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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">centero</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2542-0240</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2587-9324</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Center for Crisis Society Studies</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.23932/2542-0240-2016-9-4-6-17</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">centero-280</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>«Это геополитика, дурачок!» Анализ политики России в отношении Украины</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>It’s geopolitics, stupid: explaining Russia’s Ukraine policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Гётц</surname><given-names>Э.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Götz</surname><given-names>Elias</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>научный сотрудник Факультета политологии и управлния</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science and Government</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Университет Орхуса</institution><country>Дания</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Aarhus University</institution><country>Denmark</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>23</day><month>07</month><year>2018</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>6</fpage><lpage>17</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Гётц Э., 2018</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2018</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Гётц Э.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Götz E.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/280">https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/280</self-uri><abstract><p>Что стоит за аннексией Крыма Россией и с чем связан конфронтационный курс России по отношению к Украине? В данной статье представлена критика широко распространенного мнения о том, что определяющим фактором российской политики по отношению к Украине является личность президента Владимира Путина и его прошлое в органах государственной безопасности. В качестве альтернативной модели в статье предлагается объяснение российской политики с точки зрения геополитики, основанное на следующих трех факторах: географическое положение Украины; возросшая активность ЕС в Восточной Европе; прозападная ориентация нового правительства в Киеве. Сочетание этих трех факторов создает для России мощный стимул проводить жесткую и решительную политику в отношении Украины. Основная цель Москвы - вернуть себе частичный контроль над внешней политикой Киева и, если данная цель окажется недостижимой, создать пояс пророссийских областей на востоке Украины. Более того, согласно выводам данной статьи, текущий курс Запада в отношении России неэффективен и может привести к усугублению ситуации. Данный курс должен быть срочно и коренным образом пересмотрен.</p><p> </p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>What lies behind Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its confrontational policies towards Ukraine? This article challenges the widely held perspective that President Putin’s personality and his security-service background is the central driver of Russia’s Ukraine policy. Instead, it puts forward a geopolitical explanation that emphasizes three factors: Ukraine’s geographic location; the EU’s increased activism in Eastern Europe; and the pro- western orientation of the new government in Kiev. Together, these three factors provide Russia with a strong incentive to pursue an assertive policy towards Ukraine. Moscow’s main aim is to regain some control over Kiev’s foreign policy orientation and, if that is not possible, to establish a belt of pro-Russian provinces in Ukraine’s east. The findings of this article suggest, moreover, that the West ’s current policies towards Russia are ineffective and potentially counterproductive. A major readjustment is urgently needed.</p><p> </p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>ЕС</kwd><kwd>геополитика</kwd><kwd>гегемония</kwd><kwd>Россия</kwd><kwd>украинский кризис</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>EU</kwd><kwd>geopolitics</kwd><kwd>hegemony</kwd><kwd>Russia</kwd><kwd>Ukraine crisis</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pop V. EU expanding its ‘sphere of influence,’ Russia says. EU Observer. 21.03.2009. https://euobserver. com/foreign/27827</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pop V. EU expanding its ‘sphere of influence,’ Russia says. 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