centeroКонтуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, правоOutlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law2542-02402587-9324Center for Crisis Society Studies10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-3-54-67centero-20Research ArticleСША: новые реалииUSA: new realitiesВОЕННО-ГРАЖДАНСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ В США СО ВРЕМЕН ДЖ. ВАШИНГТОНА: ИЗМЕНИЛ ЛИ Д. ТРАМП ИХ ДИНАМИКУ?AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE GEORGE WASHINGTON: HAS DONALD TRUMP CHANGED THE DYNAMIC?МАТИШЕКДжахараMATISEKJ. W.

департамент политической науки, Северо-Западный университет

Кларка ул.,633, Эванстон, 60208, США

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University

633, Clark St, Evanston, USA, 60208

FRANKY@u.northwestern.eduСеверо-Западный университетСоединённые Штаты АмерикиNorthwestern UniversityUnited States201730102017103Армия и общество в современном мире5467Copyright © МАТИШЕК Д.W., 20172017МАТИШЕК Д.MATISEK J.W.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.ogt-journal.com/jour/article/view/20

Для того чтобы понять, каково потенциальное влияние президента Дональда Трампа на  военно-гражданские отношения в Соединённых Штатах Америки, необходим исторический  анализ становления американской армии и её отношений с политическими институтами на  протяжении двух последних столетий. Принимая в расчет предшествующий опыт, весьма  вероятно, что внешняя политика администрации Трампа и её отношения с армией останутся  стабильными, сохраняя действующий статус-кво. Однако продемонстрированный Трампом  подход «невмешательства» в сферу национальной стратегии безопасности, вероятно, даст американской армии большую автономность, в сравнении с её типичным положением в  отношении предшествующих президентских администраций. Несмотря на то, что в других  странах подобный подход мог бы вызвать опасные последствия, институциональная  устойчивость американской армии и её нормативная и правовая преданность правительству США, напротив, вызовут благоприятные следствия, учитывая сложность и  комплексность современной международной системы. Наконец, я предлагаю концепт пост- гражданско-военных отношений, в которых армия останется верной политическим институтам страны вне зависимости от оценок состоятельности и легитимности этих  институтов. Понимание таких идей позволит выработать видение того, каким образом  американская национальная стратегия безопасности будет разработана и имплементирована в годы президентства Трампа.

To understand the impact President Donald J. Trump might have on  civil-military relations in the United States of America, requires a  historical dissection and understanding of how the American military  came into being and its relationship with political institutions over  two centuries. Relying on historical antecedents, the future of the  Trump administration’s foreign policy and relations with its military  will likely remain stable in status quo terms. However, Trump’s  demonstration of a “hands-off” approach to national security strategy appears to have given the US military more  autonomy than is typical of most presidential administrations. While  this would likely be a dangerous decision in most other countries, the institutional resilience of the American military and its  normative and legalistic dedication to the United States government suggests that this newfound authority will likely prove beneficial given the complexity of the international system in the  21st century. Finally, I introduce the concept of post-Civil Military  Relations where a military can still be dedicated to the political  institutions of the state regardless of perceptions about credibility  and legitimacy. Understanding such ideas will provide a framework of  how American national security strategy will be  developed and executed in the era of President Trump.

военно-гражданские отношениявнешняя политика СШАинститутыпрезидент Д. ТрампCivil-Military RelationsAmerican Foreign PolicyInstitutionsPresident TrumpReferencesBlack H.L. (1960). The Bill of Rights. NYU Law Review, (35). 865-881.Black H.L. (1960). The Bill of Rights. NYU Law Review, (35). 865-881.Brands H.W. (2016). The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Doubleday. 448.Brands H.W. (2016). The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Doubleday. 448.Brooks R. (2016). How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon. New York: Simon and Schuster. 448.Brooks R. (2016). How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon. New York: Simon and Schuster. 448.Calhoun F.S. (1993). Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy. Kent (OH): Kent State University Press. 184.Calhoun F.S. (1993). Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy. Kent (OH): Kent State University Press. 184.Clark J.F. (2007). The Decline of the African Military Coup. Journal of Democracy, 18 (3). 141–155.Clark J.F. (2007). The Decline of the African Military Coup. Journal of Democracy, 18 (3). 141–155.Cross G. (2012). George Washington: A Biography. San Francisco: Hyperink. 28.Cross G. (2012). George Washington: A Biography. San Francisco: Hyperink. 28.Dunlap Ch. J. (1992). The origins of the American military coup of 2012. Parameters, 22 (4). 2–20.Dunlap Ch. J. (1992). The origins of the American military coup of 2012. Parameters, 22 (4). 2–20.Ellis J.J. (2005). His Excellency: George Washington. New York: Vintage Books. 352.Ellis J.J. (2005). His Excellency: George Washington. New York: Vintage Books. 352.Feaver P.D. (2009). Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 400.Feaver P.D. (2009). Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 400.Feaver P.D. (1999). Civil-Military Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1). 211– 241. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211Feaver P.D. (1999). Civil-Military Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1). 211– 241. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211Feldman D.L. (1987). Comparative Models of Civil-Military Relations and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 15 (2). 229–244.Feldman D.L. (1987). Comparative Models of Civil-Military Relations and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 15 (2). 229–244.Friedburg A.D. (1992). Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison State? International Security, 16 (4). 109–137.Friedburg A.D. (1992). Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison State? International Security, 16 (4). 109–137.Høiback H. (2013). Understanding military doctrine: a multidisciplinary approach. New York: Routledge. 271.Høiback H. (2013). Understanding military doctrine: a multidisciplinary approach. New York: Routledge. 271.Huntington S. P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The theory and politics of civil-military relations. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 534.Huntington S. P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The theory and politics of civil-military relations. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 534.Huntington S.P. (2006). Political order in changing societies. West Haven: Yale University Press. 512.Huntington S.P. (2006). Political order in changing societies. West Haven: Yale University Press. 512.Janowitz M. (1961). The Professional Soldier: A social and political portrait. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 528.Janowitz M. (1961). The Professional Soldier: A social and political portrait. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 528.Johnson D.V., Metz St. (1995). American civil-military relations: New issues, enduring problems. Strategic Carlisle (PA): Studies Institute. 36.Johnson D.V., Metz St. (1995). American civil-military relations: New issues, enduring problems. Strategic Carlisle (PA): Studies Institute. 36.Kirby J. [et al]. (2015). A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789. Hoboken (NJ): John Wiley & Sons. 241.Kirby J. [et al]. (2015). A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789. Hoboken (NJ): John Wiley & Sons. 241.Kohn R.H. (1970). The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup D’Etat. The William and Mary Quarterly, 27 (2). 188–220.Kohn R.H. (1970). The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup D’Etat. The William and Mary Quarterly, 27 (2). 188–220.Kohn R.H. (ed.). (1991). The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989. New York: New York University Press. 449.Kohn R.H. (ed.). (1991). The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989. New York: New York University Press. 449.Lasswell H.D. (1941). The Garrison State. American Journal of Sociology, 46 (4). 455–468.Lasswell H.D. (1941). The Garrison State. American Journal of Sociology, 46 (4). 455–468.Lengel E.G. (ed.). (2012). A companion to George Washington. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 678.Lengel E.G. (ed.). (2012). A companion to George Washington. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 678.Maslowski P. (1986). To the Edge of Greatness: The United States, 1783–1865.Maslowski P. (1986). To the Edge of Greatness: The United States, 1783–1865.Williamson M., MacGregor K., Bernstein A. (eds.). The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 205–241.Williamson M., MacGregor K., Bernstein A. (eds.). The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 205–241.McMaster H.R. (1998). Dereliction of duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam. New York: Perennial. 480.McMaster H.R. (1998). Dereliction of duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam. New York: Perennial. 480.Williams T.H. (2011). Lincoln and his Generals. New York: Vintage. 400.Williams T.H. (2011). Lincoln and his Generals. New York: Vintage. 400.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.