centeroКонтуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, правоOutlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law2542-02402587-9324Center for Crisis Society Studies10.23932/2542-0240-2021-14-5-10centero-861Research ArticleСфера науки и высшего образованияScience and Higher EducationRAND смотрит на Москву: военно-стратегические возможности России на постсоветском пространстве в оценках американских экспертовRAND Looks at Moscow: Russia`s Strategic Capabilities and the Post-Soviet Space in the Assessments of American Expertshttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7916-036XКривопаловА. А.KrivopalovA. A.

Алексей Алексеевич Кривопалов - кандидат исторических наук, старший научный сотрудник, Центр постсоветских исследований

117997, Профсоюзная ул., д. 23, Москва

Alexey A. Krivopalov - PhD in History, Senior Researcher, Center of Post-Soviet Studies

117997, Profsoyuznaya St., 23, Moscow

krivopalov@centero.ruНациональный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений им. Е.М. Примакова РАНРоссияPrimakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation202107112021145К 30-летию распада СССР193211Copyright © Кривопалов А.А., 20212021Кривопалов А.А.Krivopalov A.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/861

В статье рассматриваются аналитические доклады RAND Corporation за 2015–2020 гг., посвященные России, ее Вооруженным силам и политике Москвы на постсоветском пространстве. Автор исходит из предположения, что по сравнению с Россией экспертное сообщество США оказывает на внешнеполитический курс своей страны более значительное влияние. Связь между экспертной проработкой решения и его последующим политическим исполнением исторически является в США более тесной. Публикации RAND позволяют оценить ту роль, которую в общем ряду приоритетов американской национальной безопасности играют Россия и постсоветское пространство. Понимает ли Вашингтон внутренние мотивы российских действий на международной арене? Как США оценивают военные возможности России? Наконец, насколько далеко может простираться их готовность искать компромисс с внешнеполитическими устремлениями Москвы? Аналитические доклады RAND Corpo[1]ration способны пролить свет на то, как именно политические круги США представляют себе перспективы российско-американского соперничества.

This paper looks at a series of analytical reports published in 2015– 2020 by the RAND Corporation focused on Russia, its armed forces and the policies pursued by Moscow on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The assumption by the author is that the expert community in the United States can exert greater influence on US foreign policy than is generally accepted in Russia. Historically, in the United States, there has been a strong link between expert consideration of any given policy and its subsequent implementation. Reports published by RAND help assess the role that Russia and the former Soviet Union play on the list of US national security priorities. Does Washington understand the domestic-policy motives of Russia’s actions on the international stage? What is America’s overall assessment of Russia’s military capabilities? Finally, what is the extent of Washington’s willingness to seek compromise with Moscow and its foreign policy aspirations? The source analyzed in the paper can shed some light on how the political community in the United States views the future of the rivalry between Russia and America.

РоссияСШАпостсоветское пространствостратегиявнешняя политикаУкраинаRAND CorporationRussiaUSApost-Soviet spacestrategyforeign policyUkraineRAND CorporationReferencesБарабанов М.С. (ред.) (2010). Новая армия России. М.: Центр анализа стратегий и технологий.Adomeit H. (1986). Soviet Crisis Prevention and Management: Why and When Do the Soviet Leaders Take Risks? Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Биллингтон Д.Х. (2001). Икона и топор. Опыт истолкования истории Русской культуры. М.: Рудомино.Alexander A.J. (1990). Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Джервис Р. (2020). Почему разведка терпит неудачу: уроки революции в Иране и войны в Ираке. М.: Центр анализа стратегий и технологий.Alexiev A. (1988). Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Кривопалов А.А. (2016). Военные возможности России на фоне украинского кризиса // Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. Т. 9. № 5. С. 41–58. DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2016-9-5-41-58Balabanov M.S. (ed.) (2010). Russia`s New Army, Moscow, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (in Russian).Кузнецов А.В. (ред.) (2020). Феномен Трампа. М.: ИНИОН.Becker A.S., Horelick A.L. (1989). Managing U.S. - Soviet Relations in the 1990-s, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Adomeit H. (1986). Soviet Crisis Prevention and Management: Why and When Do the Soviet Leaders Take Risks? Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Billington J.H. (2001). The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretative History of Russian Culture, Moscow: Rudomino (in Russian).Alexander A.J. (1990). Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Boldt K.W. (2018). Filling the Gap of U.S. Deterrence Policy: Poland and the Future of U.S. Military Posture in Europe, Fort Leavenworth.Alexiev A. (1988). Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Boston S., Johnson M., Beauchamp- Mustafaga N., Crane Y.K. (2018). Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe Implication for Countering Russian Local Superiority, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Becker A.S., Horelick A.L. (1989). Managing U.S. Soviet Relations in the 1990-s, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Clark S. (1980). Soviet Strategic Airlift and Power Projection, Fort Leavenworth.Boldt K.W. (2018). Filling the Gap of U.S. Deterrence Policy: Poland and the Future of U.S. Military Posture in Europe, Fort Leavenworth.Cohen R.S., Radin A. (2019). Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe. Understanding the Threat, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Boston S., Johnson M., BeauchampMustafaga N., Crane Y.K. (2018). Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe Implication for Countering Russian Local Superiority, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Connable B., Doll A., Demus A., Massicot D., Reach C., Atler A., Mackenzie W., Povlock M., Skrabala L. (2020). Russia’s Limit of Advance. Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Clark S. (1980). Soviet Strategic Airlift and Power Projection, Fort Leavenworth.Connable B., Doll A., Demus A., Massicot D., Reach C., Atler A., Mackenzie W., Povlock M., Skrabala L. (2020). Russia’s Limit of Advance. Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations. Scenarios, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Cohen R.S., Radin A. (2019). Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe. Understanding the Threat, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Dobbins J., Cohen R.S., Chandler N., Frederick B., Geist E., DeLuca P., Morgan F.E., Shatz H.J., Williams B. (2019). Extending Russia. Competing from Advantageous Ground, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Connable B., Doll A., Demus A., Massicot D., Reach C., Atler A., Mackenzie W., Povlock M., Skrabala L. (2020). Russia’s Limit of Advance. Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Dobbins J., Shatz H.J., Wyne A. (2018). Russia Is a Rogue, not a Peer; China is a Peer, not a Rogue, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Connable B., Doll A., Demus A., Massicot D., Reach C., Atler A., Mackenzie W., Povlock M., Skrabala L. (2020). Russia’s Limit of Advance. Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations. Scenarios, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Fukuyama F. (1989). Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Dobbins J., Cohen R.S., Chandler N., Frederick B., Geist E., DeLuca P., Morgan F.E., Shatz H.J., Williams B. (2019). Extending Russia. Competing from Advantageous Ground, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gelman H. (1982). The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Dobbins J., Shatz H.J., Wyne A. (2018). Russia Is a Rogue, not a Peer; China is a Peer, not a Rogue, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gelman H. (1988). The Soviet Military Leadership and the Question of Soviet Deployment Retreats, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Fukuyama F. (1989). Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gelman H. (1990). Gorbachev`s First Five Years in the Soviet Leadership. The Clash of Personalities and the Remaking of Institutions, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gelman H. (1982). The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Goldhamer H. (1975). The Soviet Soldier. Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level, New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc.; London: LeoCoopeLtd.Gelman H. (1988). The Soviet Military Leadership and the Question of Soviet Deployment Retreats, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gustafson T. (1983). The Soviet Gas Campaign. Politics and Policy in Soviet Decisionmaking, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gelman H. (1990). Gorbachev`s First Five Years in the Soviet Leadership. The Clash of Personalities and the Remaking of Institutions, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Hicks K.H., Conley H.A. (2016). Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Europe. Phase II Report. June 2016, Washington: CSIS.Goldhamer H. (1975). The Soviet Soldier. Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level, New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc.; London: LeoCoopeLtd.Horelick A.L. (1990). U.S. – Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Gustafson T. (1983). The Soviet Gas Campaign. Politics and Policy in Soviet Decisionmaking, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Jervis R. (2020). Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, Moscow, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (in Russian).Hicks K.H., Conley H.A. (2016). Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Europe. Phase II Report. June 2016, Washington: CSIS.Krivopalov A.A. (2016). Russian Military Opportunities in the Context of Ukrainian Crisis. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, vol. 9, no 5, pp. 41–58 (in Russian). DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2016-9-5-41-58Horelick A.L. (1990). U.S. – Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Kuznetsov A.V. (ed.) (2020). The Trump Phenomenon, Moscow: INION (in Russian).Lambeth B.S. (1975). Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy, Santa Monica: RAND CorporationLambeth B.S. (1975). Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy, Santa Monica: RAND CorporationLambeth B.S. (1976). Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Lambeth B.S. (1976). Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Marshall A.W. (1972). Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for Strategic Analysis, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Marshall A.W. (1972). Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for Strategic Analysis, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Nash L. (2016). A Contemporary “Long Telegram”: Explaining Russian Behaviour, Fort Leavenworth.Nash L. (2016). A Contemporary “Long Telegram”: Explaining Russian Behaviour, Fort Leavenworth.Radin A. (2017). Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Radin A. (2017). Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Radin A., Davis L.E., Geist E., Han E., Massicot D., Povlock M., Reach C., Boston S., Charap S., Mackenzie W., Migacheva K., Johnston T., Long A. (2019). Future of the Russian Military, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Radin A., Davis L.E., Geist E., Han E., Massicot D., Povlock M., Reach C., Boston S., Charap S., Mackenzie W., Migacheva K., Johnston T., Long A. (2019). Future of the Russian Military, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Radin A., Reach C. (2017). Russian Views of the International Order, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Radin A., Reach C. (2017). Russian Views of the International Order, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Sadykiewicz M. (1987). Soviet-Warsaw Pact Western Theatre of Military Operations: Organization and Missions, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Sadykiewicz M. (1987). Soviet-Warsaw Pact Western Theatre of Military Operations: Organization and Missions, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Shlapak D.A., Johnson M. (2016). Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO`s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Shlapak D.A., Johnson M. (2016). Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO`s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.The Military Balance (2017), Washington, D.C.: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.The Military Balance (2017), Washington, D.C.: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.Van Oudenaren J. (1986). Soviet Policy toward Western Europe. Objectives, Instruments, Results, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Van Oudenaren J. (1986). Soviet Policy toward Western Europe. Objectives, Instruments, Results, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Van Oudenaren J. (1990). The Role of Shevarnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Van Oudenaren J. (1990). The Role of Shevarnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Warner E.L. (1989). The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Warner E.L. (1989). The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Wolf Jr. C.F. (1990). Defense and the Macroeconomy in the Soviet Union, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Wolf Jr. C.F. (1990). Defense and the Macroeconomy in the Soviet Union, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Wolfe T.W. (1972). Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Development, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Wolfe T.W. (1972). Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Development, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.