centeroКонтуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, правоOutlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law2542-02402587-9324Center for Crisis Society Studies10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-1-88-105centero-271Research ArticleВ рамках дискуссииUnder DiscussionНезаконный транснациональный бизнес и государствоIllicit Transnational Enterprises and the StateЕфимоваА. И.EfimovaAnna I.

Ph.D., приглашенный преподаватель

Факультет социальных наук

101100, Москва, Мясницкая ул., 20

Ph.D., Lecturer, Faculty of Social Sciences

20, ul. Myasnitskaya, Moscow, 101000 

Anna.yefimova@gmail.comНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияNational Research University “Higher School of Economics”Russian Federation201804042018111Государство и транснациональный бизнес88105Copyright © Ефимова А.И., 20182018Ефимова А.И.Efimova A.I.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/271

Настоящая статья вносит вклад в дискуссию о последствиях незаконной транснациональной деятельности для государств. Новейшие направления концептуализации транснациональной организованной преступности позволяют определять последнюю скорее как экономическую деятельность с целью получения прибыли, а не как преступную деятельность. Развитие незаконной транснациональной экономической деятельности в значительной степени соответствует трендам в развитии легального бизнеса. Транснациональные криминальные предприятия возникали одновременно с ростом транснациональных корпораций, используя те же возможности, что и легальный бизнес. В статье обсуждается использование насилия транснациональными преступными группами, дается обзор текущих теоретических дебатов о взаимоотношениях криминальных бизнес-групп с государством. Далее в статье проводится эмпирический анализ влияния присутствия незаконного бизнеса на слабость государства. Автор предполагает, что в слабых государствах присутствие транснационального криминального бизнеса более вероятно. Полученные результаты подтверждают значительную корреляцию между этими двумя переменными: слабость государства позитивно коррелирует с присутствием организованной преступности. При этом незначительное присутствие незаконного бизнеса не является детерминантом слабости или силы государства.

This article aims at contributing to the current debate over the effects of illicit transnational activities on states. Recent avenues of conceptualizing transnational organized crime call for defining it as an economic activity with the scope of profit, rather than a criminal activity. Illicit transnational business activities largely follow the trends in development of legal business. The transnational criminal enterprises emerged in parallel to the growth of multinational corporations, making use of the same opportunities as legal business did. The article discusses violence by illicit enterprises and reviews current theoretical debate on the linkages between illicit enterprises and the state. The paper then proceeds with an empirical analysis of the effects of the presence of illicit enterprises on state weakness. We have hypothesized that weak states may have higher presence of criminal businesses. The findings generally confirm significant correlation between the two variables. State fragility is positively correlated with the presence of organized crime. Testing these results against empirical evidence partially confirms the findings. However, this correlation might be weakened by the observation that the presence of illicit enterprises alone does not determine state fragility or strength. 

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.