order to stimulate positive and restrict its negative implications. The basic reason being that such a restricted, less globalized world, slowing down trade, and almost all other international transactions, cannot last long. Lamy, former director-general of the World Trade Organization [Lamy, 2020], is clear: “GLO is a reality that cannot be ignored or wished away. The only choice is how best to respond to it”, and, we can add, to modify it to be fairer and more equitable. The most important reason is that:

“GLO as a global division of labour/specialization is not over. Throwing the baby (GLO) out with the bathwater (virus) while dreaming of a return to autarky is no answer. A fully-fledged de-GLO would be inefficient and painful because, by throwing away the advantages of the division of labour, everybody would lose out. Still, GLO must be transformed and become more egalitarian, more human [Svetličič, 2021a].

But at the same time, we must realize that GLO is not an ever-growing, irreversible, linear, self-sustainable, long-term trend. It has in-built oscillations which we will be facing also in the future, depending

largely on our policies and changing man-made context⁴ (zeitgeist), both institutionally and in terms of the environment. Pendulum of slowbalization, we are facing now, can be transformed to upswing of better and different GLO in the future. If not able to restrict its negative effects slow down can be stronger, and if succeeding in redesigning it in a fairer process and enhance its scope in some, so needed other areas (R&D, coordination, health standards, provision of public goods) GLO can still prosper.

Compensating the losers of GLO is not enough, because it is not only about distribution. It is also a systemic rooted problem. What is called for is a new, more human, democratic, more inclusive GLO with balanced distribution of its costs and benefits, limiting, if not eliminating, its negative implications like polluting the environment, endangering the animal species and nature in general and finally reducing/eliminating risks of pandemics by enhancing resilience to future shocks (economic, climate or health) and promoting circular economy. The pandemic and GLO have made the redistributive role⁵, of the state more important. The problem is how to find an appropriate balance between national and global redistribution. Existing type of GLO is, according to Palley [Palley, 2017] and Rodrik [Rodrik, 2011] limiting the space for national policy. Thus, any new type of GLO would have to provide more policy space for countries. It is a precondition to pursue legitimate social purposes for managing their economic development successfully, without fear of retreat into a regressive nationalism but rather

3 There is not enough cooperation where it is highly needed (governance coordination, health standards, R&D cooperation, global redistribution policy...) and too much of GLO in other areas (unnecessary trade; [Svetličič, 2021b]).

4 Economic (decreasing all flows, slowing growth and productivity rates, demographic (aging), socio-political (populism, erosion of democracy, inequality increase, enhanced role of the governments and security issues, questioning of the system) and the role of technology (digitalization, erosion of privacy, disruptive innovations) [Managing Technological..., 2020, p. 415].

5 In addition to its globalization enhancing role [Rodrik, 2020], which have, so far, prevailed.

“encouraged to work together in a collective, cooperative way, acknowledging the multilateral imperative to ensure the fairest distribution of gains over time” [Piketty, 2020].

Enhancing macro resilience

The second issue related to how to address the adverse effects of COVID-19, and crises in general, is strengthening the resilience of countries, companies and individuals to the existing and future pandemics. In other words, how to develop and enhance proactive and reactive “social resilience as a meta-capability of the social system to anticipate, cope with, adapt and transform disruptive events, leading to the evolution of social systems” [Duchek, 2020]. Particularly since they are so complex, fast and unpredictable. Dobbs et al. [Dobbs, Manyika, Woetzel, 2015] estimate that this change is happening ten times faster and at 300 times the scale, or roughly 3,000 times the impact compared with the Industrial Revolution.

“Reactive resilience occurs when a system itself allows recovery from a disturbance/disaster, and is dependent on its strengths to survive through a situation while proactive resilience can safeguard a social system, much like a healthy immune system. It requires strong anticipatory capabilities and agile responses, which develop gradually through experiential learning, ongoing self-reflection and strong vicarious learning” [Menzies, Raskovic, 2020].

In general, we can therefore distinguish 4 responses to the COVID-19 pandemic:

1. Preventing the spreading of the virus globally and nationally by limiting all forms of its transfers (closing the borders, cities, municipalities ...).

2. Containing the pandemic by different prevention, mainly health, measures (face masks, distancing, ventilations, lim-

itations and even banning of people's gatherings, ...).

3. Enhancing more medium and long term resilience of the societies and parallelly creating ex ante readiness for containing or even preventing such pandemics coming.

4. Addressing long term systemic context in which pandemic crises emerges (anthropocentric development pattern, Darwinist capitalist system...) in order to eliminate the causes of viruses' emergence.

So far prevailing reactive resilience demonstrated our incapability to adequately address the roots of the COVID-19 pandemic. Improving the ventilation system (virus is spreading also in an aerosol way), the construction of buildings in a way to allow permanent circulation of clean air in interior spaces is not enough. Similar policy can be established as it was already done vs. polluted water and cholera (thanks D. Keber for these ideas). The climate or ecological degradation/crisis, which is “a direct outcome of the capitalist system. There is a causal link between capitalism and the devastation of environment” [Vrečko, 2021, p. 349].

There may be a chance that the present pandemic, will trigger off a paradigm shift, a more fundamental rethinking, of our theories, strategies, mind-sets, because it has been demonstrated that “whichever country or individual adapts faster to changes has a competitive advantage. Policies that improve adaptability and the embracing of change are therefore even more essential than before. Countries which are stuck in path dependency and adapt too slow will not excel in a post-COVID world” [Bluth, Petersen, 2020].

By enhancing it, one can be better prepared for the crises coming because they are, as demonstrated in history and confirmed theoretically, embedded in the

capitalist system(s) as an anarchic crisis-prone system⁶.

The current crisis will eventually end, either when a vaccine is available, or when enough of the global population has developed herd immunity (if lasting immunity is possible?). But, the pandemic cannot be under control anywhere unless it is controlled everywhere, if majority of the population in the world is vaccinated. Unfortunately, it doesn't look like very soon, since as current developments reveal, many LDCs will have to wait for the vaccines until 2024 unless the production will be licensed to new producers, not so far owners of the patents. Waiving of patents, although very attractive, doesn't sound very realistic at the moment.

The admiring "light speed" in developing the Corona-19 vaccine⁷ should not derail our efforts to address the real causes of the covid-19 pandemic. Virus(es) will remain circulating in societies. "Thus strengthening our ability to control epidemics, because we are still unable to conquer them, is the policy priority. We need to learn how to live with this and other viruses and cannot continue carrying on in a pre-crisis mode. There will, therefore, not be a 'post-Corona' period" [Pas, 2020, p. 5, 20] unless the existing anthropocentric development models endangering our habitat were changed.

Consequently, the best medium term response is enhancing ex ante adjustment to the potential new crises coming, because crises come in two variants: those for which

we could not have been prepared, because no one had anticipated them, and those for which we should have been prepared like known unknowns⁸, because they were in fact expected. "COVID-19 is in the latter category" [Rodrik, 2020]. Since it is impossible to know exactly what the future pandemic will be, the best response is don't be late, because the winners are doing the right thing at the right moment⁹ and try to anticipate events ex ante and adjust pro-actively. At the same time it is important to stay as flexible as possible, enhancing the competencies for managing pandemic(s), to be prepared for it institutionally and in terms of human capital. With few exceptions, it was mostly not the case so far. Asian companies were generally better prepared, having experienced both the SARS epidemic of 2002-03 and, in some cases, having had to deal with the social unrest that gripped Hong Kong for much of 2019¹⁰.

"The inconvenient truth is that the world has been busy fighting COVID-19, but that no steps have been set to increase pandemic preparedness" [Bergeijk, 2021, p. 17]. "Adaptation will be both an imperative and a key source of advantage for all actors in this world", claimed US NIC [National Intelligence Council, 2021, p. 3]. Being nimble, moving quickly, is, according to Weber [Weber, 2020], crucial, because problems often grow at exponential rates. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. The problem is however, that "people are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes"¹¹. People

6 See about the theory on this in [Svetličič, 2021a].

7 Pandemic "has led to some 350,000 bits of research, many of them on preprint servers that make findings available almost instantaneously". See: Bright side of the moonshots // The Economist. – 2021. – March 27. – P. 7.

8 As defined by Rumsfeld's (George W. Bush's secretary of defence). As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know [Graham, 2014].

9 Latecomers receive the breadcrumbs left behind from the rich man's table or are hurt badly by being unprepared.

10 Bartleby: Lessons from the front line // The Economist. – 2020. – April 18. – P. 49.

11 Many of such events are "black swans, rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are "grey rhinos," large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are "invisible gorillas," threats in full view that should be noticed but aren't so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame" [Weber, 2020].

vastly underestimate the likelihood of low-probability events, until they personally experience one. At that point, they react, and perhaps even overreact, for a short while, until the perceived threat recedes again” [Weber, 2020]. This pandemic is perhaps the best illustration. It found us all unprepared, even though it was an unpredictable predictability, because experts have over the years warned against pandemics, about high probability that they can and will happen again, although nobody knew when it might happen. Hence one can only agree with director of Bruegel think tank [Wolff, 2021], positing that “If there’s one priority on which the world community needs to deliver, it is about reducing the probability of new pandemics emerging”.

Late response is thus a consequence of ignoring the early warnings because they have not fit to the prevailing (free market) ideology and, as a consequence, lack of political will to act as well as the lack of knowledge or, better, ignoring the science. Lower costs of acting on time were ignored and consequently the pandemic costs increased. The lesson therefore is to overcome such deficiencies in the future, acting on time and continuously adjust our responses to the developments in the crisis as we learn from our own experience and from the work of scientists. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than wilfully ignoring it, thinking long run, rather than merely until the next election or reporting to shareholders in the case of companies.

COVID-19 is only in a very short term a medical problem. In the long term it is becoming more and more a socio-economic problem. It has obfuscated the challenges of how policymaking can effectively address complex and long-term societal challenges with unclear time frames, called wicked problems [Menzies, Raskovic, 2020] by enhancing its adjustments competencies. Yet we know the least of such

an “adaptive efficiency which describe how economies and societies work effectively, not at a moment in time, but through time” [North, 1999]. It can be achieved on the assumption of a sufficiently flexible institutional framework suitably adapted to an environment and smoothly absorbing exogenous shocks. Strengthening the inclusive institutions which are much more effective in doing the job compared to extractive ones, which have proved to be bad for the development [Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012] is the right response therefore. Inclusive institutions demand strong government to protect law and order (rule of law), and rule by law, public services regulating markets and politically allowing pluralism, public participation, democracy. Bad institutions can increase the risks, making us more vulnerable. Covid-19 pandemic is therefore as much a medical as it is a socio-political crisis.

Rodrik’s trilemma and possible solution(s)

Containing the virus by enhancing the resilience and ex ante capabilities to adjust can be an effective instrument in a short and medium term. However, it can work only if paralleled with needed deeper socio-political changes, if they are inbuilt in the proper institutional setup. This brings us to Rodrik’s trilemma, or the inability to have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-determination all at once which appears as the most intriguing issue in the post pandemic times. According to him, “we can restrict democracy in the interest of minimizing international transaction costs. We can limit globalization, in the hope of building democratic legitimacy at home. Or we can globalize democracy, at the cost of national sovereignty. This gives us a menu of options for constructing the world economy” [Rodrik, 2011, p. 200].

It is a huge, to some unresolvable issue. Firstly, scientifically and secondly because either the politicians nor the mainstream, and other scientists “captured” in traditional neoliberal paradigm framework, are not able or interested in the resolution of this challenge. If they were, then the problem is that politicians have been in the past not very much interested to listen to them. The pandemic started to change the climate and mind-sets a little at least; politicians were just unable to do policy without the help of the scientists. The urgent need has helped, but after it evaporates, things can return to old normal neglect of the science.

Although it looks like wishful thinking, mathematically a solution to this trilemma is by changing individual elements of the equation. We can change hyperglobalization [Rodrik, 2011] to a human face GLO. We can de-GLO irrational activities unnecessarily polluting envi-

ronment, by localizing what can be done rationally at home instead of importing, shortening of global values chains (GVCs) and in such a way enhancing autonomy and strategic sovereignty and reducing GLO activities which produce unbalanced results between winners and losers. Such changes can be done in a democratic way what would strengthen strategic sovereignty and autonomy by opening the space for sovereign autonomous decision¹² substituting in such a way some decisions which have been before, in hyperglobalization, imposed upon countries by international rules.

Schematically we can illustrate such trade-offs in the way of outlining two possible scenarios based on the attitudes regarding the elements of trilemma: GLO, national state and democracy. First is Optimal Democratic New Normal scenario and secondly Economic Nationalism scenario.

Table 1. Two possible scenarios for resolving Rodrik’s trilemma as a New Normal after the pandemic

Таблица 1. Два возможных сценария разрешения трилеммы Родрика в качестве новой нормы после пандемии

Optimal Democratic New Normal scenario		
Hyperglobalization	National state, self determination	Democracy
Moderating, slowing down GLO, thin GLO [Rodrik, 2011]	Enhancing resilience	By enhanced democracy create human face GLO based on the principle of humanity
Eliminating over-globalization (change from hyperglobalization to productive GLO) ¹³	Strategic autonomy to reduce dependency	Renationalization of some int. organizations governance (what is better done nationally-locally)
Reshoring, localizing (GVCs)	Reshaping governance of the international trade	Liberal meritocratic capitalism [Milanović, 2019]

¹² Subsidiarity principle in EU terminology.

¹³ According to De Backer and S. Miroudot [De Backer, Miroudot, 2013, p. 5] «more than half of world manufactured imports are intermediate goods (primary goods, parts and components, and semi-finished products), and more than 70% of world services imports are intermediate services». Such goods and services cross borders – often numerous times. Some of it is clearly irrational “zigzagging across borders of goods and services accounting for some 28 per cent of the value of this trade” [UNCTAD, 2013] and trade flows which are too pollution-intensive to be transported, and products like the “export of milk from some countries to be processed into yogurt and re-exported back are not really must do” [Mencinger, 2010].

Greening of GLO	Stimulating essential goods local production	Globalization-enhancing global governance on the lowest common denominator [Rodrik, 2011; Rodrik, 2020] Rodrik Rodrik consistent with democratic delegation.
Enhanced GLO of services (digitalization)	Shared sovereignty	National control over digitalization
GLO limited by the ability to govern it	New Bretton Woods providing more policy space (opt outs) to states	Enhanced transparency and democratic control over activities of international organizations
Economic Nationalism scenario		
De-GLO	Every country first	Populism with autocratic touch
Trade wars, protectionism	Flirting with autarchy, Illiberal democracies, Irrational (subsidized) sub-optimal local production	Political capitalism [Milanović, 2019] Populism
Full-fledged de-GLO	Conflicts on US-China axis as well as North-South (because of exacerbation of inequalities)	Autocracy, authoritarianism Internal political conflicts

In view of present strengthening of economic nationalism/protectionism¹⁴, every country first policy, rising authoritarianism around the globe, and rebirth of new sovereignty,¹⁵ Democratic New Normal scenario sounds like a very utopian idea. But, let us not forget, that all great ideas started first like utopia which may offer some optimism in the future developments. Particularly, since the global context may start to be conducive to such transformations. There are some similarities with the epoch of the fight of LDCs for new International economic order (NIEO) which created the “climate” for changes even in the minds of industrial countries. They realized how interdependent we are. The ideology of interdependence was used by them as an instrument for changing the minds of LDCs, particularly oil exporting countries. Now, the pandemic has clearly demonstrated even more strongly how strongly interdependent we are. Then it was the oil crisis, now we have energy crisis. It was followed

by the debt crisis which might follow now, after huge helicopter money pumped in the economies by industrial countries to solve the pandemic induced economic crisis. Then the Bretton Woods system collapsed, now WTO, or even UN system are in crisis. Development strategies started to be rethought then (from import to export led strategy) and now the realization than anthropocentric consumerist model has demonstrated its deficiencies and was ripe for fundamental transformation. The policies have now also much better instruments to address economic and social problems, provided such technologies are used for good causes. Modern technology namely offers multitude of opportunities; technology optimist would claim. But, unfortunately, digitalisation, artificial intelligence and new achievements in life sciences are too frequently abused by big tech firms and governments for antidemocratic surveillance instead. Big data companies are in modern type of surveillance capi-

14 According to Krugman “The pandemic produced some extreme forms of de facto infant industry protection, forcing millions of Americans to work differently from the way they had before. And many, though not all, of these changes are likely to stick. /.../ The obvious case, of course, is remote work. Many workers will, no doubt, eventually go back to the office”. See: Krugman P. Working Out: Alexander Hamilton and Post-Covid America // The New York Times. – 2021. – July 2.

15 It regards global governance as undemocratic.

talism [Zuboff, 2018], even taking control away from politicians and governments. The context may therefore be again conducive for deep, at least gradual changes, in the long run.

Multilateral solutions are a must

The huge extent of the pandemic, its intertwining with other related global crises (economic, social, environmental, climate...) makes it so unique that new approaches to address them are needed. Such fundamental changes of the context, of much deeper interdependence than in the previous century, demand solidarity, policy coordination and speedy responses at many levels. Kissinger [Kissinger, 2020] and Fishman [Fishman, 2020] are thus probably right claiming that the pandemic will change the world, that the pandemic is a major game changer of the existing rapidly changing world system in which US has lost its hegemon position. China is challenging such a position. Mearsheimer [Mearsheimer, 2021] claims that relations among dominant powers, USA and China are in fact resembling: “a new cold war. This rivalry will test U.S. policymakers more than the original Cold War did, as China is likely to be a more powerful competitor than the Soviet Union was in its prime. And this cold war is more likely to turn hot. None of this should be surprising. China is acting exactly as realism would predict/... /in effect imitating the United States. It wants to be the most powerful state in its backyard and, eventually, in the world. /.../Most Americans do not recognize that Beijing and Washington are following the same playbook, because they believe the United States is a noble democracy that acts differently from authoritar-

ian and ruthless countries such as China. But that is not how international politics works. All great powers, be they democracies or not, have little choice but to compete for power in what is at root a zero-sum game”. If we want to avoid such a zero-sum game and turn it to a positive sum game, major changes are needed both nationally and globally, because pandemic has dramatically changed the world.

The mankind priorities have been changing. “Pandemic added to persistent personal and societal fears, topped by job loss, climate change and hackers and cyberattacks”¹⁶. At the same time there are not much changes in the national and global governance, in the global system. It caught us off guard, not really prepared for such seismic challenge. Latour [Latour, 2021] has clearly stated that »for this war, the national state is as ill-prepared, as badly calibrated, as badly designed as possible because the battle fronts are multiple and cross each one of us. It is in this sense that the “general mobilization” against the virus does not prove in any way that we will be ready for the next one. «. One reason being also huge polarization and rivalry among the major actors in the global power struggle in the period of great transformation while for a real change there must be at least some agreement on the basic bricks of the new system.

Consequently, “the international response to COVID-19 was surprisingly inept, especially compared with previous campaigns to contain epidemics or eradicate diseases. /.../Although the creation of the vaccines was a triumph of international cooperation, their distribution has been anything but success” claim the report of an independent panel chaired by two former heads of state, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia and Helen Clark of New Zealand. To prevent the same mistake from hap-

16 Edelman Trust Barometer. – 2021. – URL: <https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2021-03/2021%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf> (accessed: 04.11.2021).

pening again, they recommended: elevating pandemic preparedness and response to the highest levels of the UN through the creation of a “global health threats council.” This council would be separated from the WHO, led by heads of state, and charged with holding countries accountable for containing epidemics. In the seismic challenge, we are, according to Suskind and Vines [*Suskind, Vines*, 2020, p. 11], facing big choices. “We can do what the world did in the late 1940s, when the institutional choices which were made helped to support the golden age of global growth during the 1950s and 1960s. Or we can instead allow what happened in the 1930s to happen all over again.”

In such a context the gap between the global governance capacity and lack of national authorities in dealing with such crises apart from its dangerously underfunding, slowness, and vulnerable to political interference, has to be narrowed. Countries have empowered multilateral institution with a lot of powers, losing their own autonomy policy space in designing policies in many areas. But when multilateral institutions fail, as has been frequently the case with COVID-19, there is consequently a lack of national, not only space, but also capabilities to address such, for nations, unexpected problems supposed to be dealt by multilateral institutions. The solutions are to be traced both in empowering multilateral institutions to do their job, but at the same time have a parallel national capacity to fill the gap if they fail in a crisis situation. Weakening of multilateral institutions, as we have been experiencing in the last decade of enhancement of power politics, has to be stopped, because “a resilient global economy needs strong institutions, rules and norms to ensure open, fair and innovative markets operating on a global level playing field. Adherence to common rules of the road ensures inclusive and sustainable growth and underpins trust in government and in the multilateral

system more broadly” [*Fostering Economic Resilience...*, 2021, p. 13].

Increased interdependence and connectivity between the states and all other actors, including non-governmental ones, facilitated the spreading of the virus but also opened new possibilities for enhanced cooperation. Such well-orchestrated cooperation can help reducing the spreading of the virus and help inventing the vaccine by pooling resources and knowledge and distributing it by concerted efforts. Unfortunately, the “lack of a truly global approach to the pandemic was”, according to Bergeijk [*Bergeijk*, 2021, p. 18], “one of the most disturbing facts.”

Therefore, the present pandemic clearly calls for multilateral actions, for reforming the system which has demonstrated many holes in its operations during the pandemic, but is still much better compared to inviable national isolationism, economic nationalism, beggar thy neighbour policies or vaccine nationalism based on zero sum approach. Such, highly popular policies of blaming or scapegoating others for all the problems, including our own mistakes, are giving ground to already enhanced, particularly right, populism. But it should not be mistakenly equalled with nationalism. They are two different concepts. America or any country first, trade (now vaccine or masks) wars and Brexit as the signs of regressive de-GLO and economic nationalism, are not the answers.

“Unilateralism, nationalist, ethnic and religious fundamentalist forces, leading to a violent dismantling of the GLO in ways reminiscent of the first half of the 20th century is not a serious policy response to the pandemic and GLO challenges. Yes, given the economic damage and social collapse, the pandemic will, in the short term, give fuel to the nationalists and anti-globalists, the China hawks, stimulating great-power rivalry, strategic decoupling, and the like. But just like in the 1930s and '40s, there might also be a slower-evolving counter cur-

rent, a sort of hard headed internationalism similar to the one that Roosevelt, and a few other statesmen, began to articulate before and during the war; an open post-war order required the building of a global infrastructure of multilateral cooperation" [Ikenberry, 2020].

Haass [Haass, 2020, p.1] is not so optimistic, not expecting many changes, because "the world following the pandemic is unlikely to be radically different from the one that preceded it. COVID-19 will not so much change the basic direction of world history as accelerate it". Mahbubani [Mahbubani, 2020] supports him: "because the Americans' lost faith in GLO and international trade, but not China. Chinese leaders now know well that China's century of humiliation (1842 to 1949) was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement. The Chinese people have experienced an explosion of cultural confidence. They believe they can compete anywhere. President Biden's team now believe "that China is less interested in coexistence and more interested in dominance. The task of American policy is to blunt Chinese ambitions"¹⁷, or in other words, wolf warrior diplomacy by increasing US power.

The surest way to avoid this pandemic nightmare and power struggle dominated international relations is to stop dreaming and get on with the task of building a more just and democratic global order based upon GLO from below [Skidmore, 2004, p. 173]. Not only GLO, but also the whole system, we can add.

Single states are simply too weak to dominate in the restructured global economy. Even US National Intelligence Council concluded, that "no single actor will be

positioned to dominate across all regions and in all domains, offering opportunities for a broader array of actors to compete to shape the international system" [National Intelligence Council, 2021, p. 8, 94]. Therefore, they designed five potential scenarios till 2040, taking into consideration:

- How severe are the looming global challenges?
- How do states and non-state actors engage in the world, including focus and type of engagement?
- Finally, what do states prioritize for the future?

Each reflects the key themes of shared global challenges, fragmentation, disequilibrium, adaptation, and greater contestation. Three are more optimistically realistic:

A. *Renaissance of Democracies* in which the United States leads a resurgence of democracies;

B. *A World Adrift* with China leading but not being dominant state globally,

C. *Competitive Coexistence*, the United States and China prosper and compete for leadership in a bifurcated world.

Other two scenarios are more confrontational, arising from particularly severe global discontinuities and both defy assumptions about the global system:

D) *Separate Silos* portraying a world in which globalization has broken down, and economic and security blocs emerge to protect states from mounting threats and

E) *Tragedy and Mobilization* portraying a bottom-up, revolutionary change on the heels of devastating global environmental crisis [National Intelligence Council, 2021, p. 109].

In a vastly uncertain future, all scenarios seem plausible, although first three sounds more realistic. Scenario A is less viable, while a combination be-

¹⁷ Biden's new China doctrine // The Economist. – 2021. – July 17. – P. 11.

tween B and C scenario looks like more realistic. Based on a positive sum game multilateral solution, they avoid a zero-sum confrontation and emphasise collective action. Only in such a way the world will be able to meet the risks of disease, climate change, environmental/climate crisis including water shortage¹⁸, cyber-attacks, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Global problems require global solutions with credible institutions to support them. Haass and Kupchan may be correct to highlight the persistent danger of great-power rivalries leading to war (similar [Mearsheimer, 2021]; see earlier). Their proposal that »the best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a kind of plurinational solution, a global *Concert of major powers*¹⁹» has some holes, since: the *Concert of Europe was not a golden age of great-power relations. The concert was based on these powers' readiness to wage war against fellow members when diplomacy failed. The concert set the stage for a disastrous century, and a new organization modelled on it would risk a similar outcome*» [The Case Against a New Concert of Powers..., 2021].

Nevertheless, if not (yet) supranational solutions look inevitable and indispensable for effective global governance, for the creation of more global public goods, but leaving enough policy space to national governments to address their specific economic, cultural/value, to their history. The 2021 Oct. meeting of G-20 also emphasised: »the crucial role of

multilateralism in finding shared, effective solutions to further strengthen our common response to the pandemic, and pave the way for a global recovery, with particular regard to the needs of the most vulnerable. We have taken decisive measures to support countries most in need to overcome the pandemic, improve their resilience and address critical challenges such as ensuring food security and environmental sustainability. We have agreed upon a shared vision to combat climate change, and taken important steps towards the achievement of gender equality. We have also further advanced in our common efforts to ensure that the benefits of digitalization are shared broadly, safely and contribute to reducing inequalities»²⁰.

Nice words, but the realization usually falls short. In order to achieve such solutions, it is also necessary to overcome the gap between global problems and the capacity to meet them. The new global governance which will narrow the gap between the global character of problems (crises, pandemic, climate change, pollution, GLO...) and their prevalingly national governance in state centric global community is needed. It implies giving enough policy space to national governments and at the same time empowering multilateral organization (old or/and newly designed more complex ones, like the original idea of International Trade Organization was) to deal effectively with global issues. It means more of GATT and less of the WTO type²¹ solutions. »The scope of workable global regulation is namely limited by the scope of

18 And other raw materials reminding us about apocalyptic, but early wakeup call study, Limits to Growth [Meadows, Meadows, 1974] or its update [Meadows, Jorgen, Meadows, 2004].

19 It would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and non-democracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type.

20 G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration. – 2021. – URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/52732/final-final-g20-rome-declaration.pdf?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=G20+Rome+Leaders%e2%80%99+Declaration (accessed: 04.11.2021).

21 GATT namely allowed member countries more policy space while WTO reduced it. Member countries have to follow the agreement's rules with almost no derogations, exceptions or transition periods, are not allowed.

desirable GLO” [Rodrik, 2011, p. 232]. It seems that walking on both legs; global governance and national one is a must.

Micro agents’ adjustments

The financial crisis of 2008, followed by GR, and now socio economic crisis, ensuing Covid-19 health crisis with parallel socio economic, environmental and climate crises, have created totally new landscape for institution, firms and individuals. These “nonergodic changes – changes that are nonlinear, erratic, and hard to predict as they do not look much like the recent past – are yielding some unexpected outcomes and boundary conditions for the current business and economic environment “[El-Erian, 2010; Hitt, Li, Xu, 2016]. The new institutional and competitive environment has been created²² with the pandemic adding new, wide spread implications to already many long term economic transformations of the global economy from technological changes and digitalization to climate changes. They, together with new power relationships and growing populism and economic nationalism, demand major shifts in firms’ behaviours and strategies [Ghauri, Strange, Fang Lee, 2021]. The UN Economist Network report [Bright side..., 2020] has identified five megatrends to which we have to adjust: climate change; demographic shifts/ageing; urbanization; digital technologies; and inequalities. Some are manifestations of human progress – such as technological innovations, urbanization or demographic trends. Others are a consequence of policy deficiencies.

There are two major ways how to react, adjust (or even try to influence) such tectonic changes. One way is:

i) to identify such changes as Ghauri and associates did or

ü) to concentrate more on own strategies and policies so as to be able to react the best to such external uncertainties, unpredictability’s.

In a normal situation the first approach would look like more appropriate. The following trends they indicated seems crucial for our analysis:

1. Increased liabilities of foreignness due to restriction of cross-border movements of goods and people.

2. Disruption of cross-border movements.

3. Reconfiguration of GVC activities (localization, the reintegration of key GVC activities, reshoring of strategic parts) to reduce risks and enhance strategic autonomy or robustness of GVCs links.

4. New opportunities in green production in order to comply to new environmental regulations.

5. Greater customization of products.

6. Erosion of profits due to government’s policies addressing increasing income inequalities [Ghauri, Strange, Fang Lee, 2021, p. 8].

Most of such transformations are now so unpredictable and unclear in today’s fluid VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) world that the identification of the above trends with some degree of certainty is almost impossible. Therefore, the second approach seems to be better suited to the new situation because crises are usually preceded by early warning signs before they occur.

Almost everybody is affected in one or the other way. The effects depend (more) on the position of the individual agents in the society and its institutions, rule of

22 See description of the major facets of the New Normal including economic, demographic, technological, political and social ones by Ahlstrom et al. [Managing Technological..., 2020, p. 415, table 1].

law but as well on their capabilities, competencies and proactive policies to address the new challenges. It is not a small challenge since most of the agents, companies, MNCs in particular, and other actors have in fact counted on continued GLO within the existing, basically, Friedmanomics capitalist system. Its legitimacy is being more and more questioned, because, according to Henderson [Henderson, 2020], it looks less and less like the textbook model of free and fair markets enabled and controlled by civil society and democratic government on which the injunction to focus solely on profit maximization was based²³. All their strategies were designed on such a basis and similarly also international (business) theories. Micro agents, including individuals, are thus weakly prepared to navigate between de-GLO, or up and down swings of GLO and other undergoing tectonic economic and political changes. Agents, firms, have to develop holistic competences because they are increasingly facing, not only other competitors on the market arena, but also more and more government interventionism of all kinds as well as actions of non-governmental organizations/lobbies prioritising social goals, environmental and climate issues and other social problems (like inequality...). Big multinational companies are in an advantageous position because they not only react but also influence government policies (surveillance capitalism; [Zuboff, 2018], of both home and host countries while small firms cannot. Even more; “the biggest technology companies as similar to states exercise a form of sovereignty over a rapidly expanding realm that extends beyond the reach of

regulators: digital space. /.../Technology companies are increasingly geopolitical actors competing with governments for influence” [Bremmer, 2021].

New global environment therefore demands revisiting of the existing strategies at all levels. Let us learn from P. Drucker famous quote, that the biggest danger in turbulent times is not the turbulence, but the fact that we respond to it with yesterday's logic. Not to follow it during the GR was the major mistake. New circumstances demand qualitatively new approaches, paradigm shifts, speedy action, not incrementalism. “The pandemic can only have two possible outcomes: either a new normal will be constructed “on the ruins of our old lives” or a new form of barbarism will emerge” [Žižek, 2020, p. 3]. “We need to work on ‘pandemic management’ just as we have developed disaster management” [Bergeijk, 2021, p. 7] and in doing so overcome the frequent mistake of many MBA programs “focusing on being scientific, developing models and techniques rather than development of diagnostic capabilities. The MBA produces “critters with lopsided brains, icy hearts and shrunken souls” [Pfeffer, Fong, 2002, p. 80]. “More than ever, speed is of the essence now. Bosses had to decide before the analysis was available”, claims K. Taga/.../ “Better to make a mistake than to wait and to waste time,” echoed another²⁴.

All agents, including firms and individuals, may need to be multifunctional, more agile, more flexible, and last, but not least, more proactive, enhancing their competencies for forecasting development ex ante to exogenous forces, including government policies. “This ability to respond

23 Not surprisingly, as much as 56 percent of more than 34,000 respondents, included in a survey of Edelman Trust Barometer published shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic changed the world, believed that capitalism was doing more harm than good globally. See: Edelman Trust Barometer Reveals Growing Sense of Inequality Is Undermining Trust in Institutions. – 2020. – URL: <https://www.2020.Edelman.Trust.Barometer.Reveals.Growing.Sense.of.Inequality.Is.Undermining.Trust.in.Institutions> (accessed: 01.06.2021).

24 Bartleby: Lessons from the front line // The Economist. – 2020. – April 18. – P. 49.

25 And, we can add, all other agents/institution/individuals.

becomes a generalized capability, differentiating firms²⁵ and becoming, tautologically, a synonym for successful adaptation” [Buckley, 2020, p. 1, 581]. In other words they have to develop strategic ambidexterity, becoming Ambidextrous Organization [Duncan, 1976] able to “be aligned and efficient in its management of today’s business demands as well as being adaptive to changes in the external environment [Raish, Birkinshaw, 2008, p. 375] Such a concept is, in today’s VUCA world, even more important, since doing business just in time is becoming risky (cuts in supply networks, traffic jams...).

In order to enhance such ex ante capabilities, we have to rely on all encompassing multidisciplinary approach. The political economy approach seems to be the best. From such a perspective, the organization of society is key, claim Wyplosz [Bergeijk, 2021, p. 12]. Namely, it is not enough if the adjustments take place only in one field. It should be done simultaneously “taking place at five relevant levels: individual (households and firms), local, national, international, and global all in order to enhance pandemic preparedness. Realization that the strength of the defence against the next pandemic will be determined by the weakest link is a must. It cannot be stressed enough that all five levels of defence prevention, detention, delay and mitigation need to be active” [Bergeijk, 2021, p. 7, 8]. But nothing can be achieved in the new environment if didn’t re-establish the eroding trust²⁶ which is a basic precondition for any successful, particularly, long term types of cooperation. And make no mistake, “if we hope to deal with the long-term crises we are going to face over the next century – whether from

future pandemics or technological threats or ecological breakdown – we will to need to make a profound shift as a species towards forging a more cooperative society based on long-term thinking” [Krznaric, 2021].

The pandemic caught also social sciences off guard not really dealing with social consequences and implications. With all its complexities, it demands more robust interdisciplinary cooperation which is, so far rather deficient. Social sciences mostly ignore, or are not aware, of health dependence of societies and how important are the timely, trustful and transparent information, or privacy issues²⁷. Consequently a sensemaking²⁸ and network theories are becoming increasingly important, because:

The COVID-19 pandemic has created an environment that is dynamically uncertain – routines are upended, normal interactions are disrupted, and risk must be reassessed on an ongoing basis. We have rarely seen a time when sensemaking was so critical yet so difficult to accomplish. /.../

As an unexpected event of unprecedented magnitude, duration, and reach, which may require scholars to broaden the methods they use and the theories they draw upon to study sensemaking.

Specifically, the pandemic illuminates the importance of studying sensemaking in ways that are more attentive to the complex and dynamic environments in which sensemaking takes place and that encompass longer spans of time [Christianson, Barton, 2020, p. 572, 575].

Improved communications competencies, including cross cultural ones, can also help. The pandemic response has also revealed the “importance not just for

26 Economic and social crises, deteriorating wellbeing during the crisis, rising inequalities exacerbate distrust of institutions and authorities in the public.

27 Threats to privacy are coming not only from governments, but, in a disaster capitalism [Klein, 2007] also companies.

28 It is usually defined as the process of building an explanation to resolve a perceived gap or conflict in knowledge.

anticipatory governance, but of transdisciplinary, anticipatory research before an actual emergency happens in order to foresee complex socio-economic consequences. Anticipatory capabilities and scenario planning are gaining in importance [Obriest, Pfeiffer, Henley, 2010]. Hybrid organizations²⁹ and competences, organizational agility and managerial dynamic capabilities can improve the effectiveness of the response provided we nurture our curiosity, learn by the past mistakes, by exploring, by learning by doing, and focus. It can work only if actors, possess transdisciplinary holistic competences. They are namely not dealing only with other firms but with governments³⁰ (both host and home), with trade unions, customers, media, bankers universities etc. Such competences have to be dynamic. Holistic education/training, based on multidisciplinary, creativity, cross cultural intelligence, is becoming a must. Demand for soft skills, like communications and negotiations, is likely to rise as automation becomes more widespread and creativity, persuasion, and collaboration are all virtually impossible to automate. Human resource professionals are identifying the demand for soft skills as the most important trend globally.

The development and exercise of dynamic capabilities require a long-term view by executives and boards of directors, mostly absent now, because they are under the pressure to provide short/medium term results which has already proved to be a barrier to longer term development strategies. “The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated that companies that invested in long term vitality have been better equipped to weather the storm” [Schwab, 2020] and those with some pandemic experiences. “Many

Asian firms, for instance, immediately set up a “war room” to take actions in the first few days of an outbreak” claims K. Taga³¹. “The pandemic has hastened the shift toward stake-holder model of corporate capitalism” [Schwab, 2020]. Recently, we witness the emergence of strong appeals to empower democracy in economy as such or at least in the working process of companies themselves, switching from shareholders to stakeholders’ system. The responsibilities of firms have changed dramatically. “If firms exist to maximize prosperity and social welfare, they have a moral duty to act as if there were a price for carbon, for example, even when there is no price in place. If firms exist to maximize freedom of opportunity, they have a responsibility to invest in health care and education, or to persuade the government to do so” [Henderson, 2021, p. 20].

Individuals are also affected by the pandemic and changed global context and have to adjust as well. Their first challenge is to enhance digital capabilities, to close digital gap and be able to work on line, to shop on line etc. On line work is not a temporary phenomenon but will remain as one type of work permanently. Secondly to retrain, if working in the jobs which are under the pressure of GLO/de-GLO, automatization/robotization. The effects are of course not only material. Studies indicate: “that the COVID-19 pandemic is associated with **distress, anxiety, fear of contagion, depression**, and insomnia in the general population and among health care professionals. Social isolation, anxiety, fear of contagion, uncertainty, chronic stress and economic difficulties may lead to the development or exacerbation of depressive, anxiety, substance use and other psychiatric disorders in vulnerable pop-

29 Ahlstrom defines a hybrid organization as one that integrates different strategies, logics, structural forms, and other key elements [Managing Technological..., 2020, p. 428].

30 Governments increasingly influence/create the business environment, particularly in countries like China.

31 Bartleby: Lessons from the front line // The Economist. – 2020. – April 18. – P. 49.

ulations including individuals with pre-existing psychiatric disorders and people who reside in high COVID-19 prevalence areas" [Sher, 2020].

Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemic came unexpectedly and evolved into unprecedented seismic crisis creating highly turbulent conditions. It demonstrated how the humanity, the world, are fragile. Nobody was prepared. It has demonstrated that societies, politicians, policy leaders have to rethink and reconsider the prevailing paradigms, the existing development model(s) and existing system(s). "The lockdown forced everyone into a kind of retreat, a moment for reflection"³². It seems that we are at the historic turning point provided we will be able to use the opportunity to really pause and rethink.

Our article, concentrating on short and medium term implications of COVID-19 and how to enhance the resilience of all actors in this regard, leaving long term systemic and development strategies issues aside, is based on the assumption that "no crisis will ever look the same" [Fostering Economic Resilience..., 2021, p. 8]. In the general framework of OECD 2021 policy proposals needed to strengthen economic resilience³³ we came to the following answers to our research questions:

ad. 1) Globalization is responsible for fast spreading of the virus but is not responsible for its creation. Therefore, solution to the pandemic cannot be sought in the GLO backlash, but in redesigning GLO so as to limit the possibilities for spreading virus and other negative implications and stimulating positive ones (efficiency impli-

cation of the global division of labour), including in some new areas where it has not been developed so enough far (like R&D, health and public goods systems cooperation).

ad. 2) Enhancing crisis/pandemic's resilience of the societies is the top priority. It has several dimensions: i) immediate one preventing the spreading of the virus, ii) vaccination as a medium term instrument for containing the pandemic and trying to create a herd immunity and finally iii) enhancing ex ante capabilities and readiness to contain the potential pandemics coming because the virus(es) are, unfortunately to stay with us. The mankind is still unable to conquer them within the framework of existing anthropocentric development pattern in the short and medium term. Deeper development model and systemic changes will be necessary to address effectively the pandemics in the long run.

ad. 3.) COVID-19 pandemic only appears to be a health crisis. Its implications and roots are much deeper, spreading into socio-economic, environmental, climate and even civilization crisis. In order to resolve its complexity, it is of high importance to be able to find a solution for Rodrik's trilemma. Resolving it in a very long term can be done by transforming the elements of the trilemma. Mathematically it is either in changing hyperglobalization to more human face, fair and equitable one, by de-GLO unnecessary transfers (localization) and in such a way enhancing in a democratic way autonomy and strategic sovereignty opening the space for national decisions where they are more optimal (subsidiarity principle). It is encompassed in the Democratic New Normal scenario refusing Nationalist scenario to resolving this trilemma.

32 Latour B. 'This is a global catastrophe that has come from within': Interview by Jonathan Watts // Guardian. – 2021. – June 6. – URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/bruno-latour-coronavirus-gaia-hypothesis-climate-crisis> (accessed: 17.7.2021).

33 They are: i) preventing the build-up of potential vulnerabilities, ii) preparing to absorb shocks when they occur and iii) the ability to engineer a swift rebound from those shocks.

ad. 4) Pandemic is a global phenomenon. Not only the failures of the so far pre-vaillingly national solutions, even nationalistic, beggar thy neighbour (vaccination nationalism) to contain it, as well as history of pandemics, teaches us, that the only solution to such crises are multilateral. Even supranational in cooperation with non-state actors and other stakeholders in a democratic way. Only collective multilateral actions as a Real New Normal, improving health standards globally, spreading the public goods availability, can reduce the risks and damages of future pandemics and resulting socio economic, climate, environmental crises (including water shortage), cyber-attacks, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. Global problems require global solutions with credible institutions to support them. Under an existing international principle known as “the no-harm rule,” sovereign states already have a general obligation not to damage the environment in areas beyond their jurisdiction. But this law has proved difficult to enforce” [Stewart, 2021], therefore a new regime is needed. “The crisis is a reminder of our underlining unity as humans, sharing similar anxieties” [Eiran, 2020]. Although empowering multilateral institutions to do their job is a priority, it is realistically also necessary to paralely enhance national capacities to fill the gap if they failed in sudden crisis situation.

Ad.5.) The implications of the pandemic are wide spread; almost everybody is affected. Competences were so far not designed to meet such huge novel challenges in a VUCA world making all the agents, including individuals, weakly prepared to navigate in the new environment. Revisiting of the existing strategies at all levels is a must, because yesterday logic cannot do the trick. But nothing can be changed, if actors didn't change mind-sets, theories, way of life, competencies and strategies by overcoming resistance to changes so persistent in many organizations and individ-

uals. For one, because our response to a crisis depends on the framework of ideas lying around. New pandemic and VUCA management have to be developed based on multidisciplinary, multifunctionality, holistic competences, agility, flexibility not only in addressing existing problems but also anticipating them by enhancing ex ante adjustability (anticipatory governance) to be able operating in the new frequently conflicting contexts of the post truth age. Only in such a way prevention, detention, and mitigation functions could be performed efficiently allowing the transformation of the system from share to stakeholders one. Such agility has to be not only developed but also maintained. All actors should realize that proactive crisis management can turn the crisis into something positive, that such an opportunity should not be vested by within the box thinking. “The COVID-19 pandemic has given us a profound opportunity to rethink our society and our institutions. We must seize the chance to reimagine capitalism” [Henderson, 2021, p. 23] also following Mahatma Ghandi famous idea: First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win!”. Not least because, as M. Friedman once said, “only a crisis – real or perceived – produces real change”.

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COVID-19: От краткосрочной национальной устойчивости к среднесрочной многосторонней новой норме

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АННОТАЦИЯ. Коронавирус COVID-19 потряс мир и заставил нас пересмотреть наши стратегии развития и всю системную структуру. Хотя глобализация способствовала пандемии, деглобализация не восторжествует. Глобализация будет, скорее, трансформирована, чтобы способствовать позитивным трендам и уменьшать/устранять ее негативные последствия. Пандемия, помимо негативных последствий (распространение вируса), продемонстрировала некоторые очень позитивные стороны глобализации, такие как научное сотрудничество. Повышение устойчивости стало главной стратегией человечества не только с точки зрения сдер-

живания пандемии, но и с точки зрения ее предотвращения в долгосрочной перспективе. Сочетание сдерживания и заблаговременного предотвращения пандемий выглядит наилучшей стратегией, потому что вирусы никуда не исчезнут, оставшись среди нас. Это можно сделать, разрешив неразрешимую с точки зрения Родрика трилемму между автономией, глобализацией и демократией как на национальном, так и на многостороннем уровне. На основе возможных сценариев развития событий в будущем мы демонстрируем, какие многосторонние решения необходимы для упреждающего создания стабильной и эффективной основы для корректировки и перестройки

стратегий и поведения всех агентов (отдельных лиц, фирм и государств), причем исходя из существующих рамок. Такая многосторонняя структура должна оставлять достаточно места для национальных действий, когда они лучше соответствуют национальным приоритетам, и для заполнения пробелов, если международные учреждения не смогут добиться успеха в решении новых задач. Требуются переосмысление наших взглядов и теорий, а также новые виды образования и обучения для создания новых компетенций микроагентов.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: COVID-19, кризис, VUCA-мир, новая норма, глобализация, деглобализация, стратегия, устойчивость, многосторонность, трилемма Родрика, микроагенты.

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