centeroКонтуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, правоOutlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law2542-02402587-9324Center for Crisis Society Studies10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-4-245-270centero-515Research ArticleВ рамках дискуссииUnder DiscussionCумерки больших батальонов. Исторический этюд о военных конфликтах будущегоThe Twilight of the Big Battalions. Historical Study of the Military Conflicts of the Futurehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7916-036XКривопаловА. А.KrivopalovA. A.

кандидат исторических наук, старший научный сотрудник, Центр постсоветских исследований

117997, Профсоюзная ул., д. 23, Москва, Российская Федерация

PhD in History, Senior Researcher, Center of Post-Soviet Studies

117997, Profsoyuznaya St., 23, Moscow, Russian Federation

krivopalov@centero.ruНациональный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е.М. Примакова РАНРоссияPrimakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation201912122019124Исторические корни современных трансформаций: из XX века в XXI245270Copyright © Кривопалов А.А., 20192019Кривопалов А.А.Krivopalov A.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/515политикастратегияфронткоммуникационная линияоперативное искусствотеатр боевых действийВторая мировая войнаИракская кампанияpoliticsstrategyfront linecommunication lineoperational arttheater of operationsWW IIOIFReferencesВольпе А.М. (1931) Фронтальный удар. М.: Госвоениздат.Asher D. (2009) The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War, Jefferson: McFarland & Company.Иссерсон Г.С. 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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.